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Abstract 
Eloquence non vaine: The Search for Suitable Style in Early Modern France 
by 
Stacey Elizabeth Battis 
Doctor of Philosophy in French 
University of California, Berkeley 
Professor Timothy Hampton, Chair 
 
This dissertation examines the fate of Classical theories of eloquence in early sixteenth-century 
France. Eloquence is a treasured commonplace inherited by the humanists from ancient Greece 
and Rome. It denotes the potent combination of elegant speech and irresistibly persuasive power, 
whether in oral or written form. Early modern writers were eager to translate this linguistic force 
into their vernacular to strengthen both their language and their literature. The twin projects of 
fashioning a French eloquence and a strong French language– in other words, “making 
eloquence French” and “making French eloquent” – participate in a growing sense of 
nationalism that is mediated by discourses on national language and literature. At the same time, 
however, imaginative writing shows itself to be less interested in the success stories of an 
eloquent France and more in the failures of eloquence. The process of domesticating eloquence 
sparks an ideological divide between imaginative writing and prescriptive texts such as treatises 
on rhetoric and poetry. The writers of my corpus mostly evoke the tradition of rhetorical theory 
to undermine it and, in so doing, they expose the vanity of eloquence. What are the stakes behind 
the representation of such a failure in the larger scope of the humanist project, at the heart of 
which is this kind of language? What does the failure of eloquence tell us about vernacular 
literary production in the early modern period?  
 
Taking these questions as a point of departure, this dissertation investigates how Classical and 
Renaissance concepts of eloquence are dissected in three major prose works published before the 
publication of Joachim Du Bellay’s Deffence et illustration de la langue française in 1549. 
These works cannot be defined by one, single genre: instead, they are textual hybrids, borrowing 
discursive practices from history, fable, chronicle, autobiography, romance, and novel. It is the 
contention of this dissertation that the writers of my corpus fully utilize the manifold possibilities 
of hybrid imaginative writing in order to question eloquence and, more specifically, to expose 
the impossibility of a perfect eloquence. Such writing provides both a defective and an ideal 
space for this exploration. It is defective in that imaginative writing cannot account for the 
traditional requirements of an oral eloquent speech, namely, persuading by adapting according to 
the needs of the moment and by exploiting proximity to the audience to gain sway over their 
affective response. An eloquent speech set into print cannot recreate the speech-act of the orator. 
However, imaginative writing uses its fixity precisely to create situations in which eloquence can 
be closely scrutinized. It becomes important to set the reading audience at a safe distance from 
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the performance of eloquence being read, for eloquence is often framed as a harmful contagion. 
The ideal reader of written eloquence is one who is in the know about how eloquence works, and 
is thus immune to its effects. 
 
The dissertation consists of three chapters, each dedicated to a major prose writer of the early 
sixteenth century in France: Jean Lemaire de Belges, François Rabelais, and Hélisenne de 
Crenne. An historical and conceptual introduction chapter precedes the analysis, and I end with a 
conclusion that looks forward to the later stylistic experiments of Michel de Montaigne. The 
dissertation contributes to the history of rhetoric in Renaissance France, and engages debates 
about the emergence of modern ‘literature’ from earlier rhetorical traditions. 
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Chapter One 
Language Contests: Eloquence, Humanist Culture, and French Prose 
 
I. Eloquence and Failure 
 
 In the middle section of Jean Lemaire de Belges’s Les Illustrations de Gaule et 
Singularitéz de Troye, the part generally known today as the “roman de Troie,” the gods 
designate the shepherd Paris Alexandre as the judge of the infamous beauty contest between 
Juno, Minerva, and Venus that instigates the Trojan War.
1
 As Mercury informs Paris of this 
decision, the three goddesses make their arrivals on scene, rendering the shepherd completely 
mute by their divine beauty; Paris will remain silent until well after each of the three goddesses 
try to convince their “Iuge pastoral” to choose her as the most beautiful over the other two, 
plying him with gifts and promises befitting their natures (1: 230-249). Paris will, of course, 
choose Venus. Like other versions of this Homeric myth, Lemaire takes great care to describe 
each goddess’s beauty, attire, and divine prerogative, meaning royal power, wisdom, and love, 
respectively. What is particularly striking about his retelling is how the contest becomes just as 
overtly about oratorical prowess as it is about physical beauty. As such, the contest brings to the 
foreground two of the questions central to this dissertation: how can a divine, idealized 
eloquence, as that represented by Minerva in this scene, fail to persuade its intended audience? 
What are the stakes behind the representation of such a failure in the larger scope of the humanist 
project, of which this language is the very center? 
The goddesses make long speeches that are engineered to persuade Paris and to neutralize 
what the others will say. This tricky calculus involves standard rhetorical techniques, among 
which is the criticism of each speaker’s character: Juno and Minerva each warn Paris against 
Venus’s seductive lasciviousness, for instance. It also takes the form of three different positions 
toward rhetoric itself. Briefly, these positions are anti-rhetoric as a claim to sincerity and 
believability (Juno), an ideal, humanist-inspired eloquence that is ethically and responsibly used 
(Minerva), and a dangerous, ethically irresponsible, and sophistic eloquence (Venus). Each 
goddess is therefore beautiful and persuasive in her own distinct way, and has her own code of 
ethics represented in and by her rhetorical choices. Moreover, Lemaire targets Minerva’s 
eloquence as the most vital of the three, the one that demands the most pointed attacks from the 
others and the one that pulls our focus. As part of her strategy, Juno, the first speaker, anticipates 
Minerva’s speech by rejecting outright “verbale garrulité” that “rien mettre en realle efficace” (1: 
235). Juno insists that the cataloging of different definitions of virtue and the other activities of 
the Minervan “philosophes” do not figure into the “Royale vocation” that is her purview; this is a 
rather bleak outlook on the humanists as represented by Minerva. Juno favors appealing to 
Paris’s sense of action and his desire for royal power, both of which lay beyond the realm of 
philosophy, wisdom, and argumentation that Minerva will inevitably offer him. Juno’s tactics 
also alert Paris to the perils of listening to empty promises gilded with pretty words, designed 
only to persuade and deceive. Juno thus takes the position of anti-rhetoric against the other two 
goddesses. This position claims to resist and even abhor rhetoric while still using its techniques; 
                                                 
1
 Les Illustrations was published in three installments between 1510 and 1513. The only modern edition, the one I 
shall reference here, is J. Stecher’s Œuvres de Jean Lemaire de Belges (1882-1891). Of that edition’s four volumes, 
Les Illustrations constitutes volumes one and two. Parenthetical references will refer to volume and page number. 
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it depends on an impression of sincerity and truthfulness obtained from a professed rejection of 
rhetorical tricks.
2
  
The rhetorical contest plays out even more obviously when Minerva speaks. The second 
goddess offers Paris the services of “tous les soudars de ma famille,” militant personifications of 
the virtues associated with her. Among these “soldiers” are Virtue, Boldness, Military Discipline, 
Justice, Prudence, and, most importantly for the purpose of this dissertation, “Eloquence non 
vaine,” or a mode of persuasive speaking that is never weak, futile, or empty (1: 238). This 
particular companion of Minerva evokes an ideal kind of artful speech that will successfully 
persuade and unfailingly stir its audience to action. Minerva claims that her soldiers alone help 
men win battles, hold communities together, maintain monarchies, attain wisdom, and gain 
renown through “ma literature [sic],” erudition and literature, which she reclaims from Juno as a 
means to glory and immortality for princes and not merely sources for quibbles (1: 239). 
Minerva presents to Paris an irresistible vision of his future princely glory, neatly tied to 
traditional representations of the power of eloquence as a civilizing force; this is a cultural and 
literary bundle inherited by the humanists from their ancient Greek and Roman predecessors and 
completely embraced by Minerva here. Minerva does not deny Juno’s charge that her eloquence 
can be deceptive but, instead, offers to impart that power to Paris as part of a larger scheme to 
guarantee the good of the state.  
In spite of her claim that such an efficacious eloquence is hers to command, Minerva 
famously loses this contest to Venus. The goddess of love and beauty quite capably dismantles 
the rhetoric of the other two goddesses in a thorough manipulation of any and all “available 
means to persuasion,” an approach that means anything goes if it gets the job done.3 This 
includes persuasive measures that Minerva’s ethics and sense of civic duty would never tolerate, 
a devious take on Juno’s anti-rhetoric bias, and an upending of the commonplace that beautiful 
people who speak well have virtuous and honest souls. Venus first makes an appeal to Paris’s 
eyes more than to his ears, telling him to judge based on what he sees – where there is no contest 
– rather than on what he hears; this is a beauty contest, after all. She further undoes the rhetoric 
of Juno and Minerva by exposing it for what it is, namely, artful persuasion. Venus laments, in a 
lengthy nautical metaphor, that both Juno’s and Minerva’s rhetorical tactics seek only to drown 
Paris’s “Galee ingenieuse” in the seas and winds of their “promesses farcies,” “vagues 
sophistiques,” and “syllogismes politiques” (1: 246). Venus completes this careful neutralizing 
before making her own promises, that of removing “ton vaisseau hors de toute laboriosité 
spirituelle,” resulting in “mellifluence sans male influence, douceur sans douleur, autorité sans 
austerité, honneur sans horreur, et luisance sans nuisance” (1: 248). In short, Venus offers Paris a 
                                                 
2
 The Heptaméron famously takes this approach in the Prologue, where the use of rhetoric is in direct opposition to 
truth-telling (“de paour que la beaulté de la rethorique feit tort en quelque partye à la verité de l’histoire,” 9). This 
was a minority opinion in the Renaissance. For more about anti-rhetoric as a form of rhetoric, see Paolo Valesio’s 
reading of Cordelia from King Lear in Novantiqua 45-60 and Plett 429-432. For more on the period’s perception of 
rhetoric as potentially subversive and dangerous, see Rebhorn, The Emperor of Men’s Minds. Very generally 
speaking, it is a discursive practice of Christian and philosophical writing to criticize rhetoric. Later in the 
dissertation I will speak more to rhetoric as a derogatory term, specifically in the context of the centuries-long 
debate between the straightforwardness and truth of philosophical discourse and the ornamentation and ostentation 
of rhetoric. See Seigel, chapter 1; Vickers, chapters 2 and 3; Kennedy, chapter 4. My interest here is primarily in 
secular writing, though Christianity’s historically oscillating relationship to eloquence is occasionally relevant. For a 
succinct overview, see Kennedy, chapter 7, and the volume of essays entitled The Rhetoric of Saint Augustine of 
Hippo. 
3
 “Rhetoric then may be defined as the faculty of discovering the possible means of persuasion in reference to any 
subject whatever” (Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.2.1). 
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life without work, whether spiritual or physical. She convinces him he deserves this life on no 
other basis than himself as he is and not as an idealized vision of rigorous princely toil as that 
promised by both Juno and Minerva. The promise of Helen is an after-thought, representing only 
a fragment of the delights that await Paris if he “tourne donc à gauche” and flees the path of 
virtue more often traveled (1: 247). All three goddesses manage to silence and stupefy Paris, 
which is an expected result of effective speech-making, but with this verbal ravishment Venus 
takes the apple. 
Why does Minerva’s failure matter? That’s how the story goes, after all. Lemaire’s 
retelling of Paris’s judgment reveals his valorization of a particular kind of eloquence, and a 
corresponding ethical code, over another. Minerva’s eloquence is the centerpiece of this scene, 
given with a specific invitation to attend to her language and its intended show of orality: “Or 
oyons maintenant par quel langage ladite tressage Deesse admonnesta Paris” (1: 237, emphasis 
mine). The second goddess evokes civic humanism in her appeals to personal virtue and duty to 
the state. Her eloquence cannot be disentangled from the humanist principles of learning, 
political responsibility, reputation, faith in man’s goodness, and proper conduct for princes, all of 
which had already gained traction in Italy via new modes of education and by this time were 
making their mark in France.
4
 Despite all this cultural weight, Minerva’s tactics seem all too 
easily unraveled by Venus, whose eloquence is artful, lamentably efficacious, and morally 
dangerous: 
 
Leloquence artificielle de dame Venus, ses paroles delicates, et sa douce 
persuasion causerent telle efficace et telle emotion au cœur du ieune adolescent 
Paris, que encores en pourra il maudire les rhetoriques couleurs, qui luy seront 
retorquees en douleurs. (1: 249) 
 
In the above prolepsis, where Lemaire announces Venus’s victory and Paris’s eventual shame at 
having fallen for her eloquence, Lemaire betrays a deep and abiding concern for the failure of 
Minervan eloquence when challenged by other methods of persuasion. This is a concern that 
pervades the Illustrations as a whole, but it is particularly in evidence in the “roman de Troie” 
and even more so in the person of the Trojan prince. After Paris makes his decision, Juno calls 
him a “chose si desnaturee” for choosing Venus’s “fard colouré et teint sophistique” that 
camouflages the emptiness (“vuide”) of her words (1: 258). Lemaire certainly encourages our 
understanding that Paris has become “dénaturé.” Prior to this episode in Paris’s life, Lemaire 
portrays the shepherd as capable and virtuous; later descriptions of him will show a weak and 
effeminate man, “tout transporté des merveilleuses visions” and “rauy en ecstase,” that is, 
completely taken over by the potent combination of Venus’s eloquence and sensuality (1: 276). 
Paris’s succumbing to this kind of eloquence will ruin him and will lead to the destruction of 
Troy and the near-annihilation of its people. Juno will call this a foolish choice of “la vie 
voluptueuse et inutile” over “la vie actiue et contemplatiue,” so the opposition between Venus 
and the first two goddesses is clearly mapped onto ethical discourses of the time (1: 258). It is 
therefore unsurprising that Minerva’s failure troubles Lemaire: her eloquence is so bound up in 
                                                 
4
 On civic humanism and its emphasis on the individual’s patriotism and public service, ideas that emerged in the 
1400s in the writings of Italian humanists, see Baron, Seigel, Garin, and the essay collection Renaissance Civic 
Humanism edited by Hankins. On civic humanism as a tradition particular to early modern political thought and to 
their conceptions of the ideal state, see Pocock. On the origins of civic humanism and of the concept of the ideal 
citizen in Cicero’s writings on rhetoric, see Connolly. 
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humanist ideology that her failure is the failure of the new learning to motivate and educate a 
prince who, instead, falls for an eloquence that inspires him to non-action in place of action. 
Minerva’s failure exposes the undesirable ethical possibilities of an eloquence uninhibited by 
humanist ideology. 
The judgment of Paris in the Illustrations provides us with a useful map for concepts 
concerning ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ language uses that prevail in early modern France, and indeed all 
of neo-Latin Western European culture. Minerva’s eloquence is the literary-cultural ideal, a 
conception of language that led to the creation of a humanist cultural consciousness that believed 
wisdom was to be found via eloquence (Plett 73). Hanna H. Gray perceptively argues that the 
“pursuit of eloquence” is the “identifying characteristic of Renaissance humanism” (498) and 
that the “humanists’ stand on eloquence implied an almost incredible faith in the power of the 
word” (503). Jerrold Seigel adds that the orator is humanism’s “organizing ideal” that fully 
embodies all it seeks to accomplish (100). Guillaume Budé’s Institution du prince of 1519 
corroborates that connection between “science” and language, and adds that honor and reputation 
happen in language: “… l’honneur de nature humaine consiste en l’engin et en l’esperit de 
l’homme lequel toujours croist par l’exercice d’estude, et l’honneur et reputation de l’esperit 
consiste en l’éloquence et langaige disert” (83). What Lemaire shows us here is that the faith in 
the power of language found in the Minervan variety of eloquence has a demonic double: an 
apprehension about the kinds of language and language uses that should not be able to persuade 
successfully when in competition with this humanist centerpiece. Minerva’s ideal eloquence and 
even Juno’s anti-rhetoric are acceptable uses of language and methods of persuasion because 
they appeal to virtue and lay claim to sincerity; Venus’s eloquence is objectionable because it 
seeks only to persuade, whether or not the cause is right or good.  
Although Minerva’s “eloquence non vaine” is the most valued iteration and the one that 
is most secured to humanist principles, it is also the one that is persistently seen as the most 
“vaine” in the imaginative writing of the sixteenth century. The paradox of an “eloquence non 
vaine” that nevertheless fails to do what it should is the central concern of this dissertation: how 
writers choose to represent eloquence failing more than succeeding, absent more than present, 
and eloquence that is heavily criticized and constrained in the internal dynamics of imaginative 
writing. I situate this study within the field of rhetorical and cultural studies that interrogates the 
role of rhetoric in humanist culture, and I do this via the lens of depictions of failures to persuade 
in roughly the first half of the sixteenth century in France. These are moments where the 
representation of eloquence is troubled, when its artifices are exposed as it futilely attempts to 
persuade, whether in overt contests like in the Lemaire example or in other scenes of persuasion 
where eloquence is rejected or even absent, meaning that a speech is described as eloquent but 
not made available for the reader to read. If the pursuit of eloquence truly represents the 
“identifying characteristic” and “organizing ideal” of this culture, it is startling to see the extent 
to which eloquence is seen to fail in the imaginative writing produced by and in that culture. 
Imaginative writing becomes a discursive response to the demanding nature of Classical 
eloquence and to its transfer to France and to the French language: the twin projects of ‘making 
eloquence French’ and ‘making French eloquent.’ What is more, as paradoxes often do, the 
paradox of this failed ideal “comments on its own method and technique” in a “profoundly self-
critical” way that will allow us to interrogate the relationship of rhetoric and literature (Colie 7). 
In other words, I show that writers of this period were interested and invested in deploying the 
dismantling tactics of a Juno or a Venus in order to interrogate the eloquence of a Minerva, their 
literary-cultural beacon. 
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II. The Discourse of Rhetoric 
 
While I do not provide here a history of rhetoric and eloquence from its beginnings in 
Greece and Rome up to the sixteenth century, a few things still need to be laid out, beginning 
with definitions.
5
 Most information to be found on rhetoric and eloquence in the Renaissance is 
contained within texts such as grammars, rhetorics, treatises on education or poetics, handbooks, 
and other such texts designed to instruct. I shall refer to such works jointly as “treatises.” The 
recovery and publication of certain texts from Antiquity led to a major revival in rhetoric’s role 
in education. Cicero’s orations had been studied since the Middle Ages; copies of his On the 
Orator, Orator, and Brutus were reprinted in 1465 (Kennedy 226). A full manuscript of 
Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria, known only through a mutilated copy until its rediscovery in 
1416, was published in 1470 and quickly became a valuable source for rhetorical technique 
alongside Cicero’s On Invention and Rhetoric for Herennius, which was attributed to Cicero 
during the Renaissance (Kennedy 229). Since the bulk of what Renaissance treatises have to say 
is inherited from these Classical texts and since rhetoric had been taught in schools for centuries, 
the same notions about eloquence and rhetoric pervade the nations of western Europe, with few 
distinctions. They thus all contribute to a widespread, highly developed, and virtually 
homogenous discourse of rhetoric.
6
 From these treatises, we know how eloquence should work 
and, with that understanding, we can better evaluate how eloquence fails to do what it is 
expected to do in imaginative writing. 
Pierre Fabri maintains the standard discourse on rhetoric and eloquence in Le grand et 
vray art de pleine rhetorique. This is a “Rethorique tant prosaïque que rithmique,” meaning it 
lays out in detail the organization and parts of the closely allied ‘rhetorics’ of prose and verse (3). 
The first of its kind to be written in French, Le grand et vray art was published in ten editions 
between 1521 and 1544.
7
 Fabri distinguishes “eloquence” from “rhetoric” in a precise and 
systematic manner indicative of the time. I will adhere to Fabri’s distinctions in my own uses of 
those two terms.  
Rhetoric is a “science politique, qui est appenseement bien dire et parler selon 
l’enseignement de l’art pour suader ou dissuader en sa matiere, et la disposer par parties, et 
chascune aorner par beaux termes, et la retenir par ordre en memoire, et bien la pronuncer” (14). 
Rhetoric, therefore, refers to an art that has order and artifice (“elegance,” “beau parler”). It is 
divided into essential parts, in keeping with the Latin tradition of inventio, dispositio, elocutio, 
                                                 
5
 Jenkins provides a useful and succinct summary of the history of the art of rhetoric from ancient Greece to mid-
sixteenth-century France in his book Artful Eloquence (20-44). For a fuller history, see Kennedy. Mack provides the 
most recent and detailed discussion of rhetoric in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and he has valuable remarks 
on how Classical rhetoric came to be Renaissance rhetoric. Two debates over rhetoric are relevant to this present 
study: Asianism versus Atticism and the Ciceronians versus the anti-Ciceronians. The former, a dispute about style, 
began in Hellenistic Greece over which was better, a highly artful, sophistic ‘Asianist’ style influenced by Gorgias, 
or a style modeled on Attic orators, whose plain language was perceived as truer to Ancient Greek oratory at its 
height. The Ciceronian debate was over imitation as well as style, for the sixteenth-century Ciceronians believed that 
the only ancient authority worth imitating was Cicero, to the extent that the only lexicon permissible to their 
scholarly writing was his. Erasmus openly mocks the Ciceronians in his satirical Dialogus Ciceronianus of 1528. 
See Plett; Shuger. 
6
 Concerning France specifically, Kennedy estimates that rhetoric had become of particular pedagogical interest in 
French schools since the eleventh and twelfth centuries, beginning in Chartres (216). I will address the subject of 
rhetoric and education further in chapter 2. 
7
 The first treatise on rhetoric written by a French writer was the Latin Rhetorica (1471) of Guillaume Fichet, a 
librarian at the Sorbonne (Kennedy 237). 
6 
 
memoria, and pronunciatio (or actio). Rhetoric also follows a prescribed “enseignement” and 
involves careful study. By this point, rhetoric was seen as both an oral and a written art that 
should be learned by all “amis de bien publicque” (7). We can clearly detect here the staples of 
civic humanism, wherein rhetoric is dutifully learned and employed to serve the greater 
community. 
Fabri gives a complex and demanding definition of eloquence. We can discern in his 
remarks certain notions that are of particular import. They deal with form, substance, 
plausibility, decorum, and action; in sum, they create a full performance of language at its very 
best and most persuasive. I shall often refer to the “full performance of eloquence” as shorthand 
for a rhetorical interaction that is artful, eloquent, persuasive, and inclusive of the qualities listed 
below. Eloquence issues from harmonious unions between form and substance, “raison avec 
oraison” (5): 
 
Eloquence est appropriation de suffisant langaige a sa substance, laquelle fait 
donner louenge a l’orateur de gens entenduz et de langaige vulgaire, sans laquelle 
l’orateur pert son nom, combien que beau parler sans sentence n’est que vent sans 
science, et parler par sentence sans mettre ordre en son langaige, c’est 
puerillement fait… . (21) 
 
Rhetoric provides form, and eloquence, in its use of rhetoric, subordinates form to substance in 
its effort to achieve persuasion, which can be defined under these circumstances as the successful 
result of the use of rhetoric or eloquence to inspire action or decision (H. Gray 510). Without 
rhetoric’s art, eloquence is “puerillement fait,” so there is a distinction between rhetoric as an art 
and eloquence as something apart that relies on the parts of rhetoric. The naked substance of 
speech is “clothed” with “rhetorical colors” according to the rules of decorum (“appetit”): 
 
Parquoy doncques, pour estre eloquent, il conuient les matieres nues reuestir de 
couleurs de rethoricque ioyeuses et delectables comme par transsumption 
[metaphor] de paroles ou substance, ou des aultres couleurs telz qu’ilz viendront a 
l’appetit du facteur… . (Fabri 21) 
 
Decorum means appropriately tailoring your speech to your audience, the occasion, and the 
substance of your speech. Cicero suggests that eloquence demands mobility and changeability, 
saying that the orator “can adapt his speech to fit all conceivable circumstances” (Orator 36. 
123). In that regard, decorum also refers to the proper use of high, middle, and low styles.
8
 
Eloquence deals in plausibility and not necessarily in the truth. Using decorum to 
coordinate his subject matter and style with his audience, the speaker strives to create a plausible 
reality, dealing with possibilities: 
 
… car la force de eloquence n’est point seullement a mener les auditeurs a croire 
la chose comme elle est, mais a ce qui est et qui n’est mie, a la agrauer ou 
deprimer, et a conduire les auditeurs a croire qu’il peult estre vray. (21) 
                                                 
8
 Guillaume Budé makes the connection between eloquence and style very clear: “Eloquence est une science qui 
peut honnestement, haultement et suffisamment parler de toutes choses, c’est assavoir des petites choses 
promptement et subtilement, des moyennes doulcement et gravement, des grandes haultment et magnificquement et 
en manière que les escoutants s’en émerveillent” (89). 
7 
 
 
Lastly, eloquence incites action in the real world. In these lines from Le grant et vray art 
we can glimpse parallels with Minerva’s speech, for here as well eloquence is a civilizing force 
that can inspire even the “lazy” to act honorably:  
 
Car éloquence est la royne des hommes, laquelle conioincte auec sapience et 
science, peult enflammer les paresseux a tous honorables perilz, restraindre les 
furieux courages, paciffier guerres de princes et seditions populaires et reduire 
tout en bonne paix et tranquilité… c’est celle qui descript les loix, les droictz et 
les iugemens. (6-7) 
 
Thus the definition of eloquence that Fabri conveys is one of “aesthetic splendor” potently 
combined with “psychological power” (Seigel 87).  
Most treatises attest even further to the overwhelming power of eloquence to incite 
change and action. Jacques Amyot, in his Projet d’eloquence royale, claims that there is no will 
or passion so strong that it cannot be “mastered” by eloquence: “Aussi n’y a-t-il rien tel que de 
sçavoir par bien dire manier une multitude d’hommes, chatouiller les cœurs, maîtriser les 
volontés et passions, voire les pousser et retenir à son plaisir, et, par manière de dire, en porter 
l’éperon et la bride pendus au bout de la langue” (43).9 There is nothing so hard that eloquence 
cannot “soften” it: “Par où l’on voit qu’il n’y a rien si dur qui ne soit détrempé et amolli par 
l’éloquence: laquelle si elle demandoit jusqu’à notre propre vie il ne seroit pas en nous de 
l’éconduire” (52). These rather frightening depictions of eloquence’s power over the mind and 
even over life and death can also be found in the figure of Hercules Gallicus. The ancient Greek 
Lucian of Samosata wrote of encountering images in Marseille of the Celt god Ogmios, which he 
mistook for Hercules (Budé 89-90). His mistake later resulted in a fortuitous representation of a 
particular eloquence native to France. Hercules Gallicus was depicted as dragging his joyful 
followers after him with chains of gold running from his pierced tongue to their ears, 
demonstrating that governing by eloquence is more potent than by force, since eloquence renders 
its audience passive and amenable. French rhetoricians and political thinkers alike seized upon 
this version of Hercules and made him a patriotic mascot for French eloquence and royalty, to 
the extent that certain French kings of the Renaissance – François I and Henri IV in particular – 
were associated with Hercules in their iconography and pageantry.
10
 
To these facets of the definition of eloquence, I must add one more that Fabri does not 
treat explicitly but that is nonetheless one of the key features in the discourse of rhetoric: ethos. 
Ethos unites the person of the speaker to his speech, resulting in an effective means of persuasion 
via the appearance of sincerity.
11
 The “ideal alignment” of “sapientia-res-verba” originates in 
Cicero’s definition of eloquence as “copiose loquens sapientia” (“wisdom speaking copiously”) 
(Cave, Cornucopian Text 6). This means that, ideally, the form and the substance of the speech 
complements the ethos, authority, wisdom, and style of the speaker, in keeping with the oft-cited 
Senecan formula “talis hominibus fuit oratio qualis vita,” or the idea that a person’s manner of 
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 Amyot’s Projet was probably written between 1570 and 1580; it was not published until 1805 (Rebhorn, Debates 
128).  
10
 For the history of the Gallic Hercules, see Marc-René Jung,  er ule dans la litt rature fran aise du   e si  le. 
For an analysis of the Gallic Hercules in emblem books and iconography, see Rebhorn, Emperor 66-74. For 
Hercules as the ideal exemplar for the French king, see Hampton, Writing From History 31-47. 
11
 Aristotle contends that good character is the most potent means of persuasion (Rhetoric 1356a4). 
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speaking is a roadmap to how he lives his life, and his life informs how he should speak.
12
 The 
alignment extends to writing and to the ethos of invented characters, and thus is particularly 
relevant to the study of eloquence in imaginative writing. Cicero says: “He [the poet] errs 
[peccat] if he puts the speech of a good man in the mouth of a villain, or that of a wise man in the 
mouth of a fool” (Orator 22.74). Often, the insinuation in the treatises is that speaking eloquently 
without wisdom and prudence is to speak recklessly: such speech is a bow with unfletched 
arrows, in Budé’s estimation (90). 
Though most treatise writers stress the importance of good ethos, others play fast and 
loose with the impulsion to be sincere and honest in speech-making, particularly when it deals 
with the polity. Masking ethos by pretending to be something you are not, such as honest and 
good, is “an acknowledged and vital element in civic humanism” beginning with Cicero (Zerba 
215). Cicero’s De Officiis, a favorite text among the humanists, endorses the “adjustment of the 
standard of truth to the standard of utility,” where utility refers to effectual persuasion, and thus 
sincerity becomes synonymous with credibility (Zerba 219). Any and all means of persuasion are 
encouraged, including “pantomimic morality,” a notion corroborated by such foundational texts 
as The Courtier and The Prince, wherein artful deception is motivated by public service more 
than private profit.
13
 Rhetoric, ethics, and interpersonal relationships are permanently bound 
together: from its beginnings, rhetoric was never exclusively about speech, but also about 
citizenship and thus it is a political art.
14
 Although rhetoric will, on occasion, be associated with 
mendacity and trickery in the language of the humanists, that is generally seen as a perversion of 
the primary, civic mission of rhetoric. Often, such depictions expose disenchantment with this 
particular aspect of humanist culture, a concern for the ‘right’ methods of persuasion, or 
evidence that the humanist project has gone awry if rhetoric is used to harm the state. Ultimately, 
representations in imaginative writing of a troubled use of rhetoric are more interesting and 
dynamic than ones in which a more straightforward use of rhetoric is apparent, and they provide 
productive spaces for exploring the nature of rhetoric, eloquence, ethics, and politics. 
At this point in Renaissance studies, it goes without saying that rhetoric occupied a 
central place in Renaissance culture. Scholars such as Paul O. Kristeller, Marc Fumaroli, Nancy 
S. Struever, Heinrich F. Plett, Quentin Skinner, Patricia Parker, and Peter Mack, to name only a 
few, have all stressed how deeply implicated rhetoric is in the social and political order of the 
time, and how rhetoric simply is political and pervades all manners of discourses. Their studies 
often begin at the source for Renaissance thought on rhetoric: James J. Murphy estimates that 
over a thousand treatises, handbooks, and manuals were published on rhetoric during the 
Renaissance and these treatises would have circulated widely and been well known to writers 
educated within the humanist system (Rebhorn, Emperor 1). These treatises reveal a “discourse 
of rhetoric” that Wayne A. Rebhorn has thoroughly catalogued in order to establish “how 
Renaissance people represented rhetoric to themselves” (2). The representation of rhetoric is a 
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 Seneca Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales 114.1. For the Classical conception of ethos, see May. For more discussion 
of the orator as both bad and good, see Rebhorn, The Emperor of Men’s Minds. Eden writes of the correspondence 
between style and ethos in her article “Literary Property and the Question of Style: A Prehistory,” published in the 
volume Borrowed Feathers. For the use of style in speech or in writing to foster intimacy as a source of persuasion, 
see Eden, The Renaissance Rediscovery of Intimacy. 
13
 See Barish, 167-179. 
14
 See Connolly. In her exploration of the correlation between the ideal orator and the ideal citizen, Connolly argues 
that Cicero isolates eloquence as the “key connection between civic virtue and individual virtue” and “What 
rhetorical discourse shows is that fragility, multiplicity, and artifice are the ideal citizen’s greatest strength,” 
therefore making eloquence by definition a civic art (14-15). 
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troubled and paradoxical one that exposes rhetoric and the humanist faith in the power of the 
word to scrutiny in Renaissance writing: Rebhorn finds that rhetoric is a “fantasy of power” in 
which the orator is a ruler who maintains social order, but also a threat to the social order; 
rhetoric is both male and female, both angelic and monstrous (15). 
What I intend to contribute to these studies is a reevaluation of the inseparability of 
rhetoric and literature: specifically, the project of making rhetoric contribute to a national literary 
endeavor that is on par with ancient models and is appropriate to the cultural aims of the 
sixteenth century.
15
 I pursue the limits of rhetoric’s identification with imaginative writing using 
moments where eloquence as an aggressive means of persuasion is challenged, counter to the 
more dominant reading of a success story in which humanist thought and humanist rhetoric are 
perfectly married. All writing at this time certainly retains oral and rhetorical elements, but 
imaginative writing exhibits the limitations of the discourse of eloquence it both cannibalizes and 
draws away from in order to make room for the text’s own persuasive maneuvers. Prose was the 
medium of many disciplines, not yet a “signifying practice” with features specific to imaginative 
writing alone (Fowler and Greene 3). The vanity of eloquence, then, shows a characteristic of the 
emerging discourse of imaginative writing, as it seeks to define itself against other forms of 
discourse and before it emerges as ‘literature.’16  
In this line of inquiry, I am indebted to the work of Terence Cave, particularly in the 
methodology and terminology used in The Cornucopian Text: Problems of Writing in the French 
Renaissance. At once post-Saussurian and historical, Cave’s approach takes into consideration 
modern theory, Renaissance theory, and Renaissance practice to pinpoint moments of self-
consciousness and self-reflexivity in Renaissance writing that result in the thematization of 
language problems. These are moments where language and wordplay, both deviant and devious, 
demand attention as autonomous sources for meaning and for investigations into how discourse 
operates (xviii). Like Cave, I am not delineating a boundary line of cause and effect that could be 
traced between theory and practice, where “theory” denotes what is found in treatises about 
rhetoric and “practice” means imaginative writing that employs that theory. Theory and practice 
have a productive relationship: practice can inform theory and even gain ground over theory’s 
confines so that contradicting theories about eloquence can be found in the performance of an 
eloquent speech (122).  
As Cave says, “fictions… attempt to escape the space of the written text, to disrupt it or 
open it up, while yet retaining fragments of writing consecrated by tradition as an integral part of 
their movement” (Cornucopian Text 141). While I consider similar moments of disruption, 
where eloquence’s dislocating tendency is highlighted, I differ from Cave in my hesitation to 
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 In this regard, the following from Northrop Frye’s Anatomy of Criticism is frequently cited: “Rhetoric has from 
the beginning meant two things: ornamental speech and persuasive speech. These two things seem psychologically 
opposed to each other, as the desire to ornament is essentially disinterested, and the desire to persuade essentially the 
reverse. In fact ornamental rhetoric is inseparable from literature itself, or what we have called the hypothetical 
verbal structure which exists for its own sake. Persuasive rhetoric is applied literature, or the use of literary art to 
reinforce the power of argument. Ornamental rhetoric acts on its hearer statically, leading them to admire its own 
beauty or wit; persuasive rhetoric tries to lead them kinetically toward a course of action. One articulates emotion; 
the other manipulates it… Most of the features characteristic of literary form, such as rhyme, alliteration, metre, 
antithetical balance, the use of exempla, are also rhetorical schemata” (245). 
16
 Terence Cave proposes that fiction “has yielded its meaning and performed its role as a servant of philosophy” 
and elaborates on the troubled relationship between fiction, philosophy, and morality in his “Epilogue” in 
Philosophical Fictions and the French Renaissance (128). On the circumstances in which literature and fiction 
acquired their present significance, originating in the seventeenth century, see Reiss, The Discourse of Modernism; 
Chevrolet, L’id e de fable; Duprat, Vraisemblances; and Paige, Before Fiction. 
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take for granted that Renaissance writers believed eloquence did what it claimed to be able to do. 
These moments of self-reflexivity may strive for copiousness and escape, as Cave argues, but a 
written eloquence is nonetheless a stuck eloquence that is bound to its page and unable to answer 
to the demanding and expectant terms ascribed to it. If ars est celare artem
17
 is the law of the 
land, the art of eloquence is difficult to hide when it is exposed to view and deprived of its usual 
immediacy with its audience:  what is ‘eloquence’ when it has been stripped of its orality and 
visuality and set into print, for a reader in place of an auditor? Cave explains that for Quintilian, 
the speech-act of the orator mimics writing, but can this mimicry be multi-directional, so that 
writing can also recreate the speech-act of the orator? In his discussion of Du Bellay and 
imitation, Cave argues that the reader’s affective response, similar to that of an auditor, becomes 
a criterion for a given text’s eloquence, but such a response is not guaranteed (62). In fact, the 
writers of my study take measures to ensure that a reader does not react to eloquence in the way 
that Paris does in the example from the Illustrations discussed above. I argue that writers of the 
time acknowledged and played with this difficulty to bring to light the limits of their idealized 
vision of language and to rebrand literary productivity in terms of rejection. 
Cave’s interest lies in figures of abundance, whose appearance in Renaissance 
imaginative writing discloses a certain anxiety about writing, language, and imitation. My 
interest is not so much in traditional figures for eloquence such as Mercury, Orpheus, and the 
Gallic Hercules, though they will frequently be relevant to the discussion. My interest is in how 
the limits of ideal language are exposed in imaginative writing. Since these limits are rarely 
united in one particular figure or kind of figure, my approach necessitates looking at persuasion 
in play, in a variety of ways. In that regard, I distinguish myself from the relatively current trend 
in rhetorical studies of tracing the history of a particular ‘figure,’ in both theory and practice, and 
how that figure serves as a site of innovation and for reflection on Renaissance writing.
18
  
The writers I discuss in this dissertation, then, profit from the mediation of print as they 
translate the performance of eloquence into words on a page. Scholars such as Walter J. Ong and 
Roger Chartier have explored the history of media and how the medium by which something is 
communicated influences the relationships between orality, literacy, and culture.
19
 Ong and 
Chartier have both made vast contributions to our understanding of the physical object of the 
book and how it conveys meaning through its very organization and visual presentation. 
Providing necessary material form to convey what is immaterial, the book becomes itself an 
“aesthetic resource” for narrative, poetic, and dramatic ends (Chartier, Inscription and Erasure 
x-xi). While some oral techniques can be approximated, there are limits to expressing a full 
performance of eloquence in print. Eloquence often relies on proximity and affective response, 
neither of which is guaranteed by the experience of reading. A narrator, Ong reminds us, feels 
very keenly that he is not an oral performer and his reader is not a crowd (Interfaces of the Word 
72-73). The distance between the writer and the reader could be seen as an insurmountable 
obstacle, both to the representation of persuasion and the text’s own persuasiveness. As Floyd 
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 “If speakers do possess an art of these things [acting], its first rule is not to seem to be art” (Quintilian, Institio 
oratoria I. 11. 3). 
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 I call attention particularly to the volume Renaissance Figures of Speech (2007), where each article takes on a 
different rhetorical figure, including synonym, comparison, periodos, ekphrasis, and hyperbole, for this very 
purpose of joining a rhetorical figure to reflections on rhetorical practice. While some of these recent studies I allude 
to focus on figures of speech (or rhetorical figures) in that way, others concentrate on a figure for rhetoric, meaning 
a figure that allegorizes or otherwise illustrates how rhetoric works, such as Hercules Gallicus. 
19
 I refer particularly to Ong’s Rhetoric, Romance, and Technology and Interfaces of the Word and Chartier’s The 
Order of Books, Forms and Meanings, and Inscription and Erasure. 
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Gray has shown, writers employ rhetorical techniques as a “protocole d’écriture et de lecture” 
that subordinates what Chartier calls the reader’s “freedom” to make meaning to the perspective 
of the text (Gray, Renaissance des mots 403; Chartier, Order of Books viii). Writers find ways 
around this distance to get at the readers and convince them through narrative means that 
eloquence may not be as desirable as it seems, since it seeks to persuade and transform 
forcefully.  
 In Emperor of Men’s Minds Rebhorn proposes a new kind of ‘rhetorical’ reading for 
literary texts that facilitates an analysis that does not divorce theory from practice and that does 
not privilege a discussion of rhetorical figures over one of concepts. A typical rhetorical reading 
focuses on how literature appropriates the techniques of rhetoric – its tropes, metaphors, 
enargeia, attention to decorum, etc. Like Rebhorn, I am not seeking signs of rhetorical technique 
or using my knowledge of rhetoric to judge texts and speeches for their eloquence. Rather, I seek 
signals that the writer is engaged with the discourse of rhetoric and with eloquence as a problem 
as opposed to an established ideal. Rebhorn’s methodology is indispensable in that regard. 
Rebhorn believes that literature has “an active and critical relationship” with the discourse of 
rhetoric and that we should, accordingly, focus our interpretative energies on how literature 
evaluates the concepts of rhetoric rather than its use of rhetoric’s tools (18). In Rebhorn’s terms, 
this means the exploration of power in the relationship between ruler/orator and 
subject/audience, the social mobility that rhetoric promises, the articulation of ‘proper’ rhetoric 
through the valorization of masculinity over femininity, and bodies as they literalize good 
rhetoric and bad through ‘civilized’ and ‘monstrous’ orators. Rebhorn’s method of reading seeks 
to show “how rhetorical situations are modeled in the liminary spaces of literary texts” in such a 
way that “allows authors to scrutinize the discourse of rhetoric even as they repeat it… . The 
literary text consequently becomes a representation not only of the world but of the discourse of 
rhetoric itself” (19).  
I want to take Rebhorn’s rhetorical reading one step further. I suggest that literary texts 
not only reproduce the problems and paradoxes inherent to the discourse of rhetoric, but they 
also create new ones as a result of this straddling of the world of discourse and the world of 
fiction-making. Literature is indeed a “privileged discourse,” but it does not merely fill in the 
blanks for what a treatise on rhetoric would not dare say or model in concrete terms (Emperor 
18). Rebhorn’s assumption that the discourse of rhetoric and literature form a kind of diptych is 
unquestionably a just one, but I wish to suggest that literature is as much in the pursuit of 
eloquence as is the discourse of rhetoric: both seek a better understanding of how rhetoric works, 
its limitations, and, at its very core, the problems of human communication. But where discourse 
is interested in the success of eloquence and in quelling any objections to it, the corpus of this 
dissertation is more interested in eloquence’s failure and in exaggerating those objections. Less 
interested in the justification of rhetoric, these writers dare to suggest that eloquence may be 
impossible or, if possible, not automatically desirable. That being said, this dissertation does not 
narrate an instance of humanism turning against itself because its praxis does not mimic its 
theory. Instead, I interrogate the assumed relationship that rhetoric has with literature and argue 
that, even when employing rhetorical procedures, these writers came to terms with the fact that 
their literature could not be eloquent. 
 Imaginative writing does indeed provide a “liminal” space for evaluating the discourse of 
rhetoric. It offers both a defective and an ideal space for this exploration: defective because the 
printed page cannot be held responsible for the traditional requirements of a mobile and 
adaptable eloquent speech, but ideal precisely because it is not bound by these constraints. 
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Decorum, delivery, and the capacity for extemporaneity become inflexible once set into print. 
While an eloquent speech can account for a diegetical audience, it cannot for a multitude of 
readers who can then see all its mechanisms at work without feeling its intended effect. In other 
words, print strips eloquence of its necessary mobility and its impact, thus rendering it ineloquent 
and unpersuasive. The reading experience makes eloquence ineloquent and eloquence’s 
reputation suffers as a result. But imaginative writing responds to these issues by being mobile 
itself, creating multiple levels of audiences within the narrative, coming and going to mediate the 
experience of eloquence. The writer ‘saves’ the reader from the power of eloquence, in a way 
affirming eloquence’s reputation even as it is undermined. The reader is put into the position of 
the clever observer of Castiglione’s disguised courtier who is awed by the courtier’s cunning and 
derives pleasure from the trick (Il Libro del Cortegiano II. xii). The reader of these texts 
becomes complicit in the deception of a failed eloquence rather than bothered by eloquence’s 
ineffability, a nice sleight-of-hand to make the reader feel he is more in the know than the 
character seduced by language; it is the writer’s ‘pleasure’ to divulge through indirection how 
such language works. 
This process of complicity is clearly an example of what Kathy Eden calls the “charitable 
reader.” In her Hermeneutics and the Rhetorical Tradition, she discusses what Erasmus and 
other writers name the interpres aequus – a reader who reads and interprets in a non-adversarial 
way, looking at both the word (littera) and the author’s intention (spiritus) before jumping to 
conclusions about the text’s meaning (2-3). The Renaissance writer hopes for a reader who can 
“reconcile the discrepancies between the author’s words and intentions” in order to understand 
the text as a whole rather than quibbling over a part of it (32). Reading charitably affirms the 
reputation of eloquence’s power by allowing the reader to see the effects of eloquence without, 
on the one hand, being affected by it, and, on the other, without the writer actually having to be 
eloquent himself as the text’s writer. This is how the complete and oral performance of 
eloquence, meant for a listening public, is accommodated to a reading public. But reading 
charitably will not always give us a full understanding of what is meant by ‘eloquence’ in this 
kind of writing. The same strategies that are used to undermine eloquence intensify the moment 
of the rhetorical interaction even as it is seen to fail. Our reading eye is not drawn away from the 
missing, oblique, or inopportune eloquent speech to see only its intention, and we do not fail to 
notice all the strategies in place for not representing eloquence in the traditional way. The 
‘uncharitable reader’ will see the failure of eloquence and how the literary text narrates that 
failure in a particular way, one that leads to questioning rhetoric’s place there, to the extent that 
literature can be produced even via a rejection of eloquence. 
 I return now to my discussion of the Judgment of Paris in the Illustrations. We can now 
fully see the dynamics of the rhetorical interaction: namely, how eloquence is meant to work, its 
effects on its audience, its relationship to ethics, and what Lemaire is doing by depicting 
eloquence in this light. So far I have mostly discussed two of the three main elements of the 
rhetorical interaction: the speaker and the speech.
20
 Lemaire’s three goddesses, their ethos, and 
the form and content of their speeches are aligned and are rooted in plausibility. We do not 
hesitate to believe that Juno’s rhetoric would be riddled with imperatives; that Minerva, in her 
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 I will use the term ‘speaker’ to describe a figure in imaginative writing who seeks to persuade via speech; I will 
reserve the term ‘orator’ for the idealized figure whose qualities and skills are determined by the writings of Cicero, 
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thorough lists of all she has to offer, would take a level-headed, rational approach that depends 
on her authority as the goddess of wisdom; or that Venus would call attention to her body as a 
persuasive maneuver, even if that is a dubious card to play according to Juno’s and Minerva’s 
ethical codes. Each performance of eloquence works as expected and moves Paris in some way. 
In terms of narrative momentum, this lengthy, static moment of speech-making grinds the story 
of Troy to a halt. This is a moment of oratorical prowess, not action, and as such it demands 
attention to the inner workings of persuasion. Lemaire wants us to pinpoint how and when 
Minerva’s “eloquence non vaine” fails. Imaginative writing of this kind allows for rhetoric to 
stall or halt production, to linger on the rhetorical interaction, especially when expectations of 
oratorical excellence are high, as is the case here. 
There remains the third of the main elements of the rhetorical interaction: audience. The 
audience, as I have said above, is part of the problem of representing eloquence. A reading 
public cannot be directly manipulated in the same way that a diegetical audience can be, written 
to respond in a given way to prove eloquence’s full power. Lemaire has Paris play his part by 
being overwhelmed and stunned into silence, a “statue immobile” transformed and persuaded by 
the full visual and oral performances of eloquence and beauty presented to him (1: 249). If these 
goddesses are so eloquent that they mute their diegetical audience, how can Lemaire ‘save’ his 
reading audience from the same eloquent, otherworldly ravishment to which he has exposed his 
hero? The mechanics of imaginative prose writing allow for a narrator who intervenes to 
comment upon the process, thus exposing, and in some cases even ridiculing, the poor person 
who falls for this kind of performance. This multiplying of audiences allows the writer to use the 
diegetic audience to influence how the non-diegetic reader interprets the scene of the rhetorical 
interaction. Such a reader takes pleasure not only in perceiving the rhetorical techniques of the 
three goddesses as the Illustrations lingers over them, but also in not being in Paris’s position.  
To varying extents and employing different devices, the writers of my study all place 
their readers in a position of immunity against eloquence, at least once removed from 
experiencing the ‘dangers’ of eloquence themselves. Paris becomes the screen through which we 
experience eloquence at a safe distance. For this purpose, Lemaire summons Mercury, the voice 
of the prologue to the Illustrations and the god of eloquence himself. Mercury rouses Paris from 
his extraordinary silence to tell him what must be done when confronted by such a performance: 
“Noble sang Troyen, combien que ceste auenture te soit autant douteuse, comme 
esmervueillable, neantmoins… il te faut icy desployer la tresample sagacité de ton entendement, 
et la prudence de iuger, dont tu es renommé par tout le monde…” (1: 249). Lemaire shows his 
readers how rhetorical power works and what it is about that power that concerns him, but he 
also encourages the exercise of prudential judgment, a form of self-defense that counteracts such 
attacks on the mind.
21
 This is the sort of writer-reader complicity that is a hallmark of 
representing eloquence in imaginative writing. Venus’s eloquence is not meant to work on us 
because we are smarter than that; no chains drag us by our ears after an eloquent (and 
unscrupulous) speaker like Venus. Paris’s example prepares us via juxtaposition to be more 
discerning about promises expressed in such potent language. Minerva’s failure to convince 
consequently magnifies Paris’s failure as a judge. 
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Prudence, and Skepticism 11). See also Kinney, Continental Humanist Rhetoric. I will discuss the idea of judgment 
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Eloquence is usually at its best when we cannot see what it is doing. Humanist treatises 
aim to demystify rhetoric and make it a controllable tool by laying bare its underlying 
architecture of rules and principles, so that eloquence too becomes an exploitable art. Lemaire 
here exposes eloquence to view, allowing us to judge and pick apart the performance. He also 
tellingly directs us toward the kind of eloquence that he prizes most: Minerva’s eloquence is the 
most valuable because it is good and right, even if it is not the most persuasive. His focus on 
Minerva’s failure is carried out through Venus’s triumph, resulting in a productive meditation on 
the uses and misuses of eloquence, an otherwise neutral tool, and how the rhetorical interaction 
becomes a battle of wills and ethics; we are called to fight against eloquence rather than fighting 
for it as an unquestioned literary-cultural ideal. As Paolo Valesio says in Novantiqua, any 
optimistic view of language, such as that found in humanist treatises, is “standing on its head” 
and “must be turned right up again” (22). The early directional poetics found in the Illustrations 
– not turning “gauche” with Venus when the “chemin” of Minerva or Juno is the better option – 
conveys an overall concern about language and writing problems of the early sixteenth century in 
France, ones that amplify the tricky relationship between a language ideal and a writing reality 
attempting to respond discursively to the demand of living up to that ideal. 
 
III. French Prose and Translatio imperii et studii et eloquentiae 
 
What does the failure of eloquence tell us about vernacular literary production in the 
early modern period? Investigating the Renaissance concept of eloquence involves not only what 
happens when eloquence is represented in written words, but also what happens when it is 
represented in written French. This dissertation addresses issues intimately tied to this problem: 
the French Renaissance’s twin projects of ‘making eloquence French’ and ‘making French 
eloquent’ that correspond with the fine-tuning of both French literature and the French language. 
If eloquence as a humanist ideal is rejected from imaginative writing, is Classical eloquence no 
longer the end goal of French writing? In other words, is the failure of eloquence linguistic and 
literary as well as ideological, or does it rather signal a paradigm shift in criteria for a strong 
vernacular and vernacular writing? This section addresses the historical and cultural context of 
attitudes toward language in France in the sixteenth century, specifically the fear of linguistic 
and literary weakness and failure. This process involves the maturation of the French language 
into a proper vehicle for French literature, the quest for a French eloquence on par with its Greek 
and Latin predecessors, and shifts in literary forms that echo these attempts at eloquence.  
The refinement of the vernacular became an explicitly national poetic mission with 
Joachim Du Bellay’s 1549 Deffence et illustration de la langue française.22 However, there is 
earlier evidence of a desire for a strong French language to support French literature. My project 
therefore traces out the prehistory of the modernist linguistic ideals of the Pléiade that favor a 
strong vernacular over the culturally prestigious Latin and Greek. Whatever shape this 
vernacular takes, it is expected to also support France’s national literature, specifically poetry in 
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 For discussions of Du Bellay, La Deffence et illustration de la langue française, poetics, and nationhood, see 
Ferguson, “The Exile’s Defense” and Trials of Desire, 18-53; F. Gray, La poétique de Du Bellay; Cave, The 
Cornucopian Text 59-76; Coleman, The Chaste Muse 5-26; Greene, The Light in Troy 189-196; Meerhoff, 49-172; 
Hampton, Literature and Nation 19-22, 150-158. Ferguson’s contextualization of the Deffence by evoking 
Barthélémy Aneau’s response to it in 1551 is especially useful in exposing Du Bellay’s (and the Pléiade’s) elitism. 
Aneau contends that the French vernacular is alive and well. He accuses Du Bellay of wanting to become a Hercules 
factitius, a man of letters masquerading as a man of arms without actual “noble labor” to pursue (Trials of Desire 
18-19). 
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the case of the Pléiade but, by extension, prose as well. Classical eloquence, language, literature, 
and a sense of national identity find a connection in this moment in France’s history. To borrow 
Terence Cave’s terms once more, I take note of “fissures” visible in imaginative writing within 
this landscape, prior to any single great historical turning point, that portray a culture at odds 
with growing expectations surrounding its language and its capacity to maintain its literature.
23
 
Eloquence, the exercise of public language, must be transferred and adapted as new literary 
forms, particularly those written in prose, enter the mainstream of literary production in a way 
that they had not before in the vernacular. This clash then plays out in literary forms that are 
hybrid by nature, defying the characteristics of any one genre of writing. As such, eloquence 
extends to literature the very adaptability inherent to that classical ideal, just as French was in its 
first steps toward becoming more regulated and defined by use rather than by ornament and 
abundance.  
The transfer from the highly Latinate language of the Rhétoriqueurs to the baroque 
vernacular of Montaigne is not an effortless one. Thus it is important to my study that I now 
situate my analysis within the context of discussions about national language and style: that is, 
conceptions of style and prescriptivist attitudes toward how French literary works should be 
written. ‘Style’ here refers to the distinctive appearance that the vernacular takes on in a 
particular text, whether it is riddled with regionalisms or weighed down by Latin constructions. 
Style also refers to delineations between high, middle, and low styles, the uses of which entail 
adapting substance and lexicon to the audience and the occasion; style is therefore a subcategory 
of decorum. Style is a topic that has concerned French writers since the Middle Ages.
 
It becomes 
a singular focus in the sixteenth century, predominantly in debates on imitation that are integral 
to the humanists’ relationship to the Classical past.24 The debate between the Ciceronians and the 
anti-Ciceronians, for instance, centers on the extent to which a writer should imitate Cicero. 
Most modern scholars interested in style research texts published in the second half of the 
sixteenth century, where significant changes take place, but I focus on earlier attitudes toward 
eloquence that shape the style and imaginative writing to come. Ultimately, I interrogate how the 
demands of eloquence are adapted to prose styles and how they contributes to new ideas about 
language and literature; that is, not merely as a way to explore rhetoric but also a way to talk 
about the coming into being of a French eloquence that defines itself by limiting what classical 
eloquence can do. The styles of the writers of my corpus – Jean Lemaire de Belges and 
Hélisenne de Crenne in particular – come into question in a post-Deffence world that defines its 
projects concerning language and literature as a reaction against their stylistic and formal 
choices. What is it about the pre-Deffence landscape that prompts changes to vernacular literary 
production made in the subsequent decades, where eloquence is increasingly equated with only 
style? I argue that the source is the stances toward eloquence evident in my corpus: these texts 
attempt to make eloquence French through restricting Classical eloquence, in a Latinized French 
and in persistent considerations given to the nature of language and persuasion. Their 
experiments with eloquence trigger a reevaluation of the demands of Classical eloquence, and 
they conclude that while French literature is indisputably rhetorical in nature, it cannot be 
eloquent consistent with Classical standards. 
In light of recent studies on English Renaissance rhetoric and eloquence, it has become 
more and more pressing in Renaissance studies to distinguish one ‘national rhetoric’ from 
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another despite their common rhetorical heritage. England’s story is particularly striking 
because, to begin with, English was not taken very seriously as a language. France at least had 
the advantage of having a prominent vernacular in the sixteenth century.
25
 For England, both in 
treatises and in imaginative writing, it appears that both ‘making eloquence English’ and 
‘making English eloquent’ involve figurations of violence, rape, theft, and, eventually, 
disenchantment with the power and utility of Classical rhetoric. This process also necessitated a 
virtual rejection of the idea of a Classical inheritance as literary endeavors leaned more toward 
prose, considered more English than the borrowed Continental poetic forms. There are many 
exceptional books available on English Renaissance rhetoric that have been invaluable to my 
own research. The following four have written on English eloquence specifically. They bring to 
light some of the important features of the confrontation between Classical past and Renaissance 
present that must be taken into consideration when investigating the early modern problem of 
eloquence and how Classical eloquence was eventually rejected or irreversibly altered. These 
scholars contribute to a growing field of eloquence studies that looks beyond the use of rhetoric 
to questions of nationality, national linguistic and literary characteristics, and the relationship of 
the Renaissance to the past. Sean Keilen argues that England is forced to come to terms with 
itself not as an ‘heir’ to Rome, but rather as its conquered and ravished former colony. Thus the 
process of making eloquence English occasions stories of territorial devastation and sexual 
violence. Jenny C. Mann focuses on Robin Hood as the figure par excellence for an imitative 
English eloquence that lives on the margins, stealing and transporting words from one place to 
another. English material thus struggles against Latin rule the way the outlaw famously did 
against the crown and the rich. Neil Rhodes discusses how faith in eloquence as a form of 
linguistic magic wanes in England between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a direct 
result of the rise of skepticism. Shifts in philosophical attitudes therefore diminish the sway that 
the ideal of eloquence held over English literary pursuits. Catherine Nicholson writes that the 
pursuit of eloquence resulted in England’s alienation from the Classical world; English writers 
had to return to linguistic difference and eccentricity in order to find a properly English 
eloquence. Each of these scholars notes a general nervousness in English treatises about the 
capacity of the English language to attain the stylistic heights of Latin. This nervousness cannot 
readily be dismissed by the modesty topos that would excuse the writer of any linguistic or 
stylistic deficiencies. It certainly does not explain the extent to which English imaginative 
writing played out these scenarios again and again with such a focus on language. 
What I have to say about France and vernacular literary production in France follows 
similar lines. The trajectory from Rome to France, from Classical eloquence to French 
eloquence, is not straightforward or untroubled, and its difficulty is explored in imaginative 
writing. Indeed, for Du Bellay, this trajectory is marked by “progression,” but not progress 
(Ferguson, Trials 36). However, there is quite a bit more to say about it in addition to Du 
Bellay’s mid-century command to create a new and invigorated French language that will, in 
turn, fashion a strong French literature and French nation. Any attempt at making eloquence 
French or making French eloquent is haunted by misgivings in imaginative writing. I am 
indebted to the studies mentioned above for obliging me to better articulate what a French 
eloquence, and the resultant French prose forms and styles, would be. The French narrative, 
however, is not as straightforward and such apprehension is not as altogether clear or universal in 
France in the decades under discussion here. In treatises, there is a firm belief in French’s 
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potential as a strong language in this period and, in some ways, French is treated as already 
eloquent in all but artfulness. 
To begin with, France’s relationship with Rome is also occasionally about subjugation, 
but still one of immense pride. The gallocentric view on rhetoric affirms France’s right to 
rhetoric and eloquence, couched in the very language with which English writers took issue. 
Take, for instance, this remark on French strength that Fabri uses to illustrate one of his points 
about substance and style: “’La force des Francoys est de merueilleuse admiration; parquoy c’est 
plus grant gloire a Cesar de les auoir subiuguez’” (24). Du Bellay, too, refers to Roman 
subjugation in this way, reminding the readers of the Deffence that the Gauls gave the Romans 
“plus de honte et dommaige que des autres” (355). The humanist narrative of a more refined 
French language begins with this very image of conquered “Gaule facunde.” The ancient Roman 
satirist Juvenal talks with disdain about the pervasiveness of the study of rhetoric in Satire 15: 
“Nowadays the whole world has its Greek and Roman Athens. Eloquent Gaul [Gallia facunda] 
has been teaching the lawyers of Britain” (110-112). The eminent humanist Guillaume Budé, 
secretary and librarian of François I, speaks of France’s reputation for eloquence in his 
Institution du prince. He interprets Juvenal’s remark this way:  
 
Anciennement en France on faisoit grant cas d’éloquence comme on trouve en 
histoire, et à ceste cause Juvenal le satyricque du temps de Domicien le 
douzièsme Cesar, appelle France la ‘gaule facunde,’ et y avoit à Lyon sur le 
Rosne tous les ans des pris qui se mectoient pour ceulx qui mieulx auroient 
composé. (88-89)  
 
Thus Juvenal’s remark is taken as a sign of French exceptionalism: Rome itself had granted 
France her own rhetorical legitimacy and established her role and high status in the study of 
rhetoric in Western Europe. 
French humanists writing on language frequently return to the colonizing moment to 
justify France’s unique place in the trajectory of translatio studii, that is, the displacement of the 
intellectual center of Europe from Athens to Rome to Paris, each surpassing its predecessor. The 
conqueror-conquered relationship provides a sense of security for France in the line from ancient 
Greece to early modern Europe. French writers acknowledge without fully appreciating the stark 
colonial and geographic concerns that England confronts more directly. France labors under 
different assumptions about its relationship to her predecessor Rome, seeing herself as Rome’s 
true heir and imagining the violence of colonization as an acceptable step in her maturation. 
After all, their most cherished image of eloquence, Hercules Gallicus, is one of force and 
subjugation. This image encapsulates the force of French eloquence without ever narrating how 
eloquence came to be French the way that Robin Hood does for England: this figure important to 
Rome simply came to France. The legend of France’s connection to Troy through Francus, one 
that Lemaire explores in the Illustrations, allocates to France a higher position than their rival 
Italy in the grand scheme of the Classical inheritance, but it does not eliminate France’s 
historical relationship to Rome and its implications. As we shall see in the texts discussed in this 
dissertation, French writers thematized the rhetorical interaction and were particularly interested 
in the idea of the transmission of eloquence from one rhetorically-inclined character to another, 
just as they were inspired by translatio studii. Becoming eloquent does not always take place in 
the classroom. The process is frequently expressed in terms of different forms of conquering, 
such as non-violent supernatural ravishment or life-altering exposure to a contagion. Eloquence 
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is often something that you ‘catch’ more than you learn, something you come by without 
necessarily seeking it out, like an unexpected inheritance.  
There is thus a fundamental difference between how France sees her inheritance and 
language’s potential and how England sees hers. Roman rule gave form to a hardy French 
material. There is little resultant resistance or resentment in the early decades of the sixteenth 
century to the idea that Latin’s syntax and lexicon will enrich the French language. Pierre Fabri 
presents the imposition of Latin rule as a means to curb the native exuberance and abundance of 
the French vernacular. In other words, Latin, the “science uiuverselle… applicable en tous 
langages,” lends art to French (9). Translating “en françoys toutes les rigles de rethorique” serves 
as a touchstone for proper French to measure itself (11). Speaking to style and the regularization 
of French, Fabri instructs French writers to be vigilant about how “ample et abundant” French 
can be. It is best to use proper terms, those “par noz peres imposez” (30) and language “approuvé 
par antiquité du temps qui fut dict, pour l’auctorité de celuy qui l’a dit, pour la raison ou sentence 
qu’il contient, et pour la commune acoustumance de parler de gens entendus” (22). There is no 
question that Latin will make French a stronger language. 
This is still a culture that finds its value in looking to the past – and its vocation. 
Guillaume Budé’s Institution du prince largely spends its time elaborating on the perceived 
indispensable applicability of humanist studies, particularly the ancient languages. Eloquence is 
a promise made by humanists. Budé’s focus is to persuade François I of the vital necessity of 
thinkers who can both understand Greek and Latin and counsel the prince with knowledge 
acquired from texts in those languages. Budé, who becomes one of the first “lecteurs royaux” of 
ancient languages (in the future Collège de France) under François I in 1530, even proposes that 
eloquence may only truly be possible in Greek.
26
 Therefore, it is imperative that Greek be 
learned in France so that, one day, a French eloquence can come about under the guidance of 
scholars such as him. Budé further makes the case for French eloquence by pitting Mercury, 
representative of Greek eloquence, against Lucian’s Hercules Gallicus: when the French evoke 
eloquence, they mean the strong, Herculean kind, and not that pretty, Greek kind (89-90). 
Making eloquence truly French is simply a matter of harnessing the vigor of French eloquence 
through careful study and knowledge of ancient languages. The number of treatises addressing 
French language and literature attest to the resolve in the 1540s and 1550s to create a strong 
prose style anchored in classical notions of eloquence, with force and art combined.
27
 Prior to 
those publications, Budé praises François I for this surge of interest and foresees that the king 
will be known as the patron of this national enterprise: “Et [vous] retirerez [récupérerez] en 
France l’honneur des bonnes lettres et élégantes… Et serez ou temps avenir le roy surnommé 
‘musagètes’… acompaigné des neuf muses comme estant leur protecteur” (79). As David O. 
McNeil observes, the missing ingredient to a latent French eloquence has always been the 
generosity of patrons, a frequent theme in Budé’s works (43). 
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In the Institution, Budé provides several examples from antiquity of men becoming 
invaluable to sovereigns thanks to their eloquence. These trace out how Budé himself finds an 
official position and begins a royally sanctioned academic movement thanks to his linguistic and 
historical knowledge, carving out a space for men such as him to be useful to the king. The 
example of the Athenian politician and general Themistocles is exceptionally telling. 
Themistocles, exiled from Athens after the second Persian invasion, eventually finds refuge at 
the court of the Persian king. There, after learning enough Persian to amaze the king with 
eloquence in a tongue foreign to him, Themistocles gives an eloquent speech about eloquence 
and “quelle estime il devoit faire d’éloquence” as a source for all knowledge (99). The Persian 
king is so pleased that he makes Themistocles very rich. The encounter between Athenian exile 
and Persian king plays out quite differently in Plutarch’s Lives, where Themistocles argues for 
his individual value in the king’s court. I have yet to find a source that confirms Budé’s version, 
where Themistocles makes a case for eloquence and not himself. Budé therefore transforms 
Themistocles’s story into the Institution du prince in miniature: the exchange between speaker 
and sovereign takes place in and about the importance of language(s). Most of Budé’s other 
stories involve similar trades of patronage and positions of authority for gratitude and 
knowledge; this kind of trade is presented as fair and equally beneficial to sovereign and subject. 
Thus when we read such treatises for attitudes toward eloquence and humanist learning, we must 
take into consideration that they, too, are acts of persuasion aimed at a given public. They wish 
to paint a specific picture of how the studia humanitatis serve the prince and the public good 
through the calculated creation of a French eloquence. We have, then, two opposing movements: 
one that seeks to legitimize humanism and the other marginalizes, in imaginative writing, the 
power of eloquence. 
A few decades later, Du Bellay speaks more frankly than Budé about how precisely 
French can overcome its deficiencies in artfulness and ornamentation to become a stronger 
vernacular. The Deffence aims to create a French style built upon a modern process of imitation 
without slavish adherence to past models.
28
 Du Bellay describes French as a poor and naked 
language, slow to mature but built to last (22). French has flowered but still has not yet born 
fruit: “… nostre Langue, qui commence encores à fleurir, sans fructifier” (23). He repeatedly 
refers to French as a language capable of the “elegance, & copie” of Greek and Latin, despite 
claims to the contrary that French is too plain and simple to be elegant (33). Du Bellay asserts 
that French can grow and produce but to do so it does need Greek and Latin, without which no 
great vernacular work can come about (42). Du Bellay cites only a few French models to imitate 
in place of Greek or Latin, though he looks forward to the day when there are more native 
sources for imitation than there are foreign ones (32). Of the oft-maligned Rhétoriqueurs, whom 
the Pléiade criticized for charlatanism, Du Bellay mentions only Jean Lemaire de Belges’s 
Illustrations. Interestingly for a treatise that pertains primarily to poetic production, Du Bellay 
calls more attention to Lemaire’s prose than his poetry, locating within the Illustrations a source 
for the enrichment of the language and the celebration of the French. He thus appears to sanction 
prose, though he does not speak of it directly, as a productive space for interrogating language 
and eloquence. Fashioning a strong vernacular involves measuring French against itself as well 
as against Latin rule, which is increasingly set aside as a means to enrich French. 
Du Bellay thus follows Budé, Fabri, and others, though his stance magnifies the 
gallocentrism of the project for eloquence by making it a poetic movement. Du Bellay’s closing 
command to “pillage” the ruins of Rome evokes the activities of Robin Hood in England’s 
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narrative of domesticating eloquence for the sake of the vernacular (89). Still, Du Bellay is more 
interested in figurations such as plant cultivation and digestion to describe his project. These 
figurations show two or more substances becoming one, as opposed to the clunky “masonry” 
effect that results from taking apart and piecing back together the edifices of the past: not theft 
like with Robin Hood, but absorption (43). Du Bellay’s metaphors for imitation are akin to the 
contagion and exposure metaphors I used earlier to describe how writers depict the transfer of 
eloquence in imaginative writing. Prose or verse without eloquence is “nudz, manques, & 
debiles,” and translated eloquence (say, a French edition of Cicero) is “contrainte, froide, et de 
mauvaise grace” (27-28).29 Du Bellay’s focus is on the effects such an eloquent vernacular 
should have on the reader, frequently referring to the figure of the orator as a way to explain 
what he seeks for the poet or even the translator. He redeploys one of the criteria for eloquence – 
the reader’s affective response – as the gauge for good poetry: 
 
Pour conclure ce propos, saiches Lecteur, que celuy sera veritablement le Poëte, 
que je cherche en nostre Langue, qui me fera indigner, apayser, ejouyr, douloir, 
aimer, hayr, admirer, etonner, bref, qui tiendra la bride de mes Affections, me 
tournant ça et la à son plaisir. (73)  
 
In his design for future French poetic achievement, Du Bellay appropriates the discourse of 
eloquence: the ability to produce emotion is the talent of both the orator and the poet, a skill set 
endowed by both “rhétorique” and “seconde rhétorique.”  
However, the very problem of representing eloquence in language – a resistant, desiring, 
feeling, thinking, reading audience – is still in play. An outright rejection of Classical eloquence 
in French does not take place in non-imaginative writing such as treatises until later in the 
century. Yet somehow French eloquence never does pass muster in this form. For some, French 
writers ignore Fabri’s warning against putting style before substance, resulting in a flowery but 
feeble French. Michel de Montaigne, one of several writers who express their extreme wariness 
of language instead of the usual optimism, while arguing for a vital shift in primacy from 
eloquence to action, writes: “Fy de l’éloquence qui nous laisse envie de soy, non des choses; si 
ce n’est qu’on die que celle de Cicero, estant en si extreme perfection, se donne corps elle 
mesme.”30 Latin eloquence, then, somehow manages to find physical substance that can emerge 
from the page and deliver. French eloquence leaves readers unsatisfied with anything other than 
the notion of eloquence itself, as it can only pick up the pieces of the Latin text-body, “comme fit 
Esculape des membres d’Hippolyte,” and pray that they can give it life again (Deffence 43-44). 
The poet and treatise-writer Jacques de la Taille’s “Au Lecteur” (from La maniere de faire des 
vers en François, comme en grec et en latin, 1573) is particularly telling in this regard: “Mais 
que sçavons-nous si la hardiesse, le sçavoir et eloquence de notre temps ne mettra point nostre 
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langue hors de page, jusques à la depestrer [dégager, se debarasser] de ce qui l’engarde de voller 
aussi haute que la Grecque et la Romaine?” (Han 81). 
But let us return to before the publication of the Deffence, before Classical eloquence 
starts to be reduced to style and delivery, when the path to a stronger vernacular was still a road 
leading to Rome. The English Renaissance scholars I mention above speak to how conflict and 
uneasiness about domesticating eloquence produces storytelling as well as reflections on 
language. The same goes for the writers of my French corpus. On the narrative level, characters 
act out the transmission of eloquence and put restrictions on its reputed power, such as showing 
Minerva’s failure when confronted by Venus in the Illustrations. These texts single out states 
such as madness and love that are by nature resistant to persuasion. In the case of François 
Rabelais, characters such as the Limousin schoolboy render possible the performance of 
academic linguistic change and its effects on everyday communication.  
On the stylistic level, these writers enrich the French language with Latin (and sometimes 
Italian) to varying degrees and in different discursive ways, sometimes even luxuriating in the 
ease with which they can pass from one style to another. The three authors of my corpus are 
concerned with style, and so are the people who criticize them. The Pléiade gave the 
Rhétoriqueurs a reputation for cultivating verbose styles. Lemaire, a late member of the 
Rhétoriquers and an early humanist, is simultaneously grouped with the Rhétoriqueurs and 
praised by Du Bellay. Hélisenne de Crenne borrows heavily from Lemaire’s highly Latinate 
style, to such an extent that Étienne Pasquier erroneously claims that Rabelais’s “écolier 
limousin” was based on her and that Rabelais’s old poet Raminagrobis is Lemaire.31 (91). Thus a 
member of the Pléiade groups these three writers together because of language. To that end, I 
mention in passing the work of Alexandre Lorian, who performs a careful linguistic study of 
changes in the vernacular in Tendances stylistiques dans la prose narrative française au XVI
e
 
siècle. Lorian signals two major tendencies in the decades under study in this dissertation: 
“emphase,” or the desire to amplify and exaggerate that often leads to verbosity, and 
“imbrication,” or wanting to tie everything together, often in long sentences (9). Eventually, such 
difficult constructions become simpler and lead to Jacques Amyot’s injunction to use a French 
that is based on everyday usage. I shall discuss this further in the coda on Michel de Montaigne 
and his concepts of style addressed in the Essais, of the latter half of the sixteenth century. 
 On the formal and thematic levels, these writers engage with the procedures of eloquence 
and persuasion themselves. In all three of these cases, the texts become acts of persuasion. In 
doing so, they take on different forms and discourses as necessary to maintain their claims about 
eloquence, rhetoric, and language in general. Like an eloquent speech being adapted according to 
the requirements of decorum to maintain its affective hold over its audience, these texts borrow 
discourses from other genres to make their points. The Renaissance encouraged “textual 
promiscuity,” after all, so this hybridity is just another arm in the arsenal of persuasion, wherein 
longer prose narratives build upon the study of rhetoric and eloquence (Cave, Pré-histoires 12). 
Lemaire, Rabelais, and Crenne operate in a liminal generic space between history, fable, 
chronicle, autobiography, novel, romance, and other kinds of discourses. Ultimately, I show that 
a feature of the beginnings of a discourse about imaginative writing is to interrogate the very 
place of eloquence within it. 
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Chapter Two 
Mercury’s Band: Jean Lemaire de Belges’s Illustrations  
and Dangerous Persuasion in Epic/History  
          
Ces choses ne sont pas feintes par maniere 
poëtique: mais sont autorisees historialement 
par vn tres-noble escripteur  
(Illustrations 1: 325). 
 
 In many respects, Jean Lemaire de Belges and his Illustrations de Gaule et Singularitéz 
de Troie signal a beginning point in sixteenth-century discourses on French language and 
literature.
32
 One of the later Rhétoriqueurs, Lemaire is considered one of France’s first 
humanists. He encountered Italian humanism in his voyages to Italy on behalf of his patrons in 
the first decade of the sixteenth century, returning with texts he claimed to have ‘discovered’ in 
Rome, texts he valued as vast historical storehouses that he applied to the Illustrations (2: 268; 
Doutrepont xi). Paul Zumthor has demonstrated that the Rhétoriqueurs and humanism share 
similar features, particularly a sense of historical consciousness and the valorization of 
eloquence, so it is difficult to determine where one movement ends and the other begins (49, 
102-103). Moreover, as Cynthia J. Brown has shown, the Rhétoriqueurs bridge changes in 
technology, shifting from manuscript to print as printing took over literary production (Poets, 
Patrons, and Printers 5). Printing changed the relationships between writers and their texts and 
between writers and their book producers and patrons, and Lemaire was one of the first to 
demonstrate an intense interest in printed book production and the potential uses of paratextual 
space to construct his authorial identity (47).  
A few decades after Lemaire, two Pléiade poets designate him as the first in the line of 
‘modern’ French writers to enrich the language. In the preface to his 1541 translation of Horace’s 
Ars Poetica, Jacques Peletier du Mans says that “… nostre langue Françoise… commença à 
s’anoblir par le moien des Illustrations de Gaule et Singularitéz de Troie, composées par Jan le 
Maire de Belges… digne d’estre leu plus que nul qui ecrit ci davant” (Critical Prefaces 114). 
Joachim Du Bellay concurs in his 1549 treatise on a national French poetic endeavor, the 
Deffence et illustration: “Bien diray-je, que Jan le Maire de Belges, me semble avoir premier 
illustré & les Gaules, & la Langue Francoyse: luy donnant beaucoup de motz, & manieres de 
parler poëtiques, qui ont bien servy mesmes aux plus excellens de notre Tens” (49). Lemaire 
certainly influenced the writing of the other two primary writers of my corpus, François Rabelais 
and Hélisenne de Crenne, both by the content of the Illustrations (giant genealogies and love 
stories particularly) and its distinct “prose inspirée et poétique” (Lecointe 14). 
It is in this light that I frame my discussion of Lemaire and his Illustrations, as a 
beginning point for French humanism, for print culture, for the rising standards for the 
vernacular, and, most importantly, for an emerging discourse of imaginative writing that 
dramatizes anxieties about Classical eloquence as that kind of writing begins to define itself 
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 I reference J. Stecher’s four-volume Œuvres de Jean Lemaire de Belges by volume and page number. The “roman 
de Troie” portion begins in book one, chapter 19 and ends with the conclusion of book two (Stecher’s volume one 
and part of volume two). It is likely that Lemaire had been working on this project since 1500. Book one was 
published in 1510, book two in 1512, and book three in 1513 (Doutrepont xi). He wanted his patron Anne de 
Bretagne (the queen of France) to commission a fourth volume, about the Greeks and the Turks, but Anne was no 
longer enticed by crusade writing so the immense project of the Illustrations concluded with book three (Minois 
454). 
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against other genres. I argue that Lemaire uses the “roman de Troie” section of the political and 
historical Illustrations to explore these anxieties in the context of the fate of the greater European 
community. Indeed, all three of my primary writers are concerned about community, in 
increasingly smaller scale, and the commonplaces about eloquence’s traditional civilizing role 
within the community. While both Rabelais and Crenne recount adventures around European 
space as part of their efforts to put pressure on the idea of eloquence within the parameters of a 
given community, Lemaire’s project is much vaster, in time as well as space. The redemptive 
project of the Illustrations – a complete history of Europe written in the name of a possible 
European unity in Lemaire’s day – amplifies the repercussions of eloquence’s failures and 
successes. He uses the past prophetically to address the present in terms of fate, national pride 
and even superiority, and ethics. The thematization of eloquence is a key component of the 
organization of his vast project of erudition. 
I showed in my introductory chapter that Lemaire focuses on negative depictions of 
successful eloquence, thus conveying certain concerns about ethically appropriate uses of such 
speech. Paris, “par jugement abusif,” chooses Venus over Juno and Minerva at his famous 
Judgment (2: 2). Paris’s choice between three competing models of eloquence and persuasion 
instigates his personal downward spiral into corruption that ultimately ends in the destruction of 
Troy. Within the epic framework of the “roman de Troie,” even idealized eloquence cannot 
override fate. For Troy to be destroyed, Minerva’s “eloquence non vaine” must first fail. Lemaire 
therefore capitalizes on the foregone conclusion of Troy’s destruction to showcase just how 
dangerous and seductive eloquence can be. Rabelais and Crenne depict characters that make 
eloquent speeches at crucial moments that do not really change anything, thereby revealing 
eloquence to be a limited “fantasy of power” in which the forcefulness of words cannot always 
inspire people to action and virtue (Rebhorn, Emperor 15). This is the very hallmark of the 
literary discourse whose prehistory I trace in this dissertation, and its beginnings, I contend, are 
found in a discourse of eloquence in which the wrong kinds of eloquence succeed all too well. In 
the “roman de Troie” section of the Illustrations, speeches are made and everything changes. 
Eloquence is the mechanism by which fate operates and secures Troy’s destruction.  
In this chapter, I will discuss what happens to eloquence when it is part of such a project 
of history and politics, located somewhere between, as my epigraph suggests, the “feintise” of 
poetry and the authority of history-writing and the histories that Lemaire consults: “Ces choses 
ne sont pas feintes par maniere poëtique: mais sont autorisees historialement par vn tres-noble 
escripteur” (1: 325). The stated purpose of the Illustrations is to recount European history and 
royal genealogy from the founding of the European kingdoms by Noah and his sons after the 
Flood to the death of Charlemagne in 814 and the coronation of Louis the Pious, king of the 
Franks and Holy Roman Emperor. Between Noah and Louis, Lemaire lingers at length – indeed, 
most of the Illustrations – over the fall of Troy, establishing the Trojan origins of the great 
houses of Europe, particularly of France and Burgundy, the provenances of his two principal 
patrons. Alongside this genealogical flattery, history and mythology are put to political use. 
Lemaire argues for the reunification of France (“France Occidentale”) and Germany (“France 
Orientale”) based on their shared lineage (“extraction toute pure Herculienne et Troyenne”) and 
he pushes for a crusade against the Turks to reclaim Trojan lands (2: 469). Against the backdrop 
of the Italian Wars (both real and cultural), the Franco-Burgundian conflict, and tensions 
between France and the Holy Roman Empire, Lemaire elaborates on a vision of the greater 
European community united by blood and a common heritage. He does this under the very aegis 
of Mercury, god of eloquence, who ‘authors’ the prologues to each of the Illustrations’ three 
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parts. Therefore eloquence (figured by Mercury) presides over the text in addition to being as 
one of Lemaire’s thematic interests, as it is used as the main catalyst for the events that unfold in 
the “roman de Troie.” 
I organize this chapter into two sections. In the first, I contextualize the Rhétoriqueurs 
and historiography in the early modern period to show that what we would consider genre 
mixing (history, epic, roman de chevalerie, mythological narrative) was common practice for 
history-writing and was used to suit political agendas. This is the necessary background 
information for understanding the Illustrations as a text very much bound to its time and the 
social status of its writer. As a result, we can detect more readily the multiple generic textures of 
Lemaire’s project because, as I argue in the second section, Lemaire capitalizes on the enclosed 
world of epic and its teleology to develop his concerns about eloquence in a world where such 
speech is given free rein. The Trojan War is prime material for Lemaire to explore many 
extreme, ravishing powers of persuasion, of which Venus’s triumph over Paris is just one 
example. Lemaire’s text therefore inaugurates a reassessment of eloquence as a feature of 
literature itself. 
 
I. “Forger une histoire totale”: Rhétoriqueurs, History-Writing, and the Illustrations 
 
The Illustrations is, first and foremost, a historical and political project. To read it, we 
must first understand the circumstances in which it was written, namely the politicized nature of 
the Rhétoriqueurs’ literary production and of early modern historiography itself, to better 
understand how Lemaire puts the Classical notion of eloquence to use in such a necessarily 
hybrid text. 
Lemaire belonged to a group of “orateurs et rhétoriciens” that lived and wrote from about 
1460 to 1520 in France and Burgundy. Although the writers of this group do not constitute the 
same kind of unified movement that their poetic successors, the Pléiade, represent, they have 
been known collectively as the Grands Rhétoriqueurs since the nineteenth century for their 
adherence to the tradition of “grande rhétorique” (Rigolot, Poésie et Renaissance 83). The 
Rhétoriqueurs were poets, secretaries, historiographers, chroniclers, propagandists, translators, 
and clerks, attached to ducal and royal courts that increasingly took men of letters into their 
service. They are often divided into two generations. The first generation’s prominent members 
are Georges Chastellain, his pupil Jean Molinet, Jean Robertet, Octavien de Saint-Gelais, and 
Jean Meschinot, all associated with the ducal courts of Burgundy, Brittany, and Bourbon. Those 
of the second generation – Jean Marot (father of Clément), Guillaume Cretin, Pierre Gringoire, 
and Molinet’s nephew Lemaire – were attached to the French royal court (Brown, The Shaping 
of History 1). The Rhétoriqueurs are primarily known for their wordplay in poetry: for instance, 
puns, linguistic and typographic experimentation, etymological play, poems composed of only 
one- or two-syllable words, and riddles. This verbal ingenuity was understood as a sign of a lack 
of imagination and real talent following the rise of the Pléiade. This judgment of the 
Rhétoriqueurs as charlatans was encouraged by literary critic Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve in 
the nineteenth century, until modern scholars such as François Rigolot, Paul Zumthor, and 
François Cornilliat began to reappraise the Rhetoriqueurs’ literary output.33 
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 Rigolot, Poésie et Renaissance 84. See Rigolot, Poétique et Onomastique and Le Texte de la Renaissance; 
Zumthor, Le Masque et la lumière; and Cornilliat, Or ne mens. The early twentieth-century historian and literary 
critic Gustave Lansan’s assessment of the Rhétoriqueurs is indicative of the kinds of studies that followed Sainte-
Beuve: “Jamais décadence littéraire n’a produit de plus misérables, de plus baroques pauvretés, [ni]… en telle 
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The main task of the Rhétoriqueurs was in reality political, not playful: gaining public 
support for their patrons by controlling the country’s “history-in-the-making” through writing in 
praise of the prince and his actions in verse and prose (Brown, Shaping of History 3). Gabrielle 
M. Spiegel has demonstrated that vernacular prose historiography had been “a powerful vehicle 
for the expression of ideological assertion” in France beginning with its rise in the thirteenth 
century (2). Rhétoriqueur history-writing is similarly meant to serve more than just the purpose 
of keeping historical records (annals, chronicles) or exploring deeper interests in the past by, for 
instance, tracing the history of a nation in a lengthy narrative (history).
34
  
For the purposes of propaganda and a burgeoning sense of nationalism, mythological 
fabula, like the Trojan War, are folded into historia and considered historical (Bietenholz 157). 
The processes of Euhemerism, a rationalizing approach to mythology, incorporate the ‘facts’ that 
have been transferred from the past to the present in fabulous garb. As Zumthor says, “Celle-ci 
[fabula], dans le récit historiographique, re-produit une ‘vérité externe, façonnée, artificialisée, 
reconstruite en vertu d’une vraisemblance morale” (78). This absorption of moralized 
mythological narrative occurs even though history was already in a centuries-long process of 
defining itself against the genres of epic and romance (Spiegel 3). As of Lemaire’s time, there 
were no clear and firm delineations between the prerogatives of history and those of imaginative 
writing: each partakes of the other. For instance, Erasmus of Rotterdam may have been the only 
writer of the first half of the sixteenth century to distinguish historical persons from epic heroes, 
who “have no basis in fact,” as he explains in De duplici copia verborum ac rerum, but this is a 
style guide and not a manual for historiography (Bietenholz 154). As a sign of change regarding 
the place of Troy in history-writing, we can consider Pierre Ronsard’s 1587 Franciade: inspired 
by Lemaire to attempt a similar project of tracing France’s legendary Trojan origins, Ronsard 
nevertheless frames it as a poetic, as opposed to a verifiably historical, glorification of France. 
Early modern practices of writing history do not see the beginnings of codification or 
methodology until the second half of the sixteenth century. Until then, and to a lesser extent 
after, history is seen as a form of rhetoric and, as such, it partakes of most other genres to 
produce a history that is truthful, useful, and moving; history deploys rhetorical skills to educate 
a given readership (Momigliano 14). The focus of writing about the past, then, is the present and 
the reader, and not necessarily historical veracity and objectivity (Rothstein, “When Fiction is 
Fact” 366). As John Burrow has suggested, humanist historiography takes more from 
imaginative writing – its narrative structures, its turn to rhetorical art, its thematic coherence, and 
its emulation of classical models – than it does from the impartial methods associated later with 
the writing of history, beginning with Jean Bodin. History’s association with literary arts and 
models therefore distinguish it somewhat from the more local record-keeping prerogatives of 
annals and chronicles.
35
 History, in sum, is considered a rhetorical and literary art until it 
excludes, more aggressively, the literary and rhetorical prerogatives of persuasion in favor of 
                                                                                                                                                             
abondance toutes sortes de fruits monstrueux et grotesques, le plus étonnant fouillis de poésie niaise, aristocratique, 
pédantesque, amphigourique, allégorique, mythologique, métaphysique, un laborieux et prétentieux fatras où les 
subtilités creuses et les ineptes jeux de mots tenaient lieu d’inspiration et d’idées” (cited in Minois 453-454).  
34
 However, as we know from Rabelais, “chronique” can also signal episodic tales of adventures. 
35
 Burrow 219. For more on Bodin’s classification and codification of history and histories, including his rejection of 
the use of rhetoric to make the reading of history pleasurable, see Kelley, Faces of History (197-200). For the 
differences between annals, chronicles, and histories, see Burrow, chapter 18. For the rise of the vernacular prose 
chronicle in France, see Spiegel. For the development of the artes historicae into its canonical form the second half 
of the sixteenth century, see Dubois, La  on eption de l’histoire en Fran e au seizi me si  le,  5 0-1610; Kelley, 
Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship; Grafton, What Was History?, chapter 1. 
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veracity.
36
 This is therefore the culture in which Lemaire writes his history, where ‘history’ 
signifies a political, historical, moral, propagandistic, and rhetorical glimpse into the past. 
Lemaire stands firmly in this tradition of reading history allegorically and reading histories 
collectively as a means to educate.  
The Illustrations was further shaped by influences beyond its writer, that is, the specific 
agendas of Lemaire’s two powerful patrons.37 Lemaire participated first in the literary activities 
of ducal courts, as the “indiciaire,” or court chronicler, of Marguerite d’Autriche38 in Burgundy 
and the Netherlands; the Illustrations is framed as something for her to read in peacetime (1: 11). 
Then, just as conflict was rising once more between Burgundy (and the Empire) and France, 
Lemaire became the historiographer of Louis XII and Anne de Bretagne
39
 at the French royal 
court.
40
 The Illustrations was originally titled Les Singularitez de Troie, intended to offer an 
account of only the Trojan War as a means to interpret the exemplarity of its participants. At the 
request of Marguerite d’Autriche, the text was expanded to support and encourage the peaceful 
rapport between Burgundy and France (Jodogne 405). For both Walter Stephens and Marian 
Rothstein, this adjustment accounts for the shift from the matter-of-fact tone of old chronicles in 
the beginning of the Illustrations, influenced by the findings of Annius of Viterbo, to the “ornate, 
elegant, and poetic” prose of the “roman de Troie.”41 Lemaire wanted to write a history of Troy 
and then had to incorporate that intent into a larger, slightly different project. 
Lemaire’s history-writing in the Illustrations involves two principal procedures. The first 
is to weave together history and mythology (as we would call them) to elaborate on a political 
and moral point about a desirable European unity. He does this through the lens of a legendary 
nation’s destruction, prioritizing the Trojan cycle, or the rise and fall of Troy, the adventures and 
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 See Gossman 3-6, 227-256; Grafton, What Was History? 31. 
37
 The Illustrations is dedicated to his patrons under the auspices of the three goddesses of Paris’s Judgment: book 
one, Marguerite d’Autriche and Minerva; book two, Anne’s daughter Claude de France and Venus; and book three, 
Anne de Bretagne and Juno. For more on Anne as a patron, see Brown, Poets, Patrons, and Printers; “Like Mother, 
Like Daughter: The Blurring of Royal Imagery in Books for Anne de Bretagne and Claude de France;” and The 
Queen’s Library. 
38
 Lemaire’s employment under his first major patron placed him on the side of Burgundy and the Holy Roman 
Empire versus France. Marguerite d’Autriche (1480-1530) was the daughter of Holy Emperor Maximilian (a 
Hapsburg) and Marie de Bourgogne; she was the aunt of the future Emperor Charles V, who was her ward when 
Lemaire was in her entourage. When she was a child, her father and King Louis XI of France arranged a marriage 
between Marguerite and Louis’s son (the future Charles VIII) as part of the Treaty of Arras (1482) that was to 
resolve the Burgundian crisis of succession, giving Burgundy to France as part of Marguerite’s dowry. This 
marriage did not take place, and there was therefore some further resentment between Marguerite and the French 
court. Lemaire became her “indiciaire” (secretary, court poet, propagandist) at some point in or after 1501, when she 
was married to Phillibert II, Duke of Savoy, and while she was regent of the Hapsburg Netherlands (Doutrepont xi). 
39
 Anne de Bretagne (1477-1514) was, at one point, Marguerite d’Autriche’s stepmother. She was twice crowned 
queen of France. Charles VIII married her when he became king, even though he had been engaged to Marguerite 
since she was a child. After his death in 1498, Anne married his cousin and successor, Louis XII. Lemaire became 
historiographer for the French court in 1512; in France, he published the final two volumes of the Illustrations in 
1512 and 1513 (Doutrepont xi). The change in patronage influenced Lemaire’s project: it was begun when the idea 
of “Burgundian unity” appealed to his patron, but completed when France and Burgundy (and the Empire) saw each 
other once more as antagonists. See Rothstein, “Politics and Unity.” 
40
 Doutrepont xi. Marian Rothstein finds that “indiciaire” was the commonly used term for historians before the 
reign of Louis XII; during and after his reign, historians began to use “historiographe, historiens, orateurs, poète” 
(“When Fiction is Fact” 361). 
41
 Rothstein, “When Fiction is Fact” 362; Stephens, Giants in Those Days 144ff. Stephens defines the Illustrations 
generically in this way: book one is apart Annian history, part pastoral prose romance; book two is an epic 
paraphrase; and book three is a historical treatise (144). 
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wanderings of Trojan and Greek heroes during the war and back at home. Troy is a useful 
narrative in that it contains manifold and rich possibilities of allegorical interpretation, as 
Lemaire acknowledges in his first prologue (1: 4). It provides a vast universe of exempla and 
opportunities for thematizing rhetorical interactions: in other words, the “fructueuse substance 
sous lescorce des fables artificielles” that Lemaire hopes to clarify (1:4). Lemaire’s second 
procedure is the evaluation and organization of histories to make one complete history (“forger 
une histoire totale,” 2: 59-60). There are multiple source texts to draw from in order to produce 
one ambitious and definitive document relating the story of Troy, and Lemaire has to prove that 
he can handle the immense amount of material that is already available.
42
 Walter Stephens and 
Judy Kem have both explored how Lemaire assesses, uses, and ‘corrects’ his source materials. 
They show how Lemaire is not just a passive compiler or translator of other textual authorities, 
but, instead, he alters and even falsifies those other versions for his own purposes and for the 
creation of his authority. One of the more striking of his citation practices is, as Stephens shows, 
to anonymize some of his sources, thus obscuring, for instance, the more negative conclusions 
that Annius of Viterbo makes about France.
43
 As a historiographer, then, Lemaire employs some 
shady practices to ‘illustrate’ Gaul, including misrepresenting his sources. 
In summary, then, Lemaire has several historiographical objectives in the Illustrations, 
which Judy Kem helpfully labels historical, political, moral, and linguistic (7). Lemaire 
approaches each of these connected objectives as a historiographer who, by virtue of his social 
status as much as his inclination and the practices of the time, must write politically in favor of a 
specific nation.
44
 His historical objective is to trace European history and write a definitive 
version of the Trojan War, “clerement interpretee” in order to counter poetic “feintise” (1: 5). 
His political agenda involves praising his patrons, encouraging peace efforts between European 
nations, and pushing for a crusade against the Turks.
45
 As Bietenholz points out, the Turks were 
also considered descendants of the Trojans until they became a military threat in the fifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries: Lemaire for that reason removes them from the Trojan family tree and 
frames them as usurpers of the Trojan lands that rightfully belong to the Christian Western 
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 Lemaire favors the accounts of Dictys and Dares, short narratives in prose that only survived in Latin translation 
and that were very influential to medieval versions of the Trojan legend, even challenging the authority of Homer 
and Virgil, as Sarah Spence argues. Kem shows that Lemaire, unlike his medieval predecessors in this endeavor, 
prefers Dictys to Dares and interprets poets (Homer, Virgil, Ovid) allegorically (42-43). For more on Dictys and 
Dares, see Frazer, introduction; Spence. The first extant text that gives France a Trojan back-story is the Chronicle 
of Fredegar from the seventh- or eighth-century (Kelley, Faces of History 113). In medieval and Renaissance 
Europe more broadly, a story of Trojan ancestry was generally embraced but periodically rejected, as it was by 
Leonardo Bruni in his History of the Florentine People, written during the first half of the fifteenth century (139). 
Burrow sees a correlation between the decline in popularity of Troy as an origin story for France and the rise of 
Tacitus as a model for history-writing in the second half of the sixteenth century; this change, notably, was inspired 
by Tacitus’s description of the Germanic and Frankish tribes as not having hereditary monarchies, therefore 
rupturing what was conceived of as an unbroken line of kings (285). As a sign of this new history-writing, for 
instance, Étienne Pasquier relegates ‘Trojan history’ to the domain of poetry (202). 
43
 Stephens, 156-160. Annius of Viterbo (Giovanni Nanni) was an Italian Dominican friar who published ‘lost’ 
histories that he (falsely) attributed to Egyptian, Chaldean, and Roman historians. He provided commentaries to 
establish their credibility. This Antiquitatum Variarum established genealogical links between Noah and Priam that 
Lemaire used in the first part of his Illustrations after ‘discovering’ the text in Rome. See Grafton, What Was 
History? 99-105; Stephens, 146-149. 
44
 For Lemaire’s awareness of his precarious situation and its effects on his poetry, see Kritzman, “The Rhetoric of 
Dissimulation;” Brown, Poets, Patrons, and Printers, chapter 3;   
45
 For an exploration of how the Illustrations influenced ducal and royal art and iconography, see Mâle, L’Art 
religieux de la fin du moyen âge en France (342-346). 
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European descendants of Troy (192; Illustrations 1: 15). Lemaire’s push against the Turks 
participates in a trend among the Rhétoriqueurs to call for the unity of Western Europe against 
the Turks.
46
 
Connected to his political objective is a moral project aimed at a prince and a linguistic 
project directed at Italy. Lemaire seeks to provide a moral education for his wider readership via 
his manifold processes of allegorical interpretation. The moral and didactic purpose is explicitly 
aimed at Marguerite d’Autriche’s nephew, the future Emperor Charles V, in the first prologue. 
As I shall show in my next chapter, treatises on the education of the prince often frame reading 
as an exercise in which the prince encounters textual versions of himself. In this case, Lemaire 
applies Paris’s example to “linstruction et doctrine dun-chacun ieune Prince de maison Royalle” 
such that, if Charles is a youthful Paris at that moment, with proper instruction he will become 
“vn second Hector” as an adult (1: 6-7). The Illustrations therefore participates in the market for 
discourses of conduct and education aimed at a noble and royal public.  
Lastly, the objective concerning the French language plays out on cultural and historical 
rather than linguistic lines. Lemaire seeks to disprove the Italians’ accusation that French is a 
‘barbaric’ language (I: 11). Richard Cooper elaborates on this Franco-Italian cultural war in 
Litteræ in tempore belli: in their own writing during the Italian Wars, the Italians describe 
encounters with the French as between a civilized people and barbarian invaders (276). In 
response, Lemaire endeavors to establish France’s origins as anterior to those of Italy; Gaul had 
laws and letters before Italy and even before Greece, and therefore the language of the current 
iteration of Gaul, France, cannot be barbaric (1: 67, 113). Anteriority combined with a love of 
letters guarantees civilization and primacy. By virtue of its political, cultural, and social 
embeddedness, then, the Illustrations has much more work to do than the other main texts of my 
corpus, where concerns about eloquence can play out on a smaller scale and in subtler ways. It is 
therefore quite difficult to discuss Lemaire’s thematization of eloquence in the “roman de Troie” 
without acknowledging the greater project to which it belongs. Lemaire’s take on eloquence is 
very motivated by the historical and political nature of the Illustrations. 
To these four objectives (historical, political, moral, linguistic) laid out by Judy Kem, I 
add a fifth, which I will call ‘literary.’ This fifth objective participates in the moral objective, as 
“bonnes lettres” must do in this period, offering themselves up as valuable in some way.47 As I 
explained above, each of the Illustrations’ stated purposes participates in the politicized 
historiographical project that holds the text together ideologically. The Illustrations is indeed 
unequal parts history, epic, romance, allegory, and chronicle, all subordinated to the overarching 
category of history as it serves political and national ends.
48
 Treating the Illustrations as such has 
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 Cynthia Brown finds a compelling juxtaposition of subject matter (crusade against the Turks) and the self-
consciousness of the poet in Rhétoriqueur poems such as Jean Molinet’s La Complainte de Grèce (1494), André de 
la Vigne’s La Ressource de la Chrestienté (1494), and Lemaire’s La Concorde du genre humain (1509) (“Rise of 
Literary Consciousness” 52). 
47
 The early modern period did not have one unique way to designate ‘literature.’ The term bonae litterae (“bonnes 
lettres”) connotes the period’s perspective on textual authority as something to be restored and used as a source of 
wisdom; their own textual output was intended to contribute to that storehouse. I acknowledge that the term “bonnes 
lettres” is not exclusive to texts containing fabula and that it is not synonymous with ‘literary’ or ‘literature.’ I 
choose to call this fifth objective ‘literary’ for lack of a more stable term to describe imaginative writing’s 
distinction from other kinds of writing. For more on litterae in the early modern period, see Marino (84-90). 
48
 I recognize that ‘epic’ and ‘romance’ are unstable categories. ‘Epic’ was not a part of the Renaissance vocabulary, 
as Rothstein has shown, and it tended to signify the text’s length (“long poëme”) and the subject (“gestes 
héroïques”) (“Le genre du roman” 37). Lemaire calls Homer’s works “fictions,” a designation that reveals both his 
anti-Greek bias and his privileging of non-verse over verse historical authorities on Troy (2: 169). As for romance, 
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produced many compelling studies about authorship, a rising rhetoric of nationalism, and the 
Rhétoriqueurs’ own preoccupations with the aesthetics of language as it extends to their prose. 
Therefore, I am in no way disagreeing with François Cornilliat’s assessment that Lemaire 
privileges his role of historiographer over any other role in the “roman de Troie” even as he 
writes within the Rhétoriqueurs’ fervent approach to ornament and rhetoric (Or ne mens 844-
845).  
What interests me here is how, even as Lemaire maintains the historical agenda through 
such narratorial interventions as citing his sources and outlining the various ‘sens’ (literal, 
astrological, metaphorical, philosophical, physical, moral, etc.) to be extracted from the Trojan 
story, he is still attached to the idea of the narrative of Troy as a different kind of literary space, 
one that is a bit at odds with the rest precisely because it requires more allegorical work. 
Nevertheless, he has more freedom to be poetic, metaphorical, and eloquent in narrative than he 
does in the more chronological work of the sections that come before and after Troy, and the 
narrative is a less aggressive means to persuade his audience of eloquence’s role in that city’s 
fate without always having to pause to explain what every element in the narrative ‘means.’ The 
literary intent within the greater project of the Illustrations allows us then to see a burgeoning 
discourse of eloquence in imaginative writing, safely experimented on within the confines of an 
epic, remote past. Terence Cave maintains that fiction will always assert itself “in excess of any 
gloss… which may be added to it” and we can discern this assertion in the “roman de Troie” 
(Cornucopian Text 100). As history is defining itself against epic and romance, as Spiegel 
shows, we see here the literary trying to define itself against history. 
 
II. Epic Containment: The Literary Space of the Illustrations 
 
There is a palpable shift in tone and in content when Lemaire announces the birth of Paris 
in part one of the Illustrations. Suddenly, what was once only ‘poetic fable’ in the first, more 
chronicle-like, section of the book is now real. We get the impression that we have entered a 
different world from the one described in the purportedly historical recounting (by rather 
procrustean means) of the founding of the European kingdoms by Noah. In this world, the 
protocols of Euhemerism are often set aside: ‘Jupiter’ is no longer only a pagan royal title, as 
“tout homme de sain entendement peult bien congoistre,” but rather a god again, exerting divine 
power in a heightened way not seen in Lemaire’s source materials (1: 82). Prophets speak the 
truth, nymphs intercede in the lives of men, and metamorphosis, rather than an allegory masked 
by poetic language, is a threat to misbehaving mortals once more. The disjointed nature of the 
Illustrations – that, for instance, a nymph is a title for a noblewoman in one section but in the 
next she is an actual nymph attached to the Trojan landscape – may indeed be due to a lack of 
thorough editing and to the imbalanced amalgamation of two slightly different projects. 
However, this disjointedness serves Lemaire well when it comes to his anxieties about 
eloquence, which are most visible in the narrative of Troy where the divine and mortal mingle, 
where long stretches of narrative run uninterrupted by allegorical explanation, and where 
eloquence is relegated to a specific time and place. As the organizing principle for the Trojan 
narrative, eloquence facilitates the mediation between the project’s different objectives, namely 
the details and correction of histories and the national project of illustrating the Gauls through 
their ancestors. 
                                                                                                                                                             
Christine S. Lee has shown that the term only applied to a small number of texts and its meaning changed drastically 
throughout the long early modern period (298). 
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I now turn to what I call the ‘epic containment’ of the “roman de Troie” and eloquence’s 
place within it. In this transitional moment in historiography, epic is often viewed as 
contaminated history. Located between oral, mythological accounts and written, verifiable prose 
histories, epic is an intermediary historical space in which there are kernels of historical truth to 
be found (Rothstein, “When Fiction is Fact” 371-372). In his quest for a “histoire totale,” 
Lemaire uses the enclosed space of epic to create a literary space in which he plays out the more 
alarming commonplaces about eloquence as a fantasy of total power while still attending to his 
other objectives. Lemaire shows very little interest in the power of speech in the sections before 
and after his Trojan narrative. Richard M. Berrong, who defines eloquence in the “roman de 
Troie” as an extreme emotional reaction that overwhelms the interlocutor’s intellect by the 
verbal and corporeal beauty of the speaker, speculates that Lemaire perhaps gives so much 
attention to eloquence in this section because he wants his readers to be too overwhelmed to 
discern the weaknesses in his historical argument (“Non est solum sophista” (32, 39). Michael F. 
O. Jenkins argues that Lemaire is somewhere between medieval and Classical notions of 
eloquence: for him, Lemaire is in the process of stripping away the medieval association of 
eloquence with style and restoring eloquence to its Classical definition of potent language, just as 
‘style’ and ‘eloquence’ were beginning to be defined separately (90). François Cornilliat 
disagrees with Jenkins, seeing not a ‘prototype’ of the humanist orator in Lemaire’s works (both 
poetry and prose), but rather a poet fully aware of the renewal of rhetoric study, but nonetheless 
cautious about its use (742).  
I propose that Lemaire reserves depictions of aggressive eloquence for the epic world so 
he can discuss it as such, making eloquence a priority of the literary and allegorical work that, by 
extension, serve the greater project. I think that Berrong, Jenkins, and Cornilliat all have 
essentially the same argument, just with slightly different emphases. Lemaire is certainly 
invested in showcasing eloquence as a potent force. The trouble, for me, is not the matter of 
where Lemaire ‘fits’ on a scale from Classical to medieval to Renaissance, since as a proto-
humanist he is inevitably involved in some form of change or renewal, but rather of figuring out 
if Lemaire thinks eloquence is dangerous in and of itself, or if his subject matter (the fate of 
Troy) obliges him to use eloquence in this way. What comes across as anxieties about eloquence 
can also be understood as products of his project, which needs a narrative device – speech-
making – to organize the “roman de Troie” and make history more dynamic, and therefore more 
didactically effective, to read. Furthermore, his allegorical explanation of Mercury’s 
accoutrements does not suggest that Lemaire is troubled about eloquence itself, but rather the 
kinds of people who use it without prudence or diligence.
49
 
The epic past can be made useful to the present precisely because its substance is remote 
and contained in another place and time, as foreign to the present as the story is familiar. Indeed, 
epic makes history more literary by its narrative, as does Lemaire’s main plot focus, that is, a 
love triangle: “les gestes de Paris, Heleine et Oenone” (2: 59-60). I cite Georg Lukács and 
Mikhail Bakhtin for their definitions of epic, as theorized against the novel, as an enclosed space. 
Epic contains a “homogeneous world,” a “rounded world” in which the movements of characters 
                                                 
49
 “… pour accomplir son commdement, affubla sa riche capeline, que les poëtes nomment Galere, laquelle est 
garnie de belles plumes, en significance que lhomme eloquent est armé de deffence et de diligence, contre tous 
ennemis: Puis chaussa ses talonnieres de fin or, garnies de belles esles, qui luy seruent à voler parmy lair, en 
denotant la grand velocité de la parole, qui va legerement en diuerses regions loingtaines. Et print en sa main sa 
verge ou masse de heraut, que les poëtes appellent Caducee, enuelopé de deux serpens entortillez, qui signifient 
prudence. De laquelle verge il enchanta et endormit iadis Argus le clervoyant. Car prudence et beau parler humain 
endort les plus rusez” (1: 204, emphases mine). 
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are generally carefully circumscribed and shaped by divine forces (Theory of the Novel 32). 
Epic’s “ultimate principle” is the world itself and not any given individual within it (46). The 
epic hero is motivated by “his relations to others and the structures which arise therefrom… love, 
the family, the state… a long road lies before him, but within him there is no abyss” (33). In 
other words, the epic hero is “never an individual” and his destiny signifies the destiny of his 
entire community: “And rightly so, for the completeness, the roundness of the value system 
which determines the epic cosmos creates a whole which is too organic for any part of it to 
become so enclosed within itself… [for the hero] to become a personality” (66). For Mikhail 
Bakhtin, the epic past is absolute and complete; it is a closed circle with “no room for 
openendedness, indecision, indeterminacy” (“Epic and Novel” 17). This is the kind of space 
where the contingencies of exemplarity, by which the past can be made to apply to the present, 
can be somewhat anchored. The openendedness, indecision, and indeterminacy that do not 
belong in epic do appear in the Illustrations, but as gestures toward the uncertainties of 
Lemaire’s present. 
However, even within the contained and determined roundness of the idea of Troy, 
Lemaire cannot establish a clear taxonomy of eloquent speakers. Between the immortals, 
mortals, Trojans, Greeks, women, nymphs, and men that populate this epic landscape, Lemaire 
neither defines the possession of eloquence along firm lines, nor does he explain how these 
speakers became eloquent (with the exception of Paris, to which I shall return shortly). The 
eloquence of immortals is not manifestly superior to that of mortals, and both can and do use 
persuasion to suit their own desires and ends regardless of consequences. The Trojans appear to 
have a singular, native capacity for eloquence until the Greeks send in their eloquent heroes to 
negotiate for the return of Helen to Menelaus: for instance Ulysses, as an “orateur et legat,” 
persuades the Trojans – including their own eloquent ambassador Antenor – that Paris is in the 
wrong (2: 141-143). Lemaire divides his female characters into mortal women whose eloquence 
contributes to the fall of Troy (the maternal concerns of Hecuba and the coy rhetoric of Helen) 
and supernatural or supernaturally-gifted women who try, and fail, to prevent disaster: namely, 
the natural eloquence of Paris’s wife, the nymph Oenone, who uses eloquence to try to keep 
Paris attached to her, and the straightforward speech of Cassandra, who is cursed to speak 
prophetic truth but never persuade because what she says, no matter how plainly expressed, 
comes across as “langage obscure,” even to figures like Oenone who are also privy to secret 
knowledge (2: 91).
50
 Hector, Lemaire’s clear favorite, is not eloquent: in fact, his one default is 
that “il estoit vn peu louche, comme escrit Dares de Phrygie, et beguayait de la langue quand il 
estoit course” (1: 313). Everyone, except Cassandra and Hector, is eloquent in the “roman de 
Troie.”  
Furthermore, Lemaire both values and discredits the use of ornamentation, whether literal 
or figurative. The natural, including natural eloquence, is often enhanced by the artificial: 
“rhetoriques couleurs” and “fleurs poëtiques” make a speech or a description beautiful and 
potent.
51
 The use of artifice to enhance is in keeping with the conceptions of language and 
rhetoric of the time: Pierre Fabri, for instance, says in his 1521 Grand et vrai art de pleine 
                                                 
50
 For more on Cassandra as an alēthomantis (a truthful prophetess) without persuasion, see Detienne, The Masters 
of Truth in Ancient Greece (77). 
51
 Lemaire takes great care to describe beautiful artifices, whether found in his source materials (Homer’s depiction 
of the combat between Menelaus and Paris is singled out particularly) or in the details of luxuries, particularly of the 
courtly environment of Troy. The attention to aristocratic accoutrements may be a holdover from thirteenth-century 
historiography, which was invested in describing such displays of wealth, as Spiegel demonstrates in Romancing the 
Past (22). 
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rhétorique that only the ignorant think there is no rhetoric beyond what is natural to language 
and that French does not need such linguistic enrichment (8). Yet artifice can also mask or 
deform nature, straining believability. At least, this is the reasoning Paris (seconded by Mercury) 
gives to the three goddesses at his Judgment when he requests that they strip, so that their 
“precieux aornements” and “precieux habillemens” do not distract him from the “pure verité” of 
their beauty (1: 251). Yet, even naked and silent, Venus’s one ornament of a rose gives her “vne 
grace singuliere” that augments her natural beauty, making her the most corporeally persuasive 
of the three goddesses (1: 255). Lemaire’s adamant privileging of ‘escrits autentiques’ over 
‘fictions poëtiques’ follows similar lines as his ambivalent attitude toward ornament: he rejects 
the poetic fictions in order to find historical truth, but he still appreciates the beauty of a poetic 
fiction and uses it to embellish his own writing. 
By developing a system in which eloquence can be possessed by anyone, used in any way 
for any purpose (usually nefarious), and be both lauded and criticized, both persuasive and not, 
Lemaire therefore stresses eloquence’s contradicting values and commonplaces, such that its 
definitions come undone: eloquence is natural and artificial, immortal and mortal, male and 
female, corporeal and verbal. Lemaire has so saturated the “roman de Troie” with eloquence and 
ornaments that we no longer know what eloquence is supposed to be or do. Ultimately, though, 
eloquence, possessed by everyone, finds its purpose as a narrative device, a form of ravishment 
that keeps epic events on track to their end. Bakhtin’s openendedness, indecision, and 
indeterminacy that do not work in epic are resolved by speech-making. The epic (or, to put it 
another way, the divine, the supernatural, the mythological put to political use) coexists with the 
historical, which pins down epic to make it useful: Lemaire makes historical detail serve his 
redemptive history. Signs and prophecies are real, contributing to the full story that epic claims 
to present in its “end-directed narrative” by manipulating time to look forward to a future that is 
already past (Quint, Epic and Empire 34).  
To illustrate these points, I turn now to the first meeting of Paris and the nymph Oenone. 
It is the first of many performances of eloquence that all serve as catalysts leading toward Troy’s 
destruction, an oversaturation of unbridled eloquence that leads to a literary discourse more 
interested in eloquence’s limitations than its successes. This meeting takes place before the 
Judgment of Paris, therefore before events leading to Troy’s fall are truly set in motion. Toward 
the beginning of the “roman de Troie,” Lemaire gives a great sweeping survey of Trojan lands, 
including the geographical (its mountains, its rivers, the city itself, the surrounding villages), the 
chronological (the building of Troy’s original walls, its destruction, later pilgrimages and 
reconstructions undertaken by Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar), and the textual (the 
authorities for all this information) (1: 133-141). These strata offer up Troy’s very history in 
great, well-researched detail. They also set the scene for Paris’s initiation into eloquent speaking. 
Lemaire lays down his researcher’s toolkit to zoom in closer on young Paris: “Or pour reuenir à 
lenfant Paris…” (1: 141). Paris lives in the middle of a pastoral paradise, bathing nude in the 
Scamander, unaware of the nymphs and fairies that leave their posts in the mountains, rivers, and 
forests to spy on him (1: 141-142). Pages are devoted without interruption to Paris’s pastoral life. 
With Lemaire’s “Or,” history opens up to the literary, where truth and falsehood are 
simultaneously possible: Jupiter both is a god and is not. But for pastoral to settle into the 
requirements of epic teleology, Paris needs a supernatural intervention. In this world where 
everyone seems effortlessly eloquent without training, Paris too must become eloquent. 
Paris’s encounter with Oenone involves a transfer of knowledge and eloquence. Place is 
very important to this transfer, because it happens in an ideal, supernatural location. One of the 
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interests of this dissertation is the ways in which writers choose to stage a character becoming 
eloquent, and the conditions in which eloquence is made possible. Often in dramatizations of 
eloquence in imaginative writing of this period, eloquence can only work under certain 
conditions, without which it falls flat. Thus it is interesting that, for the only character that we see 
become eloquent in the “roman de Troie,” Lemaire sets this episode in another world, as if it 
could only ever happen there. It begins with Paris falling asleep by a fountain, the very source of 
the Scamander that Paris only comes across after days of hunting a stag in the forests of Ida. The 
topos of the hero falling asleep in the deep wilderness is, as Danièle Duport has argued, a signal 
of the passage from one world to another (121). When Paris wakes in this “secret et taciturne” 
place, he finds himself surrounded by a number of nymphs and fairies (1: 164-165). They run, 
and Paris gives chase. One of the nymphs, Oenone, daughter of the Scamander river, stops 
running to admonish Paris. Her indignation and eloquence bring Paris to his knees, “comme 
estonné et moitié ravy tant de sa merueilleuse eloquence, comme de sa souueraine beauté” (1: 
166).  
Yet there is something perplexing about Oenone’s eloquent speech, which is brief and 
angry. Paris seems more amazed by her sudden disclosure of his royal birth than ravished by her 
words or her beauty. Her eloquence is in the revelation of forbidden knowledge, of the sort that 
will influence events if it convinces. Paris then begs her to explain why she addressed him as “ô 
jeune adolescent Royal” (1: 165). Her response reiterates the historical details of the first section 
of the Illustrations by outlining in brief the family tree Lemaire has already described, a 
genealogy that exists both in fabula and historia. Oenone’s knowledge therefore straddles the 
multiple projects of the Illustrations itself. ‘Jupiter’ is suddenly a pagan title for a king again; it 
was the third Jupiter who spirited away Paris’s relative Ganymede (1: 169). Then Oenone 
transitions to prophecy: Priam thinks he has saved Troy by getting rid of Paris, but as far as 
Oenone knows (“si ie ne suis deceue”), Fate still has something in store for the shepherd (1: 
170). Oenone wants to be part of it, as long as Paris is not insolent or proud: “Car toy mesmes te 
pourrois bien precipiter en abysme de mort” (1: 170). Oenone’s assistance entails giving Paris 
eloquence. 
Following the transfer of knowledge, the transfer of eloquence is then literalized in the 
second part of the interaction as Oenone offers Paris a ritual meal to draw him further into the 
epic world. This interaction is a strange combination of Adam, Eve, and Persephone eating 
forbidden and divine fruit: Paris is enlightened by what he consumes, never to return to his 
former rusticity. With this meal, Paris must leave (pastoral) paradise. Out of all the fruits 
available near the fountain, Oenone gives Paris an intertextual fruit, “la lote,” which is what 
nymphs eat (1: 174). Lemaire intervenes at this point to mediate between his own time and two 
different points in the Trojan cycle. The fruit comes from “Afrique, (quon dit maintenant 
Barbarie).” Moreover, Oenone and Paris cannot possibly know that this fruit is an epic fruit 
belonging as well to the errancy of romance, but Lemaire adds that “la lote” is what will make 
Odysseus’s men no longer care about returning home after the Trojan War is over. Lemaire thus 
collapses, in a quick explanation, chronological points from before the war, after, and a time at 
which he wishes to restore Troy once again. He begins from the perspective of his present for the 
benefit of the reader, providing details about this fruit before getting to the fruit’s exceptionality 
and its place in epic. These kinds of narratorial interventions show us just how quickly Lemaire 
can move from one register (the budding love story of Oenone and Paris at the very moment 
where Paris becomes eloquent) to another (the details of the historical project). 
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The transformative, otherworldly site of the fountain literalizes an exchange of eloquent 
speech as a flow of water: the very fluvial landscape of Troy (Oenone’s parents) grants Paris a 
“supernatural gift” for speech. After Paris eats “la lote,” Oenone gives Paris “la liqueur 
maternelle,” water from her mother, the fountain, in an elaborate ritual. The fountain’s waters 
bubble in response to Oenone’s prayer, “comme si elle auoit sentiment daccorder la requeste de 
la Nymphe” (1: 175-176). Nature responds to eloquence just as much as people do. Paris drinks 
and “plus eloquent que parauant,” his body shifts to accommodate the new sensations and he 
takes into himself his new place. The water becomes a figure for eloquence, ravishing and 
transforming Paris, which he describes as a shift from rusticity and ignorance to a full sensory 
and intellectual awakening: 
 
Car la seule vapeur nectaree et ambrosienne, est si penetrante et si vegetatiue, que 
des que le flair en ha esté prochain à mon sens odoritif, mon rude conceuoir sest 
esclarcy, mon gros entendement sest ouuert, et mes organes se sont ampliez, 
comme pour receuoir vn don supernaturel: tellement que ainsi comme tout enyuré 
de nouueau desir, ie suis rauy en ecstase: et aprens à speculer hautes choses. (1: 
177) 
 
After explaining how he has been changed, Paris then speculates that Oenone is Venus in nymph 
form because, as everyone knows, Venus has come to Troy before to seduce Trojans, most 
recently Anchises, father of Aeneas (1: 177-178). Paris’s first eloquent speech, then, showcases 
the power of eloquence in a speech about powers of transformation and ravishment. Oenone 
applauds his speech as “parfonde eloquence… de telle efficace, quelle pourroit tirer en sa 
sentence mesmes vn cœur adamantin” (1: 179). At the fountain, Oenone shares her knowledge, 
prophecy, eloquence, and desire with Paris: the fountain is therefore a place of determinacy, 
where the nymph’s speech act (her eloquence) and her ritualized meal function to resolve Paris’s 
very identity as a handsome, skilled, but out-of-place shepherd by announcing his true self as a 
prince of Troy. As long as Paris was “ignorant [d]es hautes fortunes aduenir,” epic was stalled in 
the land of pastoral, where hidden identity is a key topos (1: 146). 
The setting of the fountain connects Paris’s new eloquence with nature and solitude as 
opposed to civilization and community. Eloquence is here a gift from natural and supernatural 
forces: Paris does not learn eloquence – he drinks it. But however natural and remote a 
provenance they may have, Paris’s new eloquence and knowledge are not good signs for Troy. 
Even a natural eloquence like that of Oenone is not a good thing in and of itself. As I will discuss 
in my chapter on Hélisenne de Crenne, love and desire often negate or neutralize any influence 
eloquence may otherwise have. Oenone’s intervention here is motivated by desire for an 
“amoureuse alliance” with a man of “haute extraction” (1: 178). In a later apostrophe to Oenone, 
Lemaire calls her “aveuglee dambition” (1: 290). A woman’s desire therefore calls into question 
the necessary prudence and diligence of the eloquent speaker, as figured by Mercury. It also 
leads to Paris’s eye-opening experience, and the very thing that will lead to Troy’s fall is Paris’s 
wandering eye. Oenone sees his “pupilles errans et vagabondes” glimmering with possibilities 
just as the sunlight is reflected in the clear water of the fountain, and she muses about Paris’s 
immoderate affection (1: 178-179).  
Neither Paris nor Oenone know yet that Paris’s eloquence acquired from the fountain will 
be the tool by which he achieves his desire, but Lemaire’s readers do, as I shall discuss shortly. 
Eloquence used in the name of desire has amplified Paris’s own “cupidineux appetit,” therefore 
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priming him for Venus’s persuasion at the Judgment (1: 179). It then becomes less of an issue 
that Venus is the most persuasive at the Judgment, and more that Paris himself is not as prudent a 
judge as he once was reputed to be: as a shepherd, Paris was exemplary, but as prince, he will be 
much less so. Oenone thus joins Paris’s mother Hecuba in the group of women who unwittingly 
collaborate to destroy Troy out of love for Paris, deploying their female powers of persuasion to 
do so.
52
 As the “roman de Troie” unfolds, we see Paris use his eloquence to further the plot and 
fulfill the fate of Troy prophesized at his birth as he seeks out the prizes Venus promised at the 
Judgment. After being welcomed back into his birth family, Paris persuades the Trojans to 
recover Priam’s sister Hesionne, who has been enslaved by the Greek king Telamon since 
Hercules destroyed Troy a generation earlier (1: 264). Debates with the Greeks about Hesionne 
serve as a pretext for Paris to meet, impress, and abduct Helen, and in Paris’s rhetoric Lemaire 
certainly capitalizes on the recovery of Hesionne as a figure for the recovery of Troy itself, taken 
and enslaved by foreigners. The rest of the story is well known, though it is important to note 
that Lemaire heavily emphasizes and thematizes ambassadorial interactions, which are often 
lengthier and composed in more detail than the famous war itself. It is without question that 
Lemaire is invested in rhetorical interactions as a kind of organizing principle of narrative. 
Lemaire frequently interrupts the narrative to negotiate different versions of events that 
are available to him, and to state why he privileges some over others. Some of these justifications 
are aimed directly at the reader, such as the following, which Lemaire inserts as Paris enters 
Sparta pretending to be an ambassador:  
 
Or ne sesmerueillent point les lisans, si ie narre toutes ces choses, mesmement le 
rauissement d’Heleine dautre sorte quilz ne lont en leurs liures communs et 
vulgaires. Car ie ne vueil ensuiure sinon la pure verité antique, et lordre historial 
de Dictys de Crete, et de plusieurs autres acteurs tressuffisans, lesquels seront mes 
guides et mes garans en ceste œuvre, sil plait à Dieu que ie la puisse mener à chef. 
(2: 47) 
 
What Lemaire here lays claims to is his own authority as a discerning reader of history. As a 
writer who needs to shift registers frequently in this text, he also needs to validate the choices 
about historical detail that he makes. The discerning writer requires a reader who, familiar with 
other versions, nonetheless sees the value in Lemaire’s choices.  
To conclude this chapter, I will talk about Lemaire’s use of Mercury in the Illustrations 
as a means to communicate with the reader. As the writer of the Illustrations’ three prologues, 
Mercury contributes as well to the epic containment of the “roman de Troie.”53 Mercury suits 
Lemaire’s multiple roles. Mercury confirms the text’s ‘veracity’ because he is an eyewitness to 
history, giving writing to men, arranging the Judgment of Paris, and witnessing the Trojan War. 
As a god of commerce, he offers up the book as a commercial object and, as the god of 
eloquence, Mercury presides over rhetorical activity and “bonne invention” (1: 3). For Lawrence 
Kahn, ambiguity and reversal are Mercury’s very functions and powers (119). His name in Greek 
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 Lemaire singles out Hecuba’s “desordonnee affection de mere” for the corruption of the “bien publique,” because 
she twice saves Paris’s life despite the prophecies about him (2: 116). Mercury says in the prologue to the second 
part of the Illustrations that all women have persuasive powers over men, personified by Venus Verticordia, or 
Venus, Changer of Hearts (2: 4). 
53
 For a history of Mercury, see Kahn, Hermès passe. For the place of Mercury in French Renaissance poetic 
endeavors, see Welch, Ronsard’s Mer ury.  
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brings to mind interpretation itself: Boccaccio provides hermena (‘interpreter’) as the etymology 
for Hermes, a god who is “maximum divinarum rerum interpretem” (“the greatest interpreter of 
divine matters,” Genealogy of the Pagan Gods 370-371). In several respects, Mercury maintains 
the delicate boundaries of the literary space of the “roman de Troie” by mediating between 
immortals and mortals, between the subject and the writing of history, and between different 
kinds of eloquence. It is he, after all, who arbitrates Paris’s Judgment, calling Paris to choose 
between the three goddesses and their individualized approaches to persuasion, and 
demonstrating to the readers how powerful eloquence can be, thereby ‘protecting’ the readers 
through the screen of Mercury. 
Notably, Lemaire makes Mercury responsible for summoning his readership and 
managing their expectations in a way parallel to the work of epic. The Illustrations opens with an 
address from Mercury to Marguerite d’Autriche and an adapted citation from Virgil’s Aeneid: 
“Quis genus Iliadûm? quis Troiæ nesciat vrbem? Qui ne congnoit le noble sang de Troy, Et la 
cité, qui des Grecs fut la proye?” (1: 3). These are Dido’s words as she welcomes Aeneas and his 
men into Carthage: already the news of Troy has reached her and has become common 
knowledge (Aeneid 1.565). To better encompass the broader European displacement of the 
Trojans, Lemaire replaces “genus Aeneadum” (Aeneas’s people, and, eventually, the Romans) of 
the original line with “genus Iliadûm” (Ilium’s people, or the Trojans). Like Dido, the readers 
know the story of Troy but they await an authentic version: Lemaire is a new Aeneas, restoring 
Troy through writing. As Mercury urged Aeneas to leave Dido and Carthage behind, so he 
encouraged Lemaire to write this definitive history (1:4; Aeneid 4.219-278). Thus the readers are 
primed for an encounter with a “histoire totale.” 
These readers who, like Dido, want to hear the true version of the fall of Troy are given 
further characteristics in the first prologue. Mercury calls his readers those of “la bende 
Mercurienne,” and he encourages them to be members of his troupe (1: 5). What does it mean to 
be a mercurial reader? It has much to do with the multiple registers, allegorical meanings, and 
objectives of the Illustrations. Walter Stephens demonstrates that Mercury complicates our 
understanding of the Illustrations because in the prologues Mercury holds up the text as 
simultaneously true and mythic (164). Stephens sees the third prologue as resolving, somewhat, 
the two opposing interpretational approaches by asking the readers to interpret the text as they 
would the Bible, the only other text that can be both historia and fabula (165). Ann Moss, 
moreover, contends that Lemaire was unequalled in his multiple approaches to the hermeneutic 
possibilities of mythological narrative in history (Poetry and Fable 15). She argues that in the 
Illustrations “… no intelligent sense can be made of either history or fable, unless related 
accurately and unless their full implications are developed in the telling” (19). She adds that 
Mercury’s entry into the “roman de Troie” is a signal to interpret allegorically (29).  
To these assessments, I append Lemaire’s astrological ‘sens’ that occasionally peppers 
the narrative of Troy. This is an allegorical reading that involves treating the Olympic pantheon 
as figures standing in for personality traits. Lemaire frequently cites planetary influence as a way 
to read the events of the “roman de Troie.” Through the example of Paris, Lemaire demonstrates 
that having Venus “en son horoscope” means he devotes his life to the “vie voluptueuse, et 
venerique” and despises “la vie actiue de Iuno, et la vie contemplatiue de Pallas” (1: 272). This is 
the “sens interiore” of the Judgment that Lemaire finds in his sources Fulgentius and Iulius 
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Firmicus, which he uses to corroborate Paris’s negative exemplarity.54 Mercury represents an 
altogether more positive influence. Those mercurial readers “de mon influence” are defined by 
their neutrality and, alongside their patron, their prudence and diligence (1: 5, 204). During 
Paris’s Judgment, right before Mercury prods Paris to choose the most beautiful goddess, 
Lemaire reminds us that Mercury’s planet is “neutre et indifferente, bonne auec les beniuoles, 
mauuaise auec les maliuoles, maistresse de vertu imaginatiue, fantastique et cogitante…” (1: 
249). Unlike Paris, whose actions are motivated by his “natiuité… Venerienne,” mercurial 
readers do not bend a given way (1: 247). They take “les choses en bonne part” (2: 245).  
The very nature of the Illustrations necessitates mercurial readers. They can switch from 
one ‘sens’ to another, from metamorphosis to metaphor, from poetic language to historic truth. 
Like Classical eloquence itself, they are adaptable. This ability to change gears along with the 
text is best seen in the narration of Troy’s destruction and through the role that eloquence plays 
in the perpetuation of that destruction. The god of eloquence presides over the text, mediates the 
different kinds of eloquence we encounter, fashions readers in his own image as neutral judges, 
and reflects his writer, who can oscillate with ease between the project of history and the 
singularities of Troy. The mercurial readers, in Renaissance writing more broadly speaking, will 
always be in the know, malleable, and adaptable to the demands the writer places on them, 
including holding up two competing interpretations as concurrently possible. We can detect in 
the variance of the “roman de Troie,” which requires more allegorical work and more direct 
rejection of poetic “feintise” in favor of authentic history, a proto-humanist attention to historical 
consciousness, particularly in the authority of historical detail, and the simultaneous valorization 
and undoing of Classical eloquence, as Lemaire plays out every contradicting commonplace 
known to the rhetorical tradition. The thematization of eloquence is, then, a way to mediate 
meaning with the Renaissance reader that does not take on the qualities of aggressiveness and 
ravishment of Classical eloquence itself.  
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 As a Catholic, Lemaire does not, however, believe that such a planetary influence is unavoidable: the apple of 
Paris’s Judgment is “son propre franc arbitre” and the Judgment itself signifies Paris’s choice of a Venusian life over 
any other (1: 6). 
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Chapter Three 
Poinct fin ny canon: Eloquence in François Rabelais’s Educational Programs 
         
O thou monster Ignorance, how deformed 
dost thou look! (Love’s Labour’s Lost 
4.2.24) 
 
 In François Rabelais’s Cinquiesme et dernier livre des faicts et dicts heroïques du bon 
Pantagruel, the giant Pantagruel, Panurge, Frère Jean, and their traveling companions continue 
their sea voyage to consult an oracle on the matter of Panurge’s marriage.55 They pass from 
island to island, encountering monsters and marvels along the way. The adventure on one of 
these islands illustrates in brief Rabelais’s overall stance toward eloquence and his preferred 
method for undermining its traditional cultural weight. At the island of the Chats-fourrez, the 
travelers – minus Pantagruel, who refuses to join – are arrested and put on trial. A fellow 
prisoner informs them of the wickedness of their jailors: “Parmy eux regne la sexte essence, 
moyennent laquelle ils grippent tout, devorent tout, et conchient tout: ils bruslent, esclattent, 
decapitent, meurdrissent, emprisonnent, ruinent et minent tout sans discretion de bien et de mal” 
(750). Should the outside world ever discover the extent of the “inestimable meschanceté” of the 
Chats-fourrez, the prisoner continues,  
    
… il n’est, et ne fut Orateur tant eloquent, qui par son art le retint; ne loy tant 
rigoureuse et drachonique, qui par crainte de peine le gardast: ne magistrat tant 
puissant qui par force l’empeschast, de les faire tous vifs là dedans leur rabuliere 
felonnement brusler. (751) 
 
Rabelais thus turns on its head an important humanist commonplace: that eloquence is a 
civilizing force. The traditionally held belief about eloquence, found in the opening lines of 
Cicero’s De inventione and unfailingly reproduced in treatises on rhetoric up to the Renaissance, 
is that the orator’s art can civilize any barbarism and turn the wicked back to the virtuous life. In 
fact, eloquence is the purported catalyst for the foundation of all civilizations, when a mythical 
hero-orator persuades wandering peoples to establish a city and abide by common laws; 
eloquence and law together create civilization.
56
 In the Cinquiesme livre, conversely, Rabelais 
creates a people whose aggression and wickedness cannot be reined in by either law or leader. 
Eloquence has no power here. 
In the chapters describing the travelers’ time on this island, Rabelais overturns the 
connection between eloquence and civilization in two specific contexts, both of which restrict the 
fantasy of power that eloquence represents in the traditional Renaissance discourse of rhetoric.
57
 
                                                 
55
 The Cinquiesme livre was published in 1564, years after Rabelais’s death in 1553, and its authenticity as 
Rabelais’s own work has been heavily contested in the centuries following its publication. Some twentieth-century 
scholars have done important and convincing work establishing Rabelais as its author. This dissertation assumes that 
this is the case, with no qualifications, since Rabelais’s treatment of eloquence across the five volumes is consistent. 
See Petrossian; Huchon’s Rabelais grammairien; and Huchon’s notice to the fifth book in her edition of Rabelais’s 
Œuvres complètes, 1595-1607. All references here to Rabelais’s works are to Huchon’s Pléiade edition. 
56
 For more on the history of the connection between eloquence and civilization, see Rebhorn, The Emperor of 
Men’s Minds, chapter 2. 
57
 I borrow Rebhorn’s formulation of eloquence as a “… fantasy of power, in which the orator, wielding words more 
deadly than swords, takes on the world and emerges victorious in every encounter” from The Emperor of Men’s 
Minds (15). 
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The first is the exploration of the New World. Rabelais’s Chats-fourrez are anthropomorphized 
cats, part-monster and part-man, and he places them in the same discursive space between 
barbarism and civilization that most ethnographic accounts placed the newly discovered peoples 
of the New World. The Chats-fourrez are also cannibals, as some of the New World peoples 
were reported to be. Out there in the unknown parts of the globe, where the Chats-fourrez dwell, 
there are those who are beyond the bounds of Classical eloquence; their ways are the polar 
opposites of the customs and laws of sixteenth-century Europe. Through exploration, the world 
has opened up and become seemingly limitless, but eloquence’s effectiveness has an increasingly 
smaller range as the very limits of humanist book learning are reached.
58
 Ruled by a “sixth 
essence” beyond the long-sought-after alchemical quintessence, the Chats-fourrez live in a world 
beyond even the known unknowns.  
The second context in which Rabelais diminishes eloquence’s power in these chapters is 
judicial. The Chats-fourrez, though strange and unrestrained by laws, nevertheless have a law 
court that mirrors the reputed corruption within the European court system. In this court setting, 
Rabelais trivializes both eloquence and heroism – two great civilizing qualities – by reducing 
them to mere exchanges of talk and money: to win their freedom, the travelers have to answer 
the judge Grippe-minaud’s riddle and pay tribute in gold. The Chats-fourrez do not actually 
devour, burn, or ruin anything in this adventure, which would offer the travelers an opportunity 
to show their mettle. Instead, the plight of the travelers amidst the natives takes the form of a 
trial, after which the Chats-fourrez extort bribes from the travelers, twisting the European quest 
for New World gold into a depiction of local usury. The only way out of the court and off the 
island is through talk and gold; the threat of violence and the strictly enforced question-and-
answer format of the riddle do not leave room for heroism or oratorical prowess. Panurge reads 
the situation easily enough, answering the riddle and throwing gold coins into the middle of the 
court to ensure that “justice Grippe-minaudiere” (bribery) be served. Afterwards, in the safety of 
their ship, Frère Jean, ever contemptuous of language when it trumps something he considers 
more important, like faith or heroism, complains that this is not the kind of adventure he 
expected or wanted on this voyage: he cannot sleep at night if he does not perform a heroic deed 
every day. He wants to return and slay all the Chats-fourrez for their corruption, certainly, but 
also for not having satisfied his need for heroism. However, they all flee when he jumps back 
ashore and the travelers move on (758). Frère Jean cites the example of Hercules as an exemplar 
for what should have happened on the island. Unlike the ancient hero who civilizes by 
overthrowing tyrants and ridding the world of monsters, nothing is corrected here and 
(European) order and justice are not established in this strange land. The abuses of the legal 
system experienced on the island remain just as they were when the travelers arrived: the great, 
civilizing Europeans have had little to no effect on the island and its inhabitants. 
The adventure on the island of the Chats-fourrez lays bare Rabelais’s overall position 
toward eloquence in his five-book series on the giants Pantagruel and Gargantua. He magnifies 
the vanity of eloquence and its pretensions to better scrutinize this humanist ideal of language at 
its very best and most persuasive, language that is meant to maintain order and serve the public 
good; it is the ultimate political power figured as a specific kind of language. Rabelais both 
evokes the tradition of rhetorical theory and undermines it, using a variety of discursive practices 
borrowed from other genres of writing and placing them into the context of his satirical pseudo-
chivalric romance. This results in a “textually promiscuous” work that suits his kind of 
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 See Grafton, New Worlds, Ancient Texts. 
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spotlighting on humanism’s core tenets and contradictions.59 With his usual impulse to 
exaggerate and nitpick, both features of the genre of satire, Rabelais reveals his interest in the 
limits of eloquence. He is even more interested in the banal nature of those limits: the encounter 
with the Chats-fourrez ultimately suggests that eloquence will always be in vain when used 
against the greedy and corrupt. Indeed, as I shall discuss in this chapter, eloquence may only 
succeed within a specific ethical framework: how can eloquence inspire the Chats-fourrez to 
virtue if for them “vice est vertu appellée” (750)?  
The Chats-fourrez episode also signals Rabelais’s preferred rhetorical techniques for 
dismantling eloquence: literalization and antithesis. Rabelais displays a proclivity for literalizing 
metaphors in his pentalogy on the giants Pantagruel and Gargantua, making the immaterial word 
material for comedic or satirical purposes. Thus Rabelais shows us, through literalizing proverbs, 
the childhood aimlessness of Pantagruel’s father, Gargantua, who strikes while the iron is cold 
and puts the cart before the oxen (34). Rabelais’s tendency to literalize often pushes language to 
the point of incoherence or even complete breakdown. Take, for instance, the language-related 
Renaissance idiom of “skinning Latin,” which means to speak Latin improperly. The giant 
Pantagruel, in his rather infamous encounter with a Limousin student, threatens to skin him for 
having “skinned Latin” (234). In Mikhail Bakhtin’s terms, this transfer to the material 
participates in the grotesque process of degradation in which the high is brought low: 
metaphorically skinned Latin is met with the literal threat of skinning to bring an end to the 
Limousin’s linguistic affectations (Rabelais 19, 21). Gérard Defaux defines Rabelais’s narrative 
poetics as one in which any storyteller, including Rabelais as author and as his narrator alter ego, 
relies on the art of sophistry and persuasion to have an effect on the reader or audience; the 
storyteller is “naturellement et nécessairement sophiste,” whose art is “beau mensonge.”60 As a 
sophist “conteur” and master rhetorician, Rabelais frequently deploys oppositions to steer the 
reader toward one thing and away from its opposite, and often, puzzlingly, back again, making 
deeper meaning hard to decipher in his works. In his discussion of Renaissance writing as 
located between a past moment of ostensible ‘fullness’ and a desire for its own inexhaustibility, 
Terence Cave argues that distinctive to early modern writing is a “movement toward plenitude 
and presence” that is constantly “threatened by the possibility of inversion or subversion, 
whether thematically or rhetorically” (Cornucopian Text 199). “Thematically positive signs,” 
such as an eloquence that works, become a “mirage rather than the affirmation of a value-
system” when paired with its opposite. In his treatment of eloquence, Rabelais likewise pits one 
extreme against another, using binary pairs and literalizing to expose the limits of an ideal and 
break it down, turning ‘eloquence,’ whatever it may mean, into a mirage. In my discussion of 
Rabelais’s take on eloquence, we will see such pairs as angel and monster, human and animal, 
barbarism and civilization, reason and madness, wisdom and ignorance, and eloquence and 
silence or stammering. I have already shown the techniques of literalization and antithesis at 
work with the example of the Chats-fourrez. The Chats-fourrez present us with literal monsters 
that stand in for the theoretical problem of eloquence’s limitations. By inventing characters too 
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 This phrasing is adapted from Terence Cave: “Au niveau esthétique, le seizième siècle, au lieu de censurer la 
promiscuité l’encourage: il encourage le dialogue, les formes multiples, la proliferation des matériaux et la mixité 
des registres” (Pré-histoires 12). 
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 “Rabelais et son masque comique” 89-90. In “Rabelais et les cloches de Notre-Dame,” Defaux defines the 
Rabelaisian text, most of all Gargantua, as one that is structured by opposites on all levels, whether stylistically, 
thematically, ideologically, or otherwise. Defaux revisits and expands this connection between opposition and 
sophistry in his book Pantagruel et les sophistes and in his article “Rabelais et son masque comique: Sophista 
loquitur.”  
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wicked and barbarous for even eloquence to have an effect on, Rabelais undercuts the 
established reputation of eloquence as an indomitable political tool. 
The representation of language in Rabelais’s pentalogy has been much discussed in 
modern criticism. Each of his books testifies to Rabelais’s increasing interest in language. Most 
of the attention to this interest has been given to the numerous scenes in which negative attitudes 
towards language and language use are direct and obvious, or how Rabelais himself gained the 
reputation of being one of the first masters of French prose. Rabelais often mocks the highly 
stylized speech of pedants that simply does not fulfill the purpose of language, that is, 
communication: they instead “skin Latin” or otherwise ostentatiously abuse speech. Such 
representations of language and communication breakdown regularly lead to the conclusion that 
Rabelais is satirizing the educational systems of his time that produce and encourage such 
language: the pretentious learned either know too much or not enough, and it influences their 
capacity for meaningful communication. However, Rabelais does not despise language. He finds 
great joy in depicting its abuses and exposing pretentions about speech. This joy, I argue, extends 
to eloquence as well. If by satirizing improper uses of language Rabelais intends to promote 
humanist learning with eloquence as its highest ideal, it still seems peculiar that he would not 
take the opportunity to show us an unquestionably correct use of eloquence. Instead, he 
constantly frames eloquence as a limited fantasy of power, even in moments where he deploys 
eloquence as a corrective to bad rhetoric and bad education. Rabelais’s representations of 
eloquence refuse to be taken for granted as straightforward approvals of humanist commonplaces 
about such language; ‘good’ language and ‘bad’ participate equally in his overall investigation 
into language and humanism itself.  
In my discussion of Rabelais, I call particular attention to eloquence’s role in the 
education of the prince and how Rabelais uses the antithetical pairs native to Renaissance 
pedagogical discourse to call that role into question. I compare and contrast the education of the 
two giants: Pantagruel in Pantagruel, roy des Dipsodes, restitué a son naturel (1532), 
particularly as it is described in the famous letter from his father Gargantua, and Gargantua in La 
vie treshorrificque du grand Gargantua (1534). The bulk of this chapter is a close reading of the 
scene from Gargantua in which a young boy, Eudemon, speaks eloquently as proof of the 
effectiveness of humanist education. It is therefore the book about the father, Gargantua, and not 
the son, Pantagruel, that tells more openly the story of eloquence’s role in the education of the 
prince. I argue that the circumstances of the scene, combined with frequent allusions to 
contemporary discourses on education and placed within the satirical context of the pentalogy as 
a whole, confirm the theory that Rabelais’s enthusiasm for humanist learning is not as 
wholehearted as it may first appear. The two chapters that seem to endorse humanism most 
heartily – the famous letter from Gargantua in Pantagruel and the scene with Eudemon in 
Gargantua – cannot be read out of context. Rabelais’s pentalogy is resistant to traditional 
humanist commonplaces about the transformative power of eloquence, and Rabelais uses 
education as a means to locate weak points in humanist pedagogy. What is ultimately at stake 
here is the kind of prince that humanism is meant to shape: a comparative analysis of the 
educational programs described in these two books demonstrates that Rabelais, though playful in 
most respects, is quite serious about not associating his good, Christian princes with eloquence. I 
refer to Renaissance treatises on education and Michel Foucault’s late lectures on ancient ethical 
practices of speaking and self-governance to draw out Rabelais’s concerns about the education of 
the prince. I also employ Bakhtin’s arguments on exaggeration and the body in Rabelais’s work 
to elaborate on his use of antithesis and Cave’s thoughts on early modern writing to connect 
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Rabelais’s qualms about eloquence to the context of producing imaginative writing in this 
period. 
Rabelais’s narrator and alter ego Alcrofribas Nasier informs us that before Gargantua is 
educated by a humanist, Gargantua’s tutelage under the sophists was like his youthful binge-
drinking, the “poinct fin ny canon” of my title: with neither end nor rule, neither clear objective 
nor restrictions in place to manage it (58). This is also an appropriate formulation for Rabelais’s 
delight in taking every opportunity to talk about language and his issues with the educational 
models of his day. It encapsulates the limitless and manifold comedic and satirical possibilities 
of the subjects as he pushes both eloquence and education to their extremes. Yet in his 
enthusiasm for limitlessness and exaggeration, Rabelais is also interested in the rule that puts an 
end to such inexhaustibility. He lifted the phrase “poinct fin ny canon” from Erasmus’s The 
Praise of Folly. Folly, willing to transgress boundaries of good taste by praising herself 
excessively, says that while her praises are unlimited (“nullus sit modus nequis finis”), all 
orations must end at some point (Opera omnia 4:3, 178). Even boundless, abundant speech 
eventually meets its limit and exhausts itself or ceases to be effective: even unparalleled 
eloquence must meet its match. 
  
I. Expectations of Eloquence: Renaissance Education and the Study of Rhetoric 
 
 I turn first to the importance of rhetoric in humanist pedagogy and how Rabelais 
translates it into his versions of humanist educational programs in his books. Treatises on 
rhetoric and education from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries stress two essential points: the 
public usefulness of the study of rhetoric and the transformation of the student into a self-
governing public figure.
61
 There were a number of treatises circulating European courts in the 
1400s and 1500s detailing the marvels of the new humanist education, one that, like the humanist 
movement itself, was based on the revival, study, and imitation of ancient Greek and Roman 
texts. We are not sure to what extent humanist educational methods were as successful in reality 
as the humanists claimed them to be in their writing. In their excellent book From Humanism to 
the Humanities, Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine note that that there was a “great gap between 
the zealous faith of humanism and the training gained by the humanities” (xvi). They argue that 
while “humanism emphasized the study of grammar and poetry in the context of Classical 
literature and learning, allowing a student to develop his potential as an active participant in 
active life” humanism was “primarily about obedience… Classical culture was something to be 
mastered, not questioned” (xii, xiii-xiv). Their argument echoes that of Thomas Greene, who 
says that the humanists often confused “formation,” meaning education, with “transformation” 
(“Flexibility of the Self” 250, emphasis mine). Rabelais depicts this discrepancy between 
humanist ideal and humanist curriculum in his depictions of the education of his giants. I shall 
return to this discrepancy shortly and, for now, read his educational programs as straightforward 
counterparts to the treatises he undoubtedly knew alongside a discussion of Gargantua’s letter to 
his son in Pantagruel. This will later help highlight the durability test to which Rabelais submits 
the overall scheme of humanist pedagogical architecture, laying bare some of the structural 
weaknesses of its claims even as he purports to support it, especially in regards to the prince’s 
expected autonomy. 
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 For discussions on medieval and humanist curricula, see Curtius 36-78; Murphy, Latin Rhetoric and Education in 
the Middle Ages and Renaissance; and the vast contributions by Paul F. Grendler to the history of early modern 
education. 
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In his letter to his son in Pantagruel chapter 8, Gargantua insists on the ultimately public 
and active purpose of his son’s education. He accomplishes this in two fashions: first by 
emphasizing the indispensability of proving one’s intellectual prowess in public, and second by 
associating that prowess with military aptitude. Gargantua asserts that no one will dare appear in 
public without having first acquired the kind of knowledge that Pantagruel must, affixing a sense 
of shame to any lack of learning.
62
 Then, after cataloging the precise subjects that his son must 
study and how he is to prove himself intellectually, Gargantua announces the eventual end of his 
son’s life as a student and his debut as a prince: 
 
Somme que je voye un abysme de science: car doresnavant que tu deviens homme 
et te fais grand, il te fauldra yssir de ceste tranquillité et repos d’estude: et 
apprendre la chevalerie, et les armes pour defendre ma maison, et nos amys 
secourir en tous leurs affaires contre les assaulx des malfaisans. Et veux que de 
brief tu essaye combien tu as proffité, ce que tu ne pourras mieulx faire, que 
tenent conclusions en tout sçavoir publiquement envers tous et contre tous: et 
hantant les gens lettrez, qui sont tant à Paris comme ailleurs. (245) 
 
Gargantua’s prompt leap from military exercise (“apprendre la chevalerie et les armes”) back to 
intellectual defense (“tenent conclusions… envers tous et contre tous”) is not as unexpected as it 
may appear. Gargantua’s program of study for his son resonates with the contemporary debate of 
arms versus letters: in the dispute over which profession is nobler and more indispensable to the 
state, the soldier or the scholar, Gargantua eschews taking a side by framing letters as arms, at 
least for now, while Pantagruel is still young.
63
 The humanist curriculum, based on books, 
chiefly offers training in verbal defensive weaponry. The “controversiae” or “disputatio” method 
of argumentation taught in humanist educational programs was considered essential to the 
revival of Classical rhetoric and to the creation of humanist students as ideal “orators,” the figure 
that became the “organizing ideal” of humanism.64 A prince’s greatest instrument of power is the 
application of his wisdom, formed and informed by the best educational methods and teachers, 
and his eloquence, which in this letter points to his capacity for persuasive and knowledgeable 
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 “Et ne se fauldra plus doresnavant trouver en place ny en compaigne qui se sera bien expoli en l’officine de 
Minerve” (244).  
63
 Castiglione’s Il Libro del Cortigiano makes the arms versus letters debate a national matter: the Italians are all 
men of letters, the courtiers conclude, but the French only recognize arms: “i Franzesi solamente conoscano la 
nobilità delle arme e tutto il resto nulla estimino; di modo che non solamente non apprezzano le lettre, ma le 
aborriscono…” (89). However, the courtiers agree that if “monsignor d’Angolem” (the future François I) becomes 
king, then both arms and letters will flourish in France (90). It is interesting that the Italian courtiers discount here 
France’s traditional understanding of its central place in translatio studii, or “letters,” as I discussed it in my 
introduction. 
64
 Grafton, Jardine 7-8. According to Pier Paolo Vergerio, “disputatio” “… sharpens the mind, educates the tongue, 
and strengthens the memory, and not only do we learn numerous things through disputation, but we also understand 
better, express more aptly, and remember more firmly the things we learn this way. But also, by teaching others 
what we learn, we will be of no small help to ourselves; teaching what you have learned is the best way to improve” 
[“acuit enim ingenium disputatio, linguam erudite memoriamque confirmat; ac non modo multa disputando 
discimus, sed et quae sic discimus, melius scimus, aptius eloquimur et firmius recordamur. Sed et alios quoque 
docendo queae discimus, non parum et ipsi iuvabimur. Optimum namque proficiendi genus est, docere quae 
didiceris”] (Humanist Educational Treatises 64-65). For the orator as the “organizing ideal” of the humanists, see 
Seigel 100. 
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argumentation, to the benefit of his nation.
65
 Defending “conclusions” in public presents in a 
sense a prelude to Pantagruel’s future responsibilities and this exercise is part of his formation as 
a sovereign led by virtue and wisdom, just as is envisioned for the ideal orator by Cicero, who 
similarly sees eloquence as a defensive weapon.
66
 As we see in chapter ten of Pantagruel, the 
eponymous giant fulfills his father’s expectations, growing in reputation as a learned scholar and 
besting the majority of the Parisian population left and right in intellectual debates. Since 
Pantagruel conforms so perfectly to his father’s expectations, he therefore appears to be the 
perfect product of humanist education as it is outlined in this letter.
67
 
 Rhetoric, framed as verbal defense in Gargantua’s letter, plays a major role in the shaping 
of the student into a scholar and model citizen in the tradition of treatises on rhetoric and 
education from which Rabelais draws his material. The student will deploy the skills he has 
acquired for the regulation, defense, and benefit of his city. Putting private study to public use is 
a commonplace in pedagogical discourse. It is worth examining further the connection between 
rhetoric and politics in educational programs outlined in several of the most influential treatises 
of the period, to better understand the context in which Rabelais constructs his own versions of 
these programs. In fact, as Maurizio Viroli has shown, the language of politics in the 
Renaissance is the language of civil philosophy; political education at this time entails a renewal 
of republican ideals, the most important of which is the public utility of rhetoric (9, 201). Cicero, 
above all, provides the ultimate model for the humanist man. He is cited in these treatises for 
making eloquence a vital part of statecraft and for attributing the establishment and maintenance 
of order and civilization to the orators.
68
 The expectation is, therefore, that once all the effort of 
educating their students has been put in, they will repay the city by becoming active citizens; in 
Cicero’s terms, this means “persons competent to be retained as leaders and principals in civil 
actions and criminal trials and public debates” in a Republic (De Oratore 3.31.122). Pantagruel’s 
ability to prove his intellectual worth in public will be read as an indication of his potential as a 
political leader. Eventually, absolutist politics will oust Cicero in favor of Tacitus as an exemplar 
in the Renaissance: the latter, while still an orator, was a better fit for the change in regime and 
he marked a transition from the lauding of the active life to the praise of a more prudent mode of 
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 Inspired by Quintilian, who says that “perfect orators owe more to teaching than to nature,” humanists stress the 
fundamental necessity of training latent abilities (Institutio oratoria 2.19). 
66
 “… but the man who equips himself with the weapons of eloquence, not to be able to attack the welfare of his 
country but to defend it, he, I think, will be a citizen most helpful and most devoted both to his own interests and 
those of his community” [“qui vero ita sese armat eloquentia, ut non oppugnare commode patriae, sed pro his 
propugnare posit, is mihi vir et suis et publicis rationibus utilissimus atque amicissimus civic fore videtur”] (Cicero, 
De Inventione 1.i.i). 
67
 See Bauschatz, “From ‘estudier et profiter’ to ‘instruire et plaire.’” Bauschatz’s main point about Pantagruel’s 
education is that there is a one-to-one correspondence between theory and practice that is contingent upon the 
student’s compliance: “Reading (or studying) is for Pantagruel a simple process: effort leads to the desired result or 
‘prouffit.’… But it is still not clear what this ‘profit’ really is. The positive effects of study appear to be taken for 
granted by the narrator” (38). 
68
 “For my own part, after long thought, I have been led by reason itself to hold this opinion first and foremost, that 
wisdom without eloquence does too little for the good of states, but that eloquence without wisdom is generally 
highly disadvantageous and is never helpful” [“Ac me quidem diu cogitantem ratio ipsa in hanc potissimum 
sententiam ducit, ut existimem sapientiam sine eloquentia parum prodesse civitatibus, eloquentiam vero sine 
sapientia nimium obese plerumque, prodesse nunquam”]. (De Inventione 1.i.1). For remarks concerning the orator’s 
role in the creation of human society, see in particular De Oratore 1.8.33 and 1.33, De Inventione 1.2, and 
Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 2.16; see also Connolly for a thorough analysis of Cicero’s figure of the politically 
oriented orator-citizen. 
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political and social participation, without eloquence or a kind of speech particular to the prince.
69
 
Rabelais’s orator-prince is not yet the absolutist or Bodinian monarch: he is still a public man 
and this is reiterated in the discourses of rhetoric and education from the early Renaissance that 
influenced Rabelais’s writing. 
 The link between the humanist study of rhetoric and the practice of politics is found in 
influential Italian treatises of the fifteenth century. Pier Paolo Vergerio and Leonardo Bruni 
wrote two of the more important and widely-circulated treatises. Vergerio, in his The Character 
and Studies Befitting a Free-Born Youth (c. 1402), states that “eloquence, which is a distinct part 
of civics” should be added to philosophy and history as the primary studies of the public man. 
Eloquence, achieved through the study of rhetoric, is the necessary catalyst in the transformation 
of the private scholar to an ideal public figure. Like Pantagruel, the scholar must eventually leave 
his books and become useful to his city: “For someone who dedicates himself completely to 
theory and the delights of literature perchance becomes dear to himself, but whether a prince or a 
private citizen, he is surely of little use to his city.”70 Citizenship and public utility are crucial. 
The emphasis in these educational programs is that through the effort it takes to learn to speak 
well, the student will also learn to model his behavior on exemplary historical figures and 
therefore became a model for others. In other words, the mere possession of knowledge is 
insufficient, for knowledge without its application is a merely selfish enterprise: the binary pair 
that surfaces is, then, private/selfish versus public/useful. The adjustment of personal objective to 
public use is achieved through eloquence. Vergerio says, 
 
Through philosophy we can acquire correct views, which is of first importance in 
everything; through eloquence we can speak with weight and polish, which is the 
one skill that most effectively wins over the minds of the masses; but history 
helps us with both… The outcome of these studies is to enable anyone to speak 
well and to inspire him to act as well as possible; this is the mark of the greatest 
men and the absolutely finest characters.
71
 
 
Thus writers of these treatises answer the question of why we study the humanities: the purpose 
of any education is the benefit of the city. The student becomes a kind of sieve for the public, 
educating and guiding through his erudition and judgment. 
Most treatises focus on the reasons why eloquence must be mastered, but not necessarily 
how or even the criteria by which the eloquence of others should be judged. The result is that the 
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 See Salmon. Jean Bodin was influential in divorcing eloquence from politics. He attests to the necessity of 
prudence for orators in his Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem of 1566: “Et de même que par l’heureux 
concours du gouvernement, de la magistrature, du barreau et de l’Église la société sera parfaitement entretenue si les 
soldats sont vaillants, les juges équitables, les pontifes pieux et les orateurs prudents – de même tout s’écroulera non 
moins aisément si l’on ne respecte pas les principes de la politique” (19). Bodin was of the opinion that 
commonplaces about eloquence appear to give the eloquent man more power than the monarch, and therefore such 
myths about language should be discouraged (Rebhorn, Emperor 72). 
70
 “Nam qui totus speculationi ac litterarum illecebris deditus est, is est forsitan sibi ipsi carus, at parum certe utilis 
urbi aut princeps est aut privatus” (Humanist Educational Treatises 58). The importance of the orator’s active life is 
not a notion unique to Vergerio: Poliziano and Coluccio Salutati, among other prominent Italian scholars, equally 
advocate the orator’s necessary utility to the state. See also Viroli and Seigel. 
71
 “… eloquentia, quae civilis scientiae pars quaedam est. Per philosophiam quidem possumus recte sentire quod est 
in omni re primum; per eloquentiam graviter ornateque dicere qua una re maxime conciliantur multitudinis animi; 
per historiam vero in utrumque iuvamur… Ex quibus id effictur, quod est summi viri et omnino excellentis ingenii, 
ut et optime quis dicere posit et studeat quam optime facere” (Humanist Educational Treatises 48). 
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stakes of such study (the fate of the city) are magnified by the rhetoric particular to this kind of 
discourse without providing a firm structure or rules for what become an out-of-control 
curriculum of study and an impossible reading list; pedagogical discourse often simply becomes 
tautological, so that suggesting means for acquiring eloquence just reiterates how important it is 
to acquire eloquence. For instance, to master the art of eloquence, Leonardo Bruni, in his The 
Study of Literature, to Lady Battista Malatesta of Montefeltro (1420s), prescribes the reading of 
orators’ speeches – literary study above all provides the backbone for humanist education – even 
to the rare female student who will nonetheless “leave the rough-and-tumble of the forum 
entirely to men,” again emphasizing the essentially public nature of this kind of study.72 So it is 
to be through reading and exposure to eloquent writing that the student acquires this special 
language power. Bruni further pursues the public utility of such study by distinguishing the 
humanist student, who is an orator, from the philosopher. Bruni explains that even though the 
philosophers also teach how to differentiate between good deeds and bad, the orators (civic 
humanists) have some indefinable special power in this regard that surpasses the philosophers’ 
ability to convey their lessons. Bruni’s remarks neatly imitate Cicero’s De Oratore 2.35 in that 
Cicero too wants the educated man to speak with authority and to inspire his nation to virtuous 
action through his wisdom.
73
 Thus the end of education, though its processes remain somewhat 
mysterious, is not merely to obtain knowledge, but to become an ideal public figure (the Orator) 
who applies his knowledge to the “rough-and-tumble of the forum.” 
 Since the stakes are so high, the public orientation of humanist eloquence necessitates the 
personal moral integrity of the orator (Grafton, Jardine 33, 123). Cicero asserts that while 
eloquence is one of the supreme virtues, it must be “combined with integrity and supreme 
wisdom” or else “we shall not have made orators of them but shall have put weapons into the 
hands of madmen.”74 We see here the framing of letters as arms that Gargantua upholds. Instead 
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 “… totam denique fori asperitatem viris relinquet” (Humanist Educational Treatises 104). Undoubtedly, even 
female scholars would utilize this reading of orators to serve the city, even if it were only within the domestic sphere 
by fostering civic pride in her children.  
73
 “I will further urge her not to neglect the orators. Where else is virtue praised with such passion and vice 
condemned with such ferocity? It is the orators who will teach us to praise the good deed and to hate the bad; it is 
they who will teach us how to soothe, encourage, stimulate, or deter. All these things the philosophers do, it is true, 
but in some special way anger, mercy, and the arousal and pacification of the mind are completely within the power 
of the orator… In sum, all the richness, power, and polish in our expression, its lifeblood, as it were, we will derive 
from the orators” [“Oratores quoque ut legere non negligat, suadebo. Quis enim aut virtutes extollere ardentius aut 
vitia fulminare atrocious solet? Ab his et laudare bene facta et detestari facinora addiscemus; ab his consolari, 
cohortari, impellere, absterrere. Quae licet omnia a philosophis fiant, tamen nescio quomodo et ira et misericordia et 
omnis animi suscitatio ac repression in potestate est oratoris… Denique omnem opulentiam verborum, omnem 
dicendi vim et quasi ornatum, omnem orationis (ut ita dixerim) vivacitatem et sanguinem ab istis sumemus”] 
(Humanist Educational Treatises, 108-110). 
74
 “For eloquence is one of the supreme virtues – although all the virtues are equal and on a par, but nevertheless one 
has more beauty and distinction in outward appearance than another, as is the case with this faculty, which, after 
compassing a knowledge of facts, gives verbal expression to the thoughts and purposes of the mind in such a manner 
as to have the power of driving the hearers forward in any direction in which it has applied its weight; and the 
stronger this faculty is, the more necessary it is for it to be combined with integrity and supreme wisdom, and if we 
bestow fluency of speech on persons devoid of those virtues, we shall not have made orators of them but shall have 
put weapons into the hands of madmen” [“Est enim eloquentia una quaedam de summis virtutibus – quanquam sunt 
omnes virtutes aequales et pares, sed tame nest specie alia magis alia formosa et illustris, sicut haec vis quae 
scientiam complexa rerum, sense mentis et consilia sic verbis explicat ut eos qui audient quocumque incubuerit posit 
impellere; quae quo maior est vis, hoc est magis probitate iungenda summaque prudential; quaerum virtutum 
expertibus si dicendi copiam tradiderimus, non eos quidem oratores effecerimus, sed furentibus quaedam arma 
dederimus”)] (De Oratore 3.14.55). 
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of training in actual arms, humanism proposes rhetorical weapons, albeit sometimes warily 
because of the possibility of rhetoric’s misuse. In an effort to reduce such moral objections to 
rhetoric, influential figures such as Giovanni Pico della Mirandola wish language to be restrained 
by the study of philosophy and ethics.
75
 This need to shape the private moral self of the humanist 
pupil reaches perhaps its fullest expression in the first decades of the sixteenth century in 
northern Europe, with Erasmus of Rotterdam and the education of the prince. 
 As humanism made its way north, in order to maintain its relevance it had to adapt from 
the republics of Italy to a different form of government, the monarchy. The subject of treatises 
shifts from the orator-citizen to an orator-prince. Though the public purpose of education is still 
emphasized, less importance is placed on republican virtues or civic values. Foucault takes note 
of this same phenomenon in his study of parrhēsia (truth-telling) as it evolves from Athenian 
democracy to the Roman Empire: he considers specifically what the prince, as opposed to the 
citizen, needs “to form an appropriate relationship to himself that will guarantee his virtue, and 
also such that, thereby and through this teaching, he is formed as a morally worthy individual” 
and “as a governor who takes responsibility for and care of others as well as himself” 
(Government of Self 47). This truth-telling is also found in Castiglione’s ideal courtier (see 4.4). 
In the Renaissance, Christian morality and, most of all, concern for the person of the prince take 
precedence in discourses about the prince’s education as the very conduit for the prince’s 
government of himself and others. In a monarchy or an empire, there is only one man, as 
opposed to many, to persuade in order to enact change (Government of Self 224). The humanists 
imagine this concentration of power as the best kind of state, but it is also a problematic one. The 
prince and his state are often figured as one, and if one should weaken, so will the other. The 
following from Erasmus is particularly indicative of the greater stakes of the prince’s moral 
education in the humanist scheme: “The corruption of an evil prince spreads more quickly and 
widely than the contagion of any plague. Conversely, there is no other quicker and effective way 
of improving public morals than for the prince to lead a blameless life” (Institutio 219). If the 
prince is too easily manipulated, whether by others or by his own vices, he cannot be a good self-
governing sovereign and the state will be at the mercy of flatterers and counselors with 
questionable intentions; worse still, the state may descend into tyranny. The stakes of the 
prince’s education is the state itself as an extension of his person. 
 Erasmus’s reformulation of humanism into a decidedly Christian liberal pedagogy 
concerned with the prince’s moral welfare was particularly influential on his friend Rabelais, as 
were Erasmus’s overall works, in the creation of the Christian giant princes Pantagruel and 
Gargantua. Two of Erasmus’s major treatises, De pueris statim ac liberaliter instituendis 
declamatio (A Declamation on the Subject of Early Liberal Education for Children, first 
published in 1529) and Institutio principis christiani (The Education of a Christian Prince, 1516) 
outline Erasmus’s Christian pedagogy and his concern for the prince’s moral education. Erasmus 
tells the young dedicatee of the Institutio, the future emperor Charles V, to never forget that he is 
“the likeness of God and his vicar” and, as such, the prince should master “total power, total 
wisdom, total goodness… so far as you can” in emulation of God (220). Thus the prince’s 
Christian kingdom will be preserved from tyranny and destruction. The Christian prince must 
govern differently from the collection of pagan precedents (mostly tyrants themselves) acquired 
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 “People who do not care for literary form are not civilized. People without philosophy are not human. Eloquence 
without wisdom can still be useful. But inane eloquence is like a sword in the hands of the fool: it can do nothing 
except damage” (cited in Garin 103). 
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from the prince’s study of history, but this difference allows him to maintain his authority in 
better, more enduring ways:  
 
It is the right of a pagan prince to oppress his people by fear, to compel them to 
do humiliating tasks, to dispossess them, to plunder their goods and finally make 
martyrs of them: that is a pagan prince’s right. You do not want the Christian to 
have the same, do you? Or will his rightful power seem to be reduced if these 
things are denied him? Authority is not lost to him who rules in a Christian way; 
but he maintains it in other ways, and indeed much more gloriously and more 
securely… But when Christian charity binds prince and people together, then 
everything is yours whenever occasion demands. For the good prince does not 
make demands except when the country’s interests demand it.76  
 
Inspired by Plato’s figure of the philosopher-king, which also appears in the Rabelais’s books, 
Erasmus notably desires orators that are modeled on Classical exempla but nonetheless checked 
by specifically Christian thinking and morals.
77
 Such a juxtaposition emphasizes the historical 
and religious differences that separate sixteenth-century European monarchies from their 
multiple ‘ancestral,’ pagan, democratic, and imperial predecessors. The sense of Christian 
community to which Erasmus alludes here makes the prince responsible to his people in a way 
that pagan precedents do not. This Christian prince retains some of the duties and talents of the 
Ciceronian orator-citizen, but he has the most important exemplars in the Christian faith to 
ensure that the orator-prince and his state never descend into tyranny, ruled by anything outside 
the Christian ethical framework, such as the passions of ambition or greed.
78
  
Rabelais echoes Erasmus’s insistence on Christian faith in Gargantua’s letter. Gargantua 
exhorts his son to put all his faith in God, whose word remains eternal, and not in “les abus du 
monde” and “ceste vie transitoire” precisely because “science sans conscience n’est que ruine de 
l’ame” (245). In an interesting collapse of prince, orator, and God, Rabelais will insist in the 
Tiers Livre that “le dire” of God is “en un moment par effect representé,” meaning that God’s 
words are instantaneously transformed into deeds (e.g., fiat lux) (345). God, then, is the ultimate 
model for the prince and for the orator, who fashions his word on the eternal Word in his 
attempts to persuade and inspire action from speech. Thus for Erasmus and for Rabelais the 
public usefulness of humanist education relies on private faith and a community united by faith, 
where goodness and charity have agreed upon definitions. The Erasmian image of a Christian 
community stands in stark contrast to my earlier example of the Chats-fourrez; this juxtaposition 
of opposites shows Rabelais’s creative inversion of an idealized community. The Chats-fourrez 
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Institio 236. “Ius est ethnic principi suos metu premere, ad seruiles operas adigere, exigere possessionibus, expilare 
bonis; denique martyres facere ius est ethnici principis. Num idem vis esse Christiano? Aut ius illius imminutum 
videbitur, si minus haec illi liceant? Non perit suum ius ei, qui christianae gerit imperium, sed aliter possidet et 
quidem multo tum praeclarius tum tutius… Caeterum cum Christiana charitas conciliat populum ac principem, ibi 
tua sunt omnia quoties res postulat. Non enim postulat bonus princeps, nisi cum vtilitas patriae flagitat (Omnia 
opera 4:2, 166-167). 
77
 “’C’est (dist Gargantua) ce que dict Platon lib. V. de rep. que lors les republiques seroient heureuses, quand les 
roys philosopheroient ou les philosophes regneroient’” (124). Stephens also notes the novelty of Rabelais’s good 
giants in a literary landscape inclined to depict giants as unequivocally evil (11, 188). 
78
 On Erasmus’s formulations of Christian exemplarity and community, see Hampton, Writing from History, 48-62. 
For Erasmus’s emphasis on virtue, see Tracy, The Politics of Erasmus, chapter 1. For Rabelais’s now widely 
recognized Christian humanism, see Febvre, Le Probl me de l’in royan e au XVIe si  le: la religion de Rabelais. 
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cannot be charitable if greed is their only true law, and they remain untouched by both eloquence 
and learning. The Chats-fourrez therefore stand firmly outside both the Christian and the 
humanist communities that Erasmus and others construct in their discourses according to certain 
ethical and intellectual parameters: for Erasmus, “vertu est vertu appellée.” 
Erasmus’s writings related to instruction testify to shifts in his opinion on eloquence. 
Such changes were likely influential on Rabelais’s own attitudes on the subject, particularly in 
how Erasmus describes ways to protect the prince from rhetoric even as he studies it. Erasmus 
periodically questions the relevance of eloquence in the monarchies of northern Europe; this kind 
of objection comes through particularly in satirical texts such as Ciceronianus (1528) but is also 
visible in his educational treatises.
79
 He eventually moves from advocating eloquence to wishing 
to teach the prince to judge discourses on the criterion of sincerity rather than on eloquence 
(Tracy, Erasmus, The Growth of A Mind 120-121). Erasmus’s main quibble with rhetoric is its 
tendency to misrepresent the truth in favor of similitude. It uses “conjurer’s tricks” and “spells” 
to persuade by deception or by flattery.
80
 For instance, Erasmus encourages the prince to reflect 
on the sincerity of compliments before believing them: “Since you are the prince, see to it that 
you allow only such compliments as are worthy of a prince. If someone speaks highly of your 
appearance, reflect that that sort of praise is for a woman. If anyone admires your eloquence, 
remember that that is praise for sophists and orators” (242). Along with sincerity, he offers 
Christian morals as a way of reducing both the abuses of eloquence and the effects that such 
abuses can have on the prince. Indeed, the theme of “checking and diluting” (“temperari 
diluique”) becomes a commonplace in Renaissance writing on rhetoric and education aimed at 
princes so that the prince does not become a tyrant, unable to distinguish the honest man from 
the flatterer, and so that his “science” is always grounded in “conscience” (Institutio 231; Opera 
omnia 4:1, 162-3). 
I mentioned earlier that the method the humanists propose to accomplish the crafting of a 
discerning scholar is primarily reading and interpretation. It was believed that without the literary 
study distinctive of humanist education, the prince will never be able to think or act for himself.
81
 
Erasmus insists that no person can speak the truth the way books do, so the truth must be learned 
from the written word (Institutio 253). But this is certainly not the naked written word. In brief, 
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 As Erasmus says in the Ciceronianus, eloquence is not a proper activity for man if it, on the one hand, does not 
fulfill its purpose – such as addressing the public and arguing in courts of law – and if, on the other hand, such a 
skill necessary to republics is no longer applicable under monarchies (Ciceronianus 405): “Bulephorus: Eloquentia, 
quae nihil aliud quam delectate, non est eloquentia, nimirum in aliud reperta, quod nisi praestat, nec decora videri 
debet bono viro. Verum vt olim fuerit vtilis eloquentia Ciceronis, hodie quis est illius vsus? An in iudiciis?... Itaque 
cui tandem vsui Paramus hanc operosam ciceronis eloquentiam? Num concionibus? Vulgus Ciceronis linguam non 
intelligit: et apud populum nihil agitur de rep” (Opera Omnia 1:2, 654). We must, of course, take into the 
consideration the fact that the Ciceronianus is meant as a satire of those who stubbornly imitate only Ciceronian 
Latin and that Erasmus, through Bulephorus, may not mean everything in that work to be taken completely literally. 
80
 “Bulephorus: One doesn’t need Ciceronian eloquence for that sort of thing. On the contrary, your rhetorical 
theorists allow the orator on occasion to misrepresent the truth, to magnify the unimportant and make the splendid 
look small, which is a kind of conjurer’s trick, to infiltrate the hearer’s mind by deception, and finally to carry his 
intelligence by storm through rousing his emotions, which is putting a kind of spell on him” (Ciceronianus 382). 
[“Ah hoc non est magnopere opus eloquentia Ciceroniana. Nam vestri rhetores permittunt oratori mentiri 
nonnunquam, res humiles verbis attollere, magnificas deiicare, quod sane praestigii genus est, obrepere insidiis in 
animum auditoris. Postremo mouendis affecitibus, quod veneficii genus est, vim adherrre mentibus” (Opera Omnia 
1:2, 636)]. 
81
 For example, Piccolomini’s The Education of Boys lays out how the sequence of study beginning with grammar, 
rhetoric, dialectic, and leading to moral philosophy will teach the humanist student how to live rightly (Humanist 
Educational Treatises 244-259). 
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this process primarily entails different ways of reading exemplary lives and texts, but the most 
important strategy of crafting the self-governing, moral prince is the humanist tutor himself, who 
is the only one capable of interpreting texts for the prince. The rhetoric of fear for the prince’s 
mind, frequent to treatises on education and customarily aimed at the prince’s parents, professes 
to support and empower the institution of monarchy with its claims of care while equally, if not 
mostly, promoting itself by embellishing the talents of humanist tutors. Erasmus was, of course, 
acutely aware of this: his Folly is amused by the verbal trickery employed by “grammatici” to 
persuade parents of their talents.
82
 In a rather robust formulation of humanism’s capacity for 
educating the prince, in a non-satirical context, Erasmus says that only a proper humanist 
education can transform the prince from a “shapeless lump… capable of assuming any form” 
into a “godlike creature” as opposed to an “animal” (De pueris 305) or even a “horrible monster” 
(Institutio 259). Along with the pair of private and public, the opposition of godlike creature and 
monster is one of the most important antitheses of humanist pedagogical discourse, setting itself 
up as the only means of creating such a divine prince. 
Timing is, of course, everything. The prince’s education must begin when he is young, 
still “shapeless,” as it were, “while his spirit is still open to each and every influence and at the 
same time highly retentive of what it has grasped” (De pueris 297). Erasmus writes that “No 
other time is so suitable for moulding and improving the prince as when he does not yet 
understand that he is the prince” (Institutio 207). This clearly signals a problem of authority. The 
tutor is the subject of the prince but also his master. In his capacity as master, he must tell the 
truth, but as a subject, he must flatter in order to improve his charge. The only way to set aside 
this paradox of the master-as-subject is to begin the prince’s education before he knows what he 
is, before it is impossible for him to have any master other than himself. 
If the mind of the state, the prince, is healthy and virtuous, the body of the state will be as 
well, so all attention must be given to the prince’s mind: in order to govern others, he must be 
able to govern himself, but in order to govern himself, he must first be governed and shaped by 
competent hands. A country may “owe everything to a good prince, but it owes the prince 
himself to the one whose right counsel has made him what he is.”83 The organic metaphor of 
stakes tied to plants so that the plants may grow properly, an image also common to discourses 
on the imitation of Classical authors, is often evoked to depict the tutor-pupil relationship.
84
 Just 
as the plant owes its upward growth to the stake, the prince owes his development to his tutor. 
Obedience and dependence must be cultivated in the young prince. One of the tutor’s duties is 
even to restrain “this excessive desire to know and learn” so that the student’s enthusiasm does 
not become unmanageable.
85
 Thus the ideal tutor joins the ranks of privileged intellectuals 
surrounding the prince, providing living, present examples of virtue and wisdom.  
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 “Idque nescio quibus praestigiis mire efficient, vt stultis materculis et idiotis patribus tales videantur, quales ipsi 
se faciunt” (Opera omnia 4:3, 138). 
83
 Institutio 207. “Omnia debet patria bono principi. At hunc ipsum debet ei, qui rectis rationibus talem effecerit” 
(Opera omnia 4:1, 138). 
84
 “For as stakes are bound to young treeshoots to prevent them from being bent over by their own weight or by the 
wind, so also young people should depend on companions from whose advice they may learn, by whose conscience 
they be restrained, and in imitation of whom they may improve themselves” [Quemadmodum enim teneris arborum 
virgultis stipites alligantur ne aut propria mole aut vi ulla ventorum deflecti possint, ita et iuventibus adhibendi sunt 
comites quorum monitis discant et conscientia  retrahantur et imitatione proficiant] (Humanist Educational Treatises 
22-23). See also Erasmus, Institutio principis christiani 209 (Opera omnia 4:2, 140). This treatise addresses the 
instructor as much as his noble charge, as are others such as Piccolimini’s The Education of Boys (135). 
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 See particularly Vergerio’s text in Humanist Educational Treatises in which he compares restraining excessive 
curiosity to supervising proper eating and digestive habits (60-63). 
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Though Erasmus declares that there is no “truth more honest and more candid than that 
found in books,” he appends to this the need for the prince to surround himself with wise and 
frank friends and counselors to mediate between him and the text (Institutio 243). The humanist 
interprets the past for the prince through the reading of exemplary lives. He provides “living 
mirrors [vivum speculum]” in the present, good and wise men against which the prince can 
measure his virtue (Humanist Educational Treatises 13, 27). The prince must rely on other 
people and those other people must have studied a humanist curriculum, for only they can ‘read 
properly,’ whether interpreting the past, advising in the present, or speaking to the future in their 
own writing. Students deceive themselves if they rely too much on their own abilities.
86
 Erasmus 
draws from Classical mythology to illustrate this point. Phaethon, a son of the sun god, gets a 
chance to drive his father’s chariot across the sky. He is unable to keep the horses on their daily 
track and so scorches the earth, so Zeus kills him to save the world. Erasmus says that the 
humanist tutor “should show that he [Phaethon] represents a prince who seized the reins of 
government in the headstrong enthusiasm of youth but with no supporting wisdom and brought 
ruin upon himself and the entire world” (Institutio 212, emphasis mine). We see here that 
reading, for the prince, is a passive activity. He does not read and interpret for himself, learning 
to exercise his own judgment. He is read to and interpreted for by someone established as an 
unquestionable authority to which he is obedient. His reading becomes a fable about himself, 
especially his own dependence upon others and how his unchecked behavior or curiosity can 
lead to total ruin. Erasmus’s allegorization of Phaethon is also a warning: will the prince be 
memorialized as a Phaethon or as a good prince? This promise of posterity looking upon him 
favorably also keeps the prince in check, so that he may be written into history and memorialized 
as an example to follow.  
Most treatises addressed to princes, whether they aim their writing at a young prince or 
not, insist on the place of the humanist in the prince’s life, whether it is his personal life as a tutor 
or public life as a counselor. Since some treatises are addressed to adult princes, their tone tends 
to be less severe than that struck by Erasmus’s reference to the “monsters” that are created by 
bad education. For instance, Guillaume Budé, one of France’s first and more important 
humanists, writes in his De l’institution du prince that the prince has no need for a master, just 
the reading of exemplary lives, many of which he has kindly described and interpreted for his 
dedicatee’s benefit (85). Such treatises do not always insist on setting up a system of behavioral 
controls through textual interpretation for the prince, but rather they carve out opportunities for 
humanists in other ways. Yet, again, they do employ a rhetoric of dependence, of a similar 
species to that for younger princes, in which humanists create demand for what they alone can 
supply. Claude de Seyssel, author of La grand monarchie de France (1515), says that these kinds 
of checks are already embedded in the government itself, in the form of religion, justice, and 
polity.
87
 But Seyssel gives other employment opportunities to humanists: he insists that the 
prince must never depend solely on himself for counsel: the prince “ought not to keep any matter 
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 Vergerio encourages the student to confer with his classmates to sharpen their minds, because there is nothing “so 
inimical to learning as the presumption of one’s own erudition or excessive reliance upon one’s own wits: the one 
takes away our interest in learning, while the other diminishes it, and in this way students unnecessarily deceive 
themselves” (65). Erasmus, of course, speaks to a prince who would likely be educated on his own and not in a 
classroom, but the idea of the student not relying on his own mind remains consistent from republic to monarchy. 
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 In his chapter entitled “The Authority and Power of the King is Regulated and Bridled in France by Three 
Bridles”, Seyssel describes how religion, justice, and polity (here meaning ordinances made by previous kings of 
France) are sufficient in regulating both the government and the king. 
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concerning his state, however secret it may be, to himself” (79). The rhetoric of dependence 
cultivated in such writing remains persistent even when some of its usual components are absent. 
Moreover, Seyssel, unlike writers such as Budé, does not explicitly promote the dual 
nature of the prince – that he be, on the one hand, an Augustus, a true sovereign, and on the other 
hand, a Maecenas, a patron of the arts (Woodward 132). Seyssel is an exception. Most writers of 
Renaissance educational treatises tend to promote the prince’s role as patron, even referring to 
the prince’s own intellectual fecundity as responsible for the intellectual climate of the state. 
Budé says to the young François I: “Et ferez poëtes et orateurs comme vous faictes contes et 
ducs, en leur inspirant vertu d’éloquence par votre libéralle bégninité, ainsi que au temps passé 
faisoient les princes de Rome en soy portent tuteurs des disciplines libéralles” (79). The prince 
‘makes’ poets and orators in recognition of their talents as readily as he would acknowledge 
military expertise with titles and lands. This idea of princely patronage echoes the double nature 
of the humanist as scholar and public man envisioned by Gargantua in his letter, who attends to 
arms and letters in equal measure. 
Through literary study and through the production of effective discourse, the prince will 
learn how to ‘read,’ that is, make judgments of his own and evaluate his counselors’ advice. This 
kind of study becomes then both an instrument of power for the prince and a defense against that 
same power. As the sophist Janotus de Bragmardo puts it so neatly in Gargantua chapter 20, 
when he is demanding the gifts promised him by Gargantua only to be met with laughter and 
evasiveness: “ne clochez pas devant les boyteux” (54-55). No one can successfully use sophistry 
against a sophist; rhetorical tricks do not work on a rhetorician. Likewise, no one can manipulate 
a prince who has already been made aware of methods of persuasion and rhetorical tools of 
manipulation. At that point, the scholar no longer needs a teacher and he can readily instruct 
others.
88
 In order to do so, he must employ eloquence, the instrument by which the prince “peut 
pleinement et amplement monstrer et exhibir sa grande puissance” (Budé 81). Eloquence is 
nearly always framed as a crucial political power, the method by which a prince proves himself: 
letters as arms, eloquence mightier than the sword. 
All this discourse on the prince’s ‘shaping’ confirms the humanist’s main activity in the 
prince’s life: the mediator between the prince and history with eloquence as the prince’s 
instrument. The tutor interprets the past for the prince, introduces him to important contemporary 
intellectuals, and negotiates the prince’s posterity, his memorialization, and his place in the land 
of letters. “Your life is open to view: you cannot hide,” Erasmus tells the prince, now become a 
very public mirror.
89
 The prince becomes text. Renaissance humanists affirm constantly that the 
purpose of education is “not merely to demonstrate the truth of given precepts, but to impel 
people toward their acceptance and application” and also that “men could be moulded most 
effectively, and perhaps only, through the art of eloquence, which endowed the precept with life, 
immediacy, persuasive effect” (H. Gray 500-501). Becoming a model for others is the moral 
prerogative of the application of humanist learning. The prince is therefore indoctrinated by the 
reading of exemplary past figures, the company of contemporary intellectual models, and the 
idea that, in the future, the prince must be wise and good enough to also be ‘read’ as exemplary. 
Thus the expectation for eloquence in humanist education is the transformation of the prince into 
a public model for virtue and learning, one who acts always with the polity in mind and with 
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 See Guarino, A Program of Teaching and Learning (Humanist Educational Treatises 292-293). 
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 Institutio 218. “Tua in conspicuo vita est, latere non potes: aut mango omnium bono bonus sis necesse est aut 
magna omnium pernicie malus” (Opera 4:2 149). 
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language as his greatest instrument, that produces others in his image that are as vital to the 
nation as its noblemen, an equality between arms and letters embodied in the prince himself.  
The goal of these educational programs is to form a prince who can think and act for 
himself, who can detect sincerity and tell if someone is faking a limp. The process by which this 
miraculous moment of autonomy comes about, however, is not described in discourses about 
education. As Grafton and Jardine have found, humanist education primarily fosters obedience 
and imitation. The prince described in these treatises obeys, but does not yet reason or self-
govern; in Foucault’s estimation, this is the very state of Kantian tutelage, wherein an external 
source, such as a book or a “spiritual director” (Seelsorger) is substituted for the prince’s own 
judgment (Government of Self 30). The relationship of the prince with his tutor and counselor is 
that between “a sovereign, the one who has power but lacks the truth” and the counselor, “the 
one who has the truth but lacks power” (Fearless Speech 32). From the discourse of the prince’s 
education, it becomes clear that the point of humanist pedagogy is transforming a prince into a 
sovereign who has both power and knowledge, but not necessarily independence or the ability to 
act on his own judgment. 
Rabelais attempts to answer this problem of how and when the prince achieves autonomy 
in the second volume of his pentalogy. He narrates the moment when the prince is tested, where 
he is transformed, quite literally, in the encounter with his opposite. He does this through the 
intervention of a suspect literary form, the encomium, a vehicle for flattery, the very thing that 
Erasmus fears and hopes to keep in check. In what follows, I show that at the very points where 
Rabelais seems to be fully endorsing humanist pedagogy, the satirical elements and the absent 
eloquence force us to notice that even here, there is a refusal of integration: everything finds its 
opposite and undoes itself. 
 
II. Out of Joint: Expectations and Gargantuine Realities 
 
 Gargantua’s letter to his son portrays Pantagruel as an eager and diligent student meeting 
all the expectations laid out for him, both by his father and by the discourses on education that 
inform the writing of the letter. Pantagruel’s tutor Epistemon, according to Gargantua at least, 
fulfills his duties by instructing Pantagruel and acquainting his pupil with important intellectuals 
who will spur the young giant on to further study and virtuous living (244). Pantagruel’s virtue 
has already been tested to the satisfaction of his father: “Ce que je ne dis par defiance que je aye 
de ta vertu, laquelle m’a esté jà par cy devant esprouvée, mais pour plus fort te encourager à 
profitter de bien en mieulx” (243). Gargantua shows confidence in his son’s ability to become a 
“living mirror” after such rigorous study, which is his sole wish and “thesor [sic] en ce monde, 
que de te veoir une foys en ma vie absolu et parfaict, tant en vertu, honesteté et preudhommie, 
comme en tout sçavoir liberal et honeste…” (243). Gargantua’s letter gives Pantagruel “nouveau 
courage,” and his passion for books is likened to a fire burning through brush, “tant il l’avoit 
infatigable et strident” (246). What remains for Pantagruel is to make his abilities public by 
defending “conclusions” on all subjects, which he does in Paris in front of important lawyers, 
doctors, bureaucrats, and lords. He “mist tous de cul” all the professors and orators; as for the 
Sorbonne theologians, he “feist tous quinaulx, et leurs montra visiblement qu’ilz n’estoient que 
veaulx engiponnez” (250-251). Even the Parisian women begin pointing out Pantagruel on the 
street, so great is his reputation for learning and debate. Nothing appears to undermine the 
educational program that Rabelais describes in Pantagruel. 
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 At the same time, however, Pantagruel cannot be the ideal Orator outlined in the 
discourses of education and rhetoric. The proof of his successful and diligent study, defending 
“conclusions,” is ultimately selfish, almost a travesty of eloquence, as it serves no other purpose 
than the display of Pantagruel’s ability to argue against his intellectual equals and take pleasure 
in being recognized. This exercise does not speak to his ability as a prince, but rather his ability 
to consume and process his reading. More importantly, Pantagruel the book and Pantagruel the 
character both ideologically resist rhetoric altogether even as it is held up in such high esteem by 
Gargantua and the treatises that inform his letter. Indeed, the terms “rhetorique” and “eloquence” 
do not figure at all in the first of Rabelais’s books, though they are of increasing importance in 
the later books.
90
 Instead, Pantagruel aligns itself with philosophy and exhibits the violence 
towards rhetoric characteristic of philosophic discourse that insists on truth and simplicity over 
rhetorical embellishment and deception.
91
 Though he might be seen on the surface as a figure for 
the idealized Christian humanist philosopher-king, Pantagruel rejects language, often violently, 
and exhibits a consistent mistrust of words.  
Pantagruel contains many confrontations over language’s capacity to mask the truth. 
They suggest that, in this first volume, Rabelais uses Pantagruel to explore almost exclusively 
the negative commonplaces about rhetoric. Pantagruel forces the “écolier limousin,” who 
imagines himself to be a great orator by Latinizing his French, to speak “naturellement” by 
taking him by the throat (234). Pantagruel threatens two lords with beheading if they do not tell 
him the complete truth during a legal dispute (253). Along with forcing the truth out of his 
interlocutors, Pantagruel also, on numerous occasions, dries up the throats of anyone who would 
misrepresent themselves, misuse language, or transgress boundaries. This is a specifically 
language-oriented twist on the medieval tradition of Pantagruel as a little demon of salt and 
thirst. For instance, the young giant sends a box of “confitures” to the book’s primary antagonist 
Anarche that promptly burns his throat, the remedy to which is the silencing activity of 
continuous wine-drinking (313). Pantagruel’s sowing of salt into the mouths of other characters, 
whether literal or figurative, and generalized violence towards throats lead François Rigolot to 
conclude that the giant imposes silence rather than inspiring speech (Les Langages de Rabelais 
37). Indeed, the constant attention given to throats maps out the book’s preoccupation with the 
idea that human communication is ultimately unreliable, if not always outright deceitful, if it 
must be stopped at its physiological source. In another undercutting of expectations, Pantagruel’s 
role as a patron and progenitor is limited to a race of pygmies who retain their creator’s quick 
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 Dixon’s concordance to Rabelais is exceptionally useful in seeing which of his five books show more interest in 
rhetoric and speech than others. I refer here to the entries on “Rétorique” (739), “Rhétorique” (743), and 
“Eloquence” (277), as well as their adjectival and adverbial variants. Related entries such as “Dire” (254), 
“Discours” (255), “Élégant” (277), “Langaige” (475), “Oraison” (593), “Parole(s)” (621), “Prononcer” (698), 
“Propos / Propous” (699) confirm a marked quantitative increase in the use of words about speech in the books after 
Pantagruel. 
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 Foucault provides a succinct explanation of the long-standing rivalry between philosophy and rhetoric, between 
philosophers and rhetoricians. Drawing from Plato’s So rates’s Apology, Foucault concludes that the line of 
demarcation between philosophy and rhetoric has to do with art and truth: “Rhetorical language is a language 
chosen, fashioned, and constructed in such a way as to produce its effect on the other person. The mode of being of 
philosophical language is to be etumos, that is to say, so bare and simple, so in keeping with the very movement of 
thought that, just as it is without embellishment, in its truth, it will be appropriate to what it refers to… Whereas the 
mode of being of rhetorical language is to be constructed according to the rules and techniques (according to a 
te hnē) and addressed to the other’s soul, philosophical language will be without these devices, without these 
techknai (Government of Self 314-315). For more on the varying relationships between philosophy and rhetoric in 
the early modern period, see Seigel; Plett; Moss, Renaissance Truth and the Latin Language Turn. 
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temper and, in a form of Bakhtinian degradation, originate in quite the opposite end of 
Pantagruel’s body than his throat.92 We have to wonder what would have happened on the island 
of the Chats-fourrez if Pantagruel had deigned to disembark and join his traveling companions 
there, if a figure so fiercely impervious to rhetoric could have had an effect on similarly resistant 
creatures. Alcofribas suggests that they could have won against the Chats-fourrez if they had had 
a good leader with them, but it seems that Pantagruel cannot even be bothered to deal with cases 
related to the very opposite of eloquence (759).  
These interactions involving language and truth-telling suggest the distance that Rabelais 
deliberately places between his prince and rhetoric, especially the more negative commonplaces 
about rhetoric as a means to deceive your interlocutor or exaggerate your own learning. One 
explanation for certain incongruities between Pantagruel and the ideal product of humanist 
education is that Gargantua’s letter awakens Pantagruel to his future responsibilities and, as 
Erasmus puts it, informs him that he is the prince and thus has power. However, Pantagruel’s 
power is by no means latent and awakened by Gargantua’s call to arms that resounds with 
superfluity. Even so, Pantagruel is associated more with power than with the powers of 
persuasion.
93
 By imposing silence in an attempt to control language, Pantagruel nonetheless 
reveals his belief that language is indeed an instrument of power, just one that he chooses not to 
wield. The balance between arms and letters tips in favor of letters, and letters as arms, in 
humanist discourses on education. In Pantagruel, by contrast, arms (weapons and appendages) 
and the truth are weapons against the deceptiveness that can come as a by-product of learning 
letters. Pantagruel’s “conclusions” in Paris come across as empty gestures, only undertaken for 
the sake of proving his intellectual prowess and not his ability to use eloquence in the place of 
force to persuade, unite, and defend. Gargantua, however, shows eloquence in action; there, 
Rabelais narrates more fully how the prince becomes an “abysme de science.” 
The giants’ educations allow us to pinpoint shifting dynamics in Rabelais’s thoughts on 
language from Pantagruel to Gargantua. Though father and son lead mostly parallel lives within 
parallel narratives (birth, education, letters from fathers, accumulation of friends, war), Rabelais 
uses eloquence in the second book as a productive theme for interrogating language and refrains 
from the violence characteristic of the first book. Gargantua appears to reestablish the faith in 
that particular humanist value from one book to the next, and with that renewed faith come the 
other trappings of eloquence’s commonplaces. Rabelais’s tendency to set extremes against each 
other may be responsible for this shift. The competing pedagogical systems at the heart of 
Gargantua (sophists and humanists) were not in play in Pantagruel. Defaux informs us that 
since Pantagruel is riddled with sophists who are not at all concerned with ethics, Pantagruel as 
philosopher-king, fully immersed in a humanist regime, must reject any and all sophistic tricks of 
language.
94
 Gargantua, in contrast, was first indoctrinated by sophists, so Gargantua has to stage 
                                                 
92
 “Ce que fist Pantagruel, et les nomma Pygmées. Et les envoya vivre en une isle là auprés, où ilz se sont for 
multiplies despuis. Mais les grues leur font continuellement guerre, desquelles ilz se defendent courageusement, car 
ces petitz boutz d’hommes (lesquels en Escosse l’on appelle manches d’estrilles) sont voluntiers cholericques. La 
raison physicale est: par ce qu’ilz ont le cueur prés de la merde” (310-311). 
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 For more on the association of Pantagruel and “puissance,” see Berrong, “An Exposition of Disorder: From 
Pantagruel to Gargantua.” 
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 See Defaux’s Pantagruel et les sophistes, 19, 36. The only exception to rejecting sophistry is Panurge, who 
escapes Pantagruel’s usual wrath; this is partly because Pantagruel loves him and is amused by him, and partly 
because Panurge at least tells his own truth. Take, for instance, Pantagruel’s reaction to Panurge’s praise of debt in 
the Tiers Livre. Pantagruel acknowledges Panurge’s gift for speech and argumentation, but he remains utterly 
unmoved by it: “Mais preschez et patrocinez d’icy à la Pentecoste, en fin vous serez esbahy, comment rien ne me 
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how and why these predecessors to the humanists are rendered obsolete, as they are in 
Gargantua’s letter when he claims to be uneducated by the standards of his son’s education. By 
the rules of satire and Rabelais’s employment of antithetical pairs, the verbal sophistry of 
Gargantua’s first tutors has to be met with an equivalent humanist expectation for good 
language. Once Gargantua is given proper defensive tools, he is taught to better evaluate 
language use and not to see it always as a threat; he does not have to reject language outright. 
Why else is Janotus de Bragmardo rewarded by Gargantua for the same mangling of speech for 
which the “écolier limousin” was harshly punished by Pantagruel? Rabelais’s renewed interest in 
the positive connotations of eloquence is one reason why Gargantua can respond with laughter 
and not rage to Janotus’s speech-making. In fact, the replacing of misused language by 
eloquence involves an increased emphasis on sociability and community in Gargantua, 
culminating in the creation of the Thélème abbey. Rabelais’s new attentiveness to eloquence is 
partly responsible for this adjustment, since eloquence traditionally involves civility and 
civilization.
95
 
 I now return Gargantua’s letter. Gargantua hints there that his son may not be the orator-
prince that his education prepares him to be: “tel te laisser aprés ma mort comme un mirouoir 
representant la personne de moy ton pere, et sinon tant excellent, et tel de faict, comme je te 
souhaite, certes bien tel en desir” (243, emphases mine). The discrepancy hinted at between 
“faict” and “desir” combined with the idea that Pantagruel must expressly mirror his father 
seems to signal back to Gargantua as the ideal product of the education he has outlined. As I 
shall shortly show in my reading of Gargantua, he can certainly claim to have benefited more 
from humanist education than his son did, because he had so much further to go. Pantagruel may 
be a kind of “living mirror,” just not the one his father truly wants, which in the letter is himself, 
age restored to youth, old modes of learning improved by the new, death overcome by 
immortality, father and son collapsed into one “garde et tresor de l’immortalité de nostre nom” 
(242). The fact that Pantagruel’s education certainly does not fill as many chapters as that of 
Gargantua demonstrates that education as a theme is more important to Gargantua than it was in 
the earlier book. Rabelais takes an almost excruciatingly long time to narrate Gargantua’s full 
transformation from “shapeless lump” to “divine being” and, as a result, is able to more 
successfully translate the discourse of education into narrative. Thus the expectations laid out for 
the son are fulfilled through the father.  
In comparison to Pantagruel whose intellectual abilities are consistently superior, the 
expectations for Gargantua vacillate during his childhood. His birth, accompanied by remarkable 
signs, appears to signal his future greatness. For example, he was carried for eleven months in 
his mother’s belly: we are reminded by our erudite narrator Alcofribas that eleven-month 
pregnancies are reserved for heroic masterpieces that require extra time for their optimal 
                                                                                                                                                             
aurez persuadé, et par vostre beau parler, jà ne me ferez entrer en debtes” (367). Defaux has argued that Rabelais 
uses Panurge to deflect negative qualities, such as this capacity for sophistry, away from Pantagruel (see Le Curieux, 
le glorieux et la sagesse du monde). For more studies on Panurge as a rhetorician, see Coleman, Rabelais 118-140; 
Cave, The Cornucopian Text 111-121, 183-222; Greene, Rabelais: A Study in Comic Courage 63-68; Demerson, 
“Tradition rhétorique et création littéraire chez Rabelais;” Bowen, Enter Rabelais, Laughing 102-128. 
95
 This observation about civility in Gargantua versus Pantagruel is widely accepted. Hampton observes in his 
Literature and Nation that Gargantua, out of the five books, is the most politically- and patriotically-minded (67). 
Berrong sees an increase in emphasis on “civilized intercourse” in Gargantua (“Exposition” 21). Bauschatz frames 
the increase in attention to civility as a rise in the need for approval from the community; this kind of approval is 
congruent with what I have called the rhetoric of dependence characteristic of humanist pedagogical treatises 
(“From ‘estudier et profiter’ 41). 
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formation (15). Gargantua springs Minerva-like from his mother’s head, but does not destroy her 
as his son’s birth does Gargantua’s wife (21-22). Grandgousier hails his son’s intelligence in 
chapter 14, stipulating that Gargantua will attain “à degre souverain de sapience, s’il est bien 
institué,” after which Grandgousier gives his son a sophist preceptor (43). In the letter to his son 
Gargantua affirms that not only did he meet with his own father’s expectations with regards his 
learning, he even surpassed them: 
 
Mais encores que mon feu pere de bonne memoire Grand Gousier eust adonné 
tout son estude, à ce que je profitasse en toute perfection et sçavoir politique, et 
que mon labeur et estude correspondit tresbien, voire encores oultrepassast son 
desir: toutesfoys comme tu peulx bien entendre, le temps n’estoit tant idoine ne 
commode es lettres comme est de present, et n’avoys copie de telz precepteurs 
comme tu as eu. (242, emphasis mine) 
 
Here, there is no discrepancy between the father’s desire and the end result, though Gargantua is 
nevertheless quick to qualify his final grade of ‘exceeds expectations’ with a comparison 
between the educational methods of his youth with those of his son: all that was lost during the 
“temps tenebreux” has been restored, and Gargantua, though he was “le plus sçavant dudict 
siecle,” is now no more learned than the “petitz grimaulx” of Pantagruel’s day (243). The 
conditions were indeed different. Whereas Gargantua’s letter announces a seemingly uncalled-
for intensification in his son’s studies, the brutal switch in educational methods brought about by 
Grandgousier that we see in the second book was enormously crucial in reforming the young 
Gargantua – and with him the figure of the giant borrowed from the tradition of the Les Grandes 
et Inestimables Chronicques – into the kind of man who writes a letter often hailed as a very 
serious “hymn to the Renaissance” by modern commentators, a letter that contains the outline of 
Gargantua’s own humanist educational program.96 I turn now to Gargantua’s education in an 
effort to understand how Gargantua is meant to replace Pantagruel as a living embodiment of 
humanist study. 
 
III. “Thou monster Ignorance”: Gargantua’s Education Revised   
 
Rabelais fleshes out Gargantua’s epistolary description of his education over the course 
of several chapters in Gargantua. We see how Gargantua gains his reputation for learning under 
the sophists and how that reputation is undermined when juxtaposed with the new, humanist 
pedagogy. In brief, a series of events prompts Gargantua’s father, Grandgousier, to make 
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 The phrase “hymn to the Renaissance” is from Abel Lefranc’s 1922 Œuvres de Fran ois Rabelais (x, 98). The 
reading of Gargantua’s letter in this positive light dominated criticism for the first half of the twentieth century (see 
Brault, “Abysme” 615-616). Perhaps the first to do so, Brault argued in 1966 that the letter is purposefully farcical, 
an “inside joke” between Rabelais and other humanists, a “serious matter presented in comic form” (“Abysme” 
617). In the 1970s, Edwin M. Duval, in his article on Rabelais and the medieval curriculum, and Gérard Defaux, in 
his book exploring Rabelais’s interest in sophistry, both situate the letter in Rabelais’s project of satirizing university 
life and its pretensions; this reading of the letter as satire persists today. The letter may indeed be a satire or a farce. I 
am more interested in how the letter participates in Rabelais’s overall scheme to dismantle shared cultural 
pretensions through exaggeration and less invested in the letter’s generic or tonal status as a sincere (or insincere) 
cultural document that stands on its own. Pantagruel takes it seriously enough. What is more, the letter is very useful 
to my analysis: it permits the comparative study of the two giants’ educations from a single point of view 
(Gargantua’s), alongside the discourse of education of the time. 
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changes to his son’s education. First, Grandgousier discovers his young son’s “hault sens et 
merveilleux entendement” when he invents a “torchecul” (42). Then, Gargantua spends 
approximately fifty-four years under the tutelage of the sophist Thubal Holoferne, and an 
undisclosed amount of time under another, Jobelin Bridé. His time is spent being read to from 
medieval textbooks, memorizing them so he can recite them backwards and forwards. Lastly, 
despite all this reading and study, Grandgousier observes that Gargantua is making no 
intellectual progress whatsoever. Gargantua is instead “fou, niays, tout resveux et rassoté” (44). 
Upon the advice of Don Philippe des Marays, Grandgousier has a young page brought to court in 
order to demonstrate the efficacy of the learning of “le temps present,” meaning humanist 
pedagogy. A language contest thus prompts a complete overhaul of Gargantua’s education. 
Eudemon, who is not yet twelve years old, has only been studying under this new system of 
learning for two years but he is capable of producing extemporaneously an encomium of 
Gargantua that is so eloquent that Gargantua is rendered speechless. Grandgousier immediately 
hires Eudemon’s humanist tutor Ponocrates to instruct his son. The true aims of education are 
therefore redirected from rote memorization to language, judgment, and comportment 
(“’meilleur jugement, meilleures paroles, meilleurs propos…, meilleur entretien et honnesteté,’” 
44).  
In modern criticism, Gargantua chapter 15, where Eudemon makes his speech and, by 
extension, the case for humanism, is typically read as a fairly straightforward suggestion of 
Rabelais’s distaste for medieval educational methods (“vos resveurs mateologiens97 du temps 
jadis”) and of his confidence in the new humanist learning (“les jeunes gens de maintenant,” 44). 
Diane Desrosiers-Bonin, for instance, writes in her Rabelais et l’humanisme  ivil that 
Gargantua’s second round of education joins theory with practice and produces the civically- and 
ethically-minded prince that humanism promises (chapter 3). Huchon notes in her edition of 
Rabelais that “Ce chapitre est central, célébrant l’avènement d’une nouvelle rhétorique 
humaniste” (1103 n. 1). More recently, E. Bruce Hayes argues that the Eudemon episode fits the 
usual framework for the farcical punishment of ignorance, but the real target of the farce is not 
Gargantua or the medieval pedagogy of the past, but rather the contemporary educational 
methods of the Sorbonne (117). I propose reading Gargantua 15 twice. I first examine Rabelais’s 
use of antithesis to exaggerate, in humanism’s favor, the differences between “le temps jadis” 
and “maintenant.” Then I revisit those antitheses with specific attention to how eloquence – here 
the very sign of humanism’s potential – is called into question and how it raises the stakes for the 
kind of prince humanist education is meant to produce. 
Many of the details of Gargantua chapters 14 and 15 confirm Rabelais’s intention of 
using binary thinking to elevate humanism over other institutions of learning. Even the names of 
Gargantua’s multiple tutors encourage this reading. The name of Gargantua’s first sophist tutor 
Thubal Holoferne tells this story in miniature. Huchon notes that “Thubal” means “confusion” in 
Hebrew (4101, n. 1) and “Holoferne” appears to be shorthand for the fall of the pretentious. 
Dante places the Biblical Assyrian general Holofernes in his Purgatorio as an example of “pride 
cast down” (Purgatorio 12:58-60; Book of Judith 10-13). Shakespeare employs this same name 
in Love’s Labour’s Lost for the court “bookman” (pedant) who speaks a convoluted mixture of 
English and Latin.
98
 It is that Holofernes who voices the epigraph used in this chapter and in the 
title of this subsection, chosen for its uncanny similarity with what happens in these two chapters 
                                                 
97
 “Mateologien” is a New Testament term designating “des parleurs aux discours vains” (Œuvres  ompl tes 1104 n. 
8). 
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 This may even be Rabelais’s influence, even if only distantly. See Prescott. 
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in Gargantua, where ignorance is equated with literal monstrosity: “O thou monster Ignorance, 
how deformed dost thou look!” (4.2.24). Shakespeare’s juxtaposition of his pedant with the 
“animal” Dull is another instance of a comic commonplace: that is, the exaggerated and 
ineffectual sophistry of the intellectual elite who seek to instruct. “Jobelin,” the name of 
Gargantua’s second tutor, simply means “sot” (Rabelais, Œuvres 1102 n. 21). By contrast, 
Eudemon and Ponocrates have Greek names meaning, respectively, “happy” or “fortunate”99 and 
“power through hard work” (Highet 183). 
Rabelais wishes to recount in detail, in the book of the father, the great transformation in 
learning that Gargantua applauds in the book of the son. Gargantua’s letter hyperbolizes the 
greatness of the new era, using the metaphor of shadows and light to pit the past against the 
present. The metaphorical language of the letter expands and become literal in Gargantua, 
drawing on even more of the Renaissance discourse on education to do so. Gargantua and 
Eudemon are clearly marked as diametrical opposites, each representing the ultimate products of 
their respective educations. Jean Plattard emphasizes the antagonism between the two methods 
as it is represented by Rabelais: 
 
L’éducation ancienne était chargée de tous les défauts, responsable de toutes les 
misères physiques, intellectuelles et morales; l’éducation nouvelle, seule juste 
dans ses principes et son objet, pouvait seule provoquer et entretenir l’activité, 
seule produire de bons résultats. (79) 
 
In order to fully emphasize the unique potential of the new educational program in his 
descriptions, then, to the extent that Eudemon embodies humanist perfection, Rabelais must 
reduce Gargantua to a sophist beast. Rabelais is insistent on the fact that Gargantua is as wise as 
he can be according to the educational methods available in his youth, such that he now stands in 
for those methods: “Et quelques aultres [livres] de semblable farine, à la lecture desquelz il 
devint aussi saige qu’onques puis ne fourneasmes nous” (43). His mother’s lengthy pregnancy 
and his prolonged sophist education ‘cook’ Gargantua as much as he can be cooked. Rabelais 
establishes an end point of that kind of learning beyond which Gargantua can no longer go: there 
are limits to how far memorization can actually inform and transform a student. These methods 
have long overstayed their welcome since Gargantua is now over sixty years old. In Bakhtinian 
terms, Gargantua, and the sophists who educated him, must be brought low. To do so, Rabelais 
turns to another extreme, that of perfection, to discredit the sophists as ignorant charlatans and 
push them further down the spectrum of pedagogical and ideological effectiveness. This is the 
point where Eudemon, the realization of the ideal orator, must appear to provoke a change and 
provide the new end goal of Gargantua’s education.  
Rabelais applies Erasmus’s opposition of monstrosity to divinity as the possible result of 
educational systems to the confrontation between Gargantua and Eudemon in chapter 15. Here, 
we see a literal “godlike creature” facing an “animal” (De pueris 305) and “horrible monster” 
(Insitutio 259). We have in one corner Gargantua, representing the sophists. In his reaction to 
Eudemon’s speech, Gargantua is figured as a monstrous and inarticulate body with no control 
over his own physicality and emotions. His reactions imitate the movements of livestock and he 
is unable to say a single word. He devolves into an Erasmian “shapeless lump:” “Mais toute la 
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 Eudaimonia is a tricky concept to parse. It is usually translated as “happiness,” but it really is a goal-oriented 
approach to ethics in which the eudaimon leads an authentic life by fulfilling objectively determined criteria for 
happiness, as distinct from pleasure. See Plato, The Republic, book 4; Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics; Asselin. 
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contenance de Gargantua fut, qu’il se print à plorer comme une vache, et se cachoit le visaige de 
son bonnet, et ne fut possible de tirer de luy une parole, non plus q’un pet d’un asne mort.” 
Despite his extensive reading, Gargantua clearly does not know the prescriptions of Plutarch 
against the display of emotions. Plutarch writes in De garrulitate that Odysseus’s eloquence 
went hand in hand with his self-control, notably over the physical expression of his emotions, 
such as tears, as well as control over his tongue.
100
 Gargantua here prefigures the book’s 
antagonist, Picrochole, the mad king, who is pushed into pursuing outrageous conquests by his 
greedy, obsequious advisers, driven by language rather than resistant to it. He has been taught to 
absorb language through memorization, but not how to put it to use, resist it, or control his 
reactions to it. In Janotus de Bragmardo’s words, if a man faked a limp, Gargantua would believe 
that man was lame. In addition, Rabelais here puts the body to shame where he would otherwise 
revel in bodily functions, such as the chapter in which Gargantua’s intelligence is measured by 
his curious invention of a “torchecul.”  
Eudemon, in the other corner, represents the humanists. He betrays no emotions and is 
manifestly in control of his entire person. His body does not betray him in any way; every 
gesture is contrived to convey sincerity. Even when confronted by (and made to praise) a 
monstrous and inarticulate body, he does not flinch or hesitate: he performs. Eudemon is held up 
as the embodiment of humanist eloquence. He is young, he comports himself well and in 
accordance with all the rules of courtly etiquette and propriety, and his education has been neatly 
condensed into only two years. Eudemon is “… tant bien testonné, tant bien tiré, tant bien 
espousseté, tant honneste en son maintien, que trop mieulx resembloit quelque petit angelot 
qu’un homme” (44). There is a complete orderliness to Eudemon that contrasts with the 
emotional disorder of Gargantua. Even our knowledge of him is orderly. We know every gritty 
detail of Gargantua’s upbringing, but we know virtually nothing about Eudemon. Our knowledge 
of Eudemon is contained in this chapter, just a hyperbole-saturated description of him and his 
speech. The implied narrative is that humanist education works swiftly, efficiently, and in an 
orderly fashion; it preaches discipline; it elevates man to the orders of angels. 
 We do, however, know that Eudemon hails from Villegongys. This hamlet is near Saint-
Genou, a locale that comes up again elsewhere in Gargantua (1104 n. 6). I do not want to linger 
too long on this connection, but Rabelais’s allusions to Saint-Genou and its environs are 
interesting in that they connect the theme of rescue to changes in the regulation of the body. 
They also suggest Rabelais’s further uses of antithesis. The old woman who assisted in 
Gargantua’s strange birth came from the area of Saint-Genou. When Gargantua’s mother was 
having difficulty giving birth, this old woman gave her “un restrinctif si horrible” that, once 
Gargamelle’s lower orifices were closed up, forced her baby out of her left ear (21).101 The scene 
with Eudemon, similarly though less literally, portrays Gargantua on a vertical axis of upper and 
lower, where he is trapped in a lower stratum of human intelligence, figured by muteness and 
animal sounds and by the covering of his face. Lest we forget, it was the invention of a 
“torchecul,” with its joyful attention on the care of the lower parts, that prompted Grandgousier 
to have his son educated in the first place (42). The movement that Rabelais suggests is up and 
away from lower orifices. The ‘natural’ path that Gargantua takes, whether through his mother’s 
body or his education, has to be diverted in an upper, cerebral direction. 
The direct result of Eudemon’s speech is Gargantua’s silent weeping, which results in 
another extreme emotion. Seeing his son in such an emotional and mute state makes 
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 Plutarch, Moralia VI, 505f-506a; Odyssey 10.491, 210-212; 20.13, 16. 
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 For an excellent reading of this scene, see Hampton, “The Fallen Fundament.” 
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Grandgousier “tant courroussé” that he immediately wants to kill the tutor Jobelin Bridé (45). 
The Erasmian pedagogy that informs Rabelais’s depictions of education also helps to 
contextualize Grandgousier’s rage as a reaction born out of shame and fear. The study of 
eloquence establishes the self and hands over to the student the tools of mastering others. 
Eudemon is clearly in the position of power over Gargantua, but his eloquence does not civilize 
the giant: it bestializes him (Rhodes 41, 139). Gargantua’s selfhood is at risk. Erasmus places the 
burden of a child’s education on the father, and he would blame parental neglect for Gargantua’s 
state. It is in the hands of the father to correctly ‘shape’ the son. Without such care taken for the 
son, the father himself becomes less than a man: 
 
There is no beast more savage and dangerous than a human being who is swept 
along by the passions of ambition, greed, anger, envy, extravagance, and 
sensuality. Therefore a father who does not arrange for his son to receive the best 
education at the earliest age is neither a man himself nor has any fellowship with 
human nature.
 102
 
 
Grandgousier is therefore responsible for his son’s ‘unnaturalness.’ His anger also, less selfishly, 
originates in fear related to flattery and the manipulation of the passions. At the core of 
Eudemon’s speech is flattery and the young page has proven that Gargantua is highly susceptible 
to it. Erasmus is particularly vehement about the dangers of flattery, as I stated above, and insists 
that the prince learn to reject praise directed at him: “And when you [the prince] hear the same 
things from foolish eulogizers, then reflect all the more ‘What has this to do with being a 
prince?’”103 Erasmus’ recommendation of ‘reflecting’ on flattery forces the prince to shrewdly 
juxtapose the praise offered with its purpose, so that the prince may gain critical distance and not 
be swayed by obsequious speech. Gargantua, then, is in dire need of the sort of education that 
promises defenses for the weak mind against praise. This scene in a sense proves the humanists 
right in showing their concern about the mental defenses of the prince. Don Philippe des Marays 
steps in again, mollifying Grandgousier who decides to get Bridé drunk and send him away 
instead of killing him. In Gargantua, drinking and laughter replaces punishment via thirst and 
violence to the throat. 
Being susceptible to flattery connects Gargantua here to the book’s later description of 
the antagonist Picrochole, particularly in chapter 33 where Picrochole’s advisers use his greed 
and ambition to urge him to invade foreign lands. Grandgousier will continuously lament the 
downfall of his friend and fellow Christian monarch in this regard, so it is fair to say that this is a 
concern he has for his son (82-85). The connection between chapters 15 and 33 is corroborated 
further by the presence of “bonnets,” which Rabelais uses as an external and decipherable sign of 
sincerity. Eudemon’s speech is bookended with movements concerning caps. The young page 
removes his without prompting before he begins his speech, and Gargantua covers his face with 
his own at the end. Combined with Eudemon’s “face ouverte” and overall pleasant appearance, 
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 De pueris 305; Opera omnia 1:2, 32. See also Institutio 259 (Opera omnia 4:1, 188) and Rebhorn, Emperor of 
Men’s Minds 218-219. 
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 “Cum sis princeps, videto, ne quam admittas laudem, nisi dignam principe. Effert aliquis formam tuam, cogita ad 
istum modum laudari foeminas. Si quis admiratur facundiam, memineris istam sophistarum ac rhetorum esse 
laudem… At cum audieris eadem a stultis laudatoribus, multo magis cogita: quid haec ad principem?” (Institutio 
242; Opera Omnia 4:1, 172). 
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Eudemon’s cap removal participates in an outward demonstration of sincerity and modesty.104 
This gesture is a sign of transparency as part of the speech’s delivery and of the creation of a 
trustworthy orator persona or ethos.
105
 The inverse image appears at the beginning of chapter 33 
when Picrochole orders his advisers to cover themselves:  
 
- Cyre aujourd’huy nous vous rendons le plus heureux, plus chevaleureux prince 
qui oncques feust depuis la mort de Alexandre Macedo. 
- Couvrez couvrez vous dist Picrochole. 
- Grand mercy (dirent ilz) Cyre, nous sommes à nostre debvoir. (91)  
 
The fact that Picrochole’s advisers have to cover themselves tells us that they were previously 
uncovered, perhaps in the same gesture of sincerity and transparency that Eudemon adopts, and 
their superficial obeisance masks their bad advice. Since the advisers will shortly be exposed to 
the readers as greedy and manipulative through their zealous rhetoric of invasion and empire, the 
appropriation of this gesture unveils the moral ambiguity of rhetoric and how the body can 
manufacture signs to convey trustworthiness. Rhetoric does what it must to convey the intended 
message and try to persuade. The body can be made to lie. Therefore Gargantua must be taught 
to fortify his mind against all rhetoric, so evil counselors and Eudemons alike cannot reduce him 
to indecorous behavior or make him a puppet of their political agendas. 
 What follows this chapter appears to verify the interpretation of Rabelais’s representation 
of humanist education as straightforward and marked by earnest enthusiasm. Rabelais deploys 
more antitheses to signal the differences between sophist and humanist instruction. Like 
Pantagruel, Gargantua is sent to Paris “pour congnoistre quel estoit l’estude des jouvenceaulx de 
France pour icelluy temps,” stressing once again in Gargantua the ‘nowness’ and ‘newness’ of 
humanist pedagogy (45). In chapters 21 and 22, Gargantua shows Ponocrates how his days were 
structured under the sophists. There is particular emphasis on an overall lack of discipline and 
physical exercise. When Gargantua does study for “quelque meschante demye heure,” his body 
is poised for intellectual activity, eyes fixed on his book, but his mind lacks obedience, for it 
“estoit en la cuysine” (57). To recall the image of bread evoked in Gargantua 14, Gargantua has 
already been fully “cooked” by sophist bakers. Eudemon’s speech succeeds in provoking the 
changes necessary to Gargantua’s development. Now comes the “task of unteaching,” which is 
more arduous than teaching itself.
106
 In chapter 23 we see that Gargantua’s days become heavily 
structured so as not to waste any more time. His body and mind must reach a kind of harmony, 
such that to talk of one is also to talk of the other. Vergerio, for instance, uses the language of the 
body to discuss the regulation of the mind and management of the appetites. The mind, curiosity, 
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 Erasmus is particularly adamant about this gesture of respect (Colloquia – Monitoria Paedagogica). Smith sees 
in certain passages of the Colloquia and the Adagia the basis for Eudemon’s character (199-200). See also Humanist 
Educational Treatises 139-141. 
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 Another association that can be made here is Eudemon’s cap with Gargantua’s childhood codpiece from chapter 
eight. Figured as a cornucopia, “tousjours verdoyante, tousjour fleurissante, tousjours fructifiante, plene d’humeurs, 
plene de fruictz, plene de toutes delices,” Gargantua’s “braguette” is specifically noted for being unlike the 
codpieces of other young men “qui ne sont plenes que de vent, au grand interest du sexe feminin” (25-26). Like 
Eudemon’s cap removal, Gargantua’s codpiece represents sincerity and the lack of false pretense.  
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 Piccolomini is referring specifically to the vices of tutors that can be passed on to their pupils and to the difficulty 
of guiding those pupils away from vice again: “Non sint [praeceptores] austeritate tristes nec comitate nimis 
dissolute, quos nec odire nec contemnere iure possis, quorum sermo plurimum de honesto sit; ne ab his vitia discas, 
quae postmodum sit opus dediscere, in quibus eluendis magna difficultas est, et onus dedocendi gravius est quam 
docendi” (Humanist Educational Treatises 136-137). 
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and body of the humanist student must digest in a way that remains useful, allowing what is 
taken in to nourish and instruct, both figuratively and literally (60-63). Gargantua reads proper 
books and makes actual progress, and he begins to frequent “gens sçavans” to provide him with 
“living mirrors” to emulate. Very importantly, Gargantua learns to scrutinize the rhetoric and 
gestures of the sellers of quack remedies in the marketplace, the “theriacleurs,” whose persuasive 
tactics are likely far from subtle and therefore easier to see through (72). We see a connection 
between Gargantua’s education and the letter he writes to his son: unable to utter a word during a 
rhetorical contest, Gargantua becomes insistent that his own son be protected from rhetoric and 
be ready to defend “conclusions” in public. 
It is of course problematic to say that Grandgousier’s anger and Gargantua’s shame 
provide an explanation for Gargantua’s encouraging Pantagruel to intensify his studies. The book 
of the son came before that of the father, so the problem of publication does complicate the 
relationship between the two books and their pedagogical programs. However, Rabelais 
reengineers the letter in retrospect by expanding on the adult Gargantua’s position on education. 
The first Gargantua, the ‘uneducated’ writer of the letter in Pantagruel, and the second 
Gargantua, the young humanist prince, are not completely irreconcilable. In both books, we see a 
giant who finds argumentation difficult. Rabelais’s figurative language signals this connection, 
using rhetoric to draw our eye to Gargantua’s relationship to language. In Pantagruel, 
Gargantua’s wife dies giving life to their son. In response, Gargantua, confronted with 
“argumens sophisticques qui le suffocquoyent,” “pleuroit comme une vache, mais tout soubdain 
rioit comme un veau” (225). Gargantua suffers a moment of aporia in an attempt to support, 
logically and emotionally, both mourning his wife and celebrating his son’s birth. The 
association of Gargantua with animals, such as crying like a cow after Eudemon’s speech, will 
never truly escape him, no matter his education. It is simply part of Rabelais’s rhetoric 
surrounding the giant, even in the later books where he does not appear often. In the Tiers Livre 
of 1546, Panurge exclaims that it would be easier to “tirer un pet d’un Asne mort” than to get a 
straight answer out of the philosopher Trouillogan (466). Gargantua displays his disgust at the 
philosopher’s evasive tactics and quickly excuses himself. Gargantua may still have a particular 
sensitivity to this expression of impossibility that, for him, recalls a childhood humiliation. 
Rabelais merges the two versions of Gargantua through a consistent use of figurative language. 
As a result, Gargantua’s reimagining of its protagonist makes Pantagruel seem an even more 
novel version of the humanist prince, one who takes charge of his education and asserts his 
authority and autonomy precisely because he calls into question strictly upheld commonplaces 
about language. 
However, it is rare that Rabelais would give unqualified praise to any topic brought up in 
his books, even, and perhaps especially, if it were something as important as eloquence is to his 
cultural milieu. Berrong asserts that since Rabelais does nothing in the chapters following 
Gargantua 15 to discredit Eudemon and Ponocrates, it is safe to believe that Rabelais 
wholeheartedly puts his faith in eloquence and that the overall presentation of eloquence and 
humanist education is positive (“Sophista” 40). Other scholars who have studied the curricula of 
the time say that the innovations depicted in Gargantua are largely superficial. Comparing the 
old methods with the new, some scholars of the Renaissance see in these chapters of Gargantua 
a mere matter of applying discipline to an already established program of study as opposed to a 
revolutionary change in regime, or of merging training in “chevalerie” with that of “clercs” to 
create a prince who can defend his nation but who is also of his time, learned in the sciences and 
arts (Plattard 81, 83). Others note Rabelais’s adherence to the humanist attention to reading well 
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and widely as opposed to the medieval period’s reputation for rote memorization and for reading 
the wrong books (Rigolot, Langages 76; Highet 184). It is my contention that even though there 
is no explicit condemnation of what Eudemon represents, that does not necessarily equate to 
wholesale support. The speech itself demands our further scrutiny in order to determine whether 
or not Rabelais does not place the entire enterprise into question. In the next section, I will argue 
that Rabelais’s attentiveness to Eudemon’s speech and its aftermath makes legible Rabelais’s 
interests in the limits of eloquence and calls into question the kind of prince that such an 
education creates. 
 
IV. “Sweet smoke of rhetoric!” (LLL 3.1.64): Absent Eloquence and Angelic/Demonic Doubles 
 
Eudemon’s speech follows the organization for an encomium prescribed in detail by 
Aphthonius, an ancient Greek rhetorician and sophist who wrote a manual of exercises to be used 
by students of rhetoric. Though Rabelais would perhaps have known Aphthonius’s 
Progymnasmata from recent Greek editions or Latin translations, he would have certainly been 
aware of Erasmus’s recommendation of the text as an excellent guide to the study and practice of 
rhetoric. Erasmus presides over much of Rabelais’s pedagogy, and Philippe des Marays, the lord 
who brings Eudemon to Grandgousier’s court, suggests an anagram of D. Erasmus.107 
Aphthonius offers the following outline for the praise of a king or a person in power: 1) 
exordium or introduction; 2) praise of ancestry, including nation, country, ancestors, and parents; 
3) praise of education, including institutions, arts, and laws; 4) praise of deeds, including of the 
mind, body, and fortune of the speech’s addressee; 5) comparisons of the addressee to historical 
figures; and 6) conclusion (Brault, “Significance” 313-314). Here is Eudemon’s performance of 
eloquence, worth quoting in full: 
 
Alors Eudemon demandant congié de ce faire audict viceroy son maistre, le 
bonnet au poing, la face ouverte, la bouche vermeille, les yeulx asseurez, et le 
reguard assis suz Gargantua, avecques modestie juvenile se tint sus ses pieds, et 
commença le louer et magnifier, premierement de sa vertus et bonnes meurs, 
secondement de son sçavoir, tiercement de sa noblesse, quartement de sa beaulté 
corporelle. Et pour le quint doulcement l’exhortait à reverer son père en toute 
observance, lequel tant s’estudioit à bien le faire instruire, enfin le prioit qu’il le 
voulsist retenir pour le moindre de ses serviteurs. Car aultre don pour le present 
ne requeroit des cieulx sinon qu’il luy feust faict grace de luy complaire en 
quelque service agreable. 
Le tout feut par icelluy proferé avecques gestes tant propres, pronunciation 
tant distincte, voix tant eloquente, et language tant aorné et bien latin, que mieulx 
resembloit un Gracchus, un Ciceron ou un Emilius du temps passé, qu’un 
jouvenceau de se siecle. (44-45) 
 
Eudemon’s speech suggests a full performance of methodically structured oratory. Eudemon’s 
body, modesty, gestures, and voice all contribute to a material and completely legible and visible 
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eloquence. It is almost an afterthought that his language, “tant aorné et bien latin,” also 
contributes to his performance. 
That being said, the immediate issue is the inappropriateness of Eudemon’s speech. The 
comedic purpose of this language contest is to startle readers with the discrepancy between 
Eudemon and his praise on one hand and the object praised on the other. The inarticulate 
Gargantua before our eyes is incompatible with the Gargantua imagined in the speech. 
Eudemon’s praise seems to refer back to the high expectations for Gargantua prior to his sophist 
education, assessing his potential in a very flattering light rather than conveying a truthful image 
of what he sees. In rhetorical terms, this speech, a model for epideictic oratory, uses the full 
performance of eloquence as an optimistic mirror to show what Gargantua should be in a sort of 
Nietzschean will to truth (Rebhorn, Emperor 107). Eudemon is clearly lying and he has been 
well-trained to flatter. His paradoxical ethopoeia, or ethical narrative, of Gargantua intimates 
rhetoric’s true nature: it will always do what it must. Eudemon, like treatises about education 
addressed to princes, performs a function, persuading his audience that this education forms the 
student in a certain way. In this manner, Eudemon’s speech fulfills its purpose in spite of its 
inappropriateness: he skillfully navigates the requirements of the encomium to maximum 
persuasive effect, and the result is that Grandgousier will have his son reeducated.  
Moreover, Eudemon’s speech is only an outline, lifted directly from a manual. Contrary 
to his standard practice, Rabelais does not privilege his readers with a transcription of 
Eudemon’s speech as he does for ‘skinners’ of Latin, stutterers, and even those who use 
language as juridical weapons like the Chats-fourrez. François Rigolot says in Les Langages de 
Rabelais that Rabelais is more interested in shadows than in light (87). Examples of language 
abuse and verbal violence proliferate in the five books because they are openly and obviously 
funny, and they serve a satirical purpose. Though I think that a speech about Gargantua’s 
“bonnes meurs,” “noblesse,” and “beaulté corporelle” would certainly have been humorous to 
read, and Rabelais has the rhetorical skill to pull it off, Rabelais’s main focus is elsewhere: to 
make the angelic body and the monstrous body – as opposed to eloquence and inarticulacy – do 
the bulk of the work discrediting the sophists’ educational methods and praising those of the 
humanists. Though this confrontation is ostensibly about language, it is inscribed on the body 
more than it is in language. Given Gargantua’s emotional reaction, his embarrassment, and 
Grandgousier’s anger, the scene does not truly establish eloquence as a necessary skill to acquire, 
but rather as a skill that should be resisted because it unsettles so easily. The acknowledgement 
of eloquence’s central place in humanist pedagogy therefore takes place without eloquence, at 
the level of pure figuration.  
It is possible that Rabelais resists writing Eudemon’s speech because of the difficulty 
inherent to translating into print an oral performance that depends on immediacy and proximity.   
Writing out eloquent speech strips eloquence of its essential mobility. In keeping with Paolo 
Valesio’s argument against ideology as decayed rhetoric, print petrifies what would otherwise be 
an example of energetic language, transforming it into an emblem or cliché, since it may be 
impossible to translate a necessarily multi-dimensional performance into sufficiently descriptive 
words (66). We have no proof that Eudemon’s speech is more than an outline or a set piece that 
he has memorized. He lies, and his eloquence is borrowed: this is the very anxiety at the heart of 
the humanists’ wish to match their ancient predecessors through imitation. Eudemon is an 
obedient automaton made to perform humanism as a show of body language, hygiene, formulaic 
speech, and emotional control in front of a king in order to prove a point. By deferring to 
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something that is not there, Eudemon’s speech, such as it is, casts heavily ironic light upon the 
practicability and ideology of humanist pedagogy.  
Eudemon may be one of the “jeunes gens de maintenant,” but he is described as both out 
of place and out of time. The fact that we know so little about him contributes to this impression, 
but it emerges more in the types of comparisons Rabelais uses to depict him. Eudemon is “tant 
bien testonné, tant bien tiré, tant bien espousseté, tant honneste en son maintien” that he 
resembles an “angelot” more than a man (44). This is unquestionably an allusion to Giovanni 
Pico della Mirandola’s famous 1486 Oration on the Dignity of Man, a speech on human 
achievement and learning composed to open a debate of nine hundred theses that never took 
place.
108
 According to Pico, man’s place in the cosmic hierarchy is between animal and angel, 
partaking of the characteristics of both. Eudemon is slightly above man. It is striking that 
Eudemon is a little angel based on appearance and comportment alone. Clean, well-spoken, and 
angelic, Eudemon appears to represent a certain morality that is transcribed on and by the body. 
Yet, as I showed in my earlier discussion of caps, appearance and comportment are attributes 
that can be learned and manipulated to project a certain ethos, a speaking self worthy of belief. 
We later see that Gargantua has acquired this system of material, external signs, regulating and 
dressing the body so that cleanliness conveys mental orderliness (65). The commonplace of a 
handsome face as the exterior sign of a virtuous mind may no longer apply when students are 
encouraged to manufacture such signs.  
Rabelais’s description of Eudemon after his speech further shows Eudemon’s dislocation 
from the present by directing our attention to his language. Rabelais compares Eudemon to three 
famous Roman orators of the Roman Republic: Eudemon “mieulx resembloit un Gracchus, un 
Ciceron ou un Emilius du temps passé, qu’un jouvenceau de se siecle” (45). Though Eudemon is 
initially brought before Grandgousier as a representative of “les jeunes gens de maintenant,” the 
constant emphasis is on Eudemon’s otherworldliness, first as a divine creature and then as 
ranking among the exemplary orators of Rome. He is not of “maintenant,” because he incarnates 
an unrealizable ideal. Eudemon is pure text, and that text is a handbook for rhetorical study. In 
Bakhtin’s terms, since “the rebirth of Cicero’s Latin made it a dead language,” the more the 
humanists stressed stylistic perfection and imitation, the more “beautiful but dead” Latin became 
(Rabelais 466-467). Where humanists betray a hope that their own eloquence will fly off the 
page, this eloquence remains petrified and locked in typographic space, empty exercises that 
borrow from past greatness but cannot help duplicate or master it. Eudemon represents an 
unattainable ideal of rhetoric’s potential: he is a new Tantalus whose rhetorical abilities are as 
present and immediate as the water and fruit so tantalizingly near, but somehow they are never 
made accessible, though rhetoricians try to make a systematic science of it. Eudemon 
metonymically represents a previously established eloquence that is no longer available. 
In one sense, this failure of eloquence was foreseen by rhetorical theorists in their 
discussions of audiences. Even Quintilian, the source for many of the ideas about rhetoric echoed 
in Renaissance treatises, accentuates the difficulty in any man becoming an ideal orator. He even 
goes so far to say that the “perfect orator does not yet exist” because “perhaps no art exists in 
perfection” and “no single form has pleased everybody.”109 Quintilian’s objection to artistic 
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perfection is that there are too many variables: no single orator can please or persuade each of his 
auditors, because of the changing “conditions of particular times or places” and “the tastes and 
aims of each person.” This suggests that, in order for the ideal orator to exist, he must have 
before him an ideal audience, which would be homogenous by necessity, or at least made to be. 
Quintilian wants us to define a speech’s eloquence by its effectiveness on its audience, but this 
proves difficult when there are multiple audiences to account for (12.10.44).  
In chapter 15 of Gargantua, we see three audiences. In order to convince his official 
audience (Grandgousier) of the effectiveness of humanist pedagogy, Eudemon must direct his 
speech at another audience (Gargantua). The test of Eudemon’s education and eloquence is to 
put his rhetoric on display, to convincingly and visibly prove the power language can have over 
another person. Grandgousier never loses sight of the artifice in the exercise precisely because 
his son is its focus. Gargantua’s reaction, discussed above, reveals his susceptibility to flattery. 
We can only guess why Gargantua has such an emotional reaction, if he believes Eudemon’s 
praise to be genuine and is flattered into muteness, or if he is ashamed at having his lesser 
qualities so exposed. In either case, we do not get a word from him, though his corporeal 
responses and silence seem to imply a reading of susceptibility over one of sudden self-
awareness. Since Eudemon has such an effect on his immediate audience, he proves himself to 
be a master of this kind of speech-making. The source of persuasion for Grandgousier is 
therefore not the speech itself or the speaker’s ethos, but rather his son’s reaction, which proves 
to him all he needs to know about the uselessness of Gargantua’s former tutors.  
The ultimate audience is the book’s readers. Rabelais situates us alongside Grandgousier 
in Gargantua 15. His gaze is our own, we look where he looks, from perceiving (“son pere 
aperceut”) his son as “fou, niays, tout resveux et rassoté,” to scrutinizing Eudemon’s appearance 
(“voyez vous ce jeune enfant?”), to the sight of his son weeping “comme une vache” (“dont son 
pere fut tant courroussé,” 44-45). Rabelais diverts our attention away from Eudemon’s absent 
eloquence to appearances and bodies in this chapter, to what Grandgousier sees, how he reacts to 
it in a way his grandson Pantagruel might, and how Philippe des Marays coolly engineers the 
event. Despite these distractions, our perception of the performance still pivots around the empty 
space left by the speech that we do not get to read. By aligning his reader with Grandgousier, 
Rabelais adapts the character of his audience to respond in a certain way, with alarm. If the 
character of the audience is that of the most suitable Rabelaisian reader – the charitable 
boozehound addressed in the prefaces and bonded together in “readerly solidarity”110 – then they 
must go even further than Grandgousier’s reluctant acquiescence and laugh, because we are ‘in 
the know,’ we are immune to rhetoric and to the manufactured ethos of the other. We can see 
Eudemon for what he is: pure text, even pure textbook.  
The issue of engineering how the audience perceives the narrative involves in most 
respects changes in literary productivity in the advent of print. This dissertation is about a new 
regime in fiction-making where eloquence is staged but ineffective. It does not propel the 
narrative forward, but makes its audience linger on reading an often lengthy scene of speech-
making. The audience is meant to believe that such speech has a kind of power even if it does not 
reach them through the page. It has been argued that writers in this period turn increasingly to 
rhetorical structures to control a fictional audience in an effort to make reading a similar 
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experience to that of an oral performance (Ong 71; C. Freccero 41). This may be especially so 
for Gargantua, which, as Carla Freccero and Barry Lydgate have both shown, is more of a 
“manifestly text” book whereas Pantagruel retains some of the quasi-oral mechanisms of 
Rabelais’s source text (C. Freccero 38-42). The consequence is a change in the intellectual habits 
of readers, giving them a more active role (Lydgate 346, 352). Readerly complicity and 
multiplicity of meaning become the very devices of a humanist poetics that tests humanism’s 
core tenets by setting them into narrative and into print (Kinney xiii). Actual readers have to 
learn “this game of literacy” and submit themselves to a narrative authority that subsumes them 
into a homogenous fictive reader, figuring out how “to play the game of being a member of an 
audience that ‘really’ does not exist” (Ong 61). As Walter Stephens has demonstrated, Rabelais’s 
fictive audience is quite erudite and would recognize that the source of his comedy and satire is 
rhetoric and rhetorical amplification (28). Using Grandgousier’s line of sight is just one of the 
written means by which Rabelais guides his readers through the labyrinth of multiple 
interpretations of this scene: because Grandgousier ignores Eudemon’s absent eloquence and 
reacts with anger, humanism ‘wins’ over medieval pedagogy. But if we look too closely at 
Eudemon, as I did above, the joke is just as much on humanism’s pretensions of Classical 
emulation that beget only empty exercises. Dorothy Gabe Coleman, in a comment pertaining to 
Rabelais’s prologue to Pantagruel that is also relevant here, says there is no “stable level from 
which the reader can view the story” (Rabelais 31). Readerly complicity here also entails an 
awareness and acceptance of a kind of writerly duplicity: readers are expected to agree on certain 
parameters for eloquence, all at once: that Eudemon’s eloquence is both present and absent, both 
perfect and empty; that eloquence in general is desirable but also dangerous; that it creates 
communities but cannot exist outside of a certain community; that it is a fantasy of power that is 
irresistibly persuasive but also quite fragile. 
For Rabelais, the heart of the matter is the prince and what this kind of language is 
supposed to do for him. I turn now to the aftermath of Eudemon’s speech, both in Gargantua’s 
education and in Gargantua as a whole. The scene of two competing pedagogical systems 
provides the key for reading eloquence in the rest of Rabelais’s pentalogy, as an ideal, out-of-
place form of language that has practical limitations concerning its ability to civilize and 
transform. Despite traditional commonplaces about eloquence’s power to inspire people to virtue 
and virtuous action, Eudemon’s eloquence does not, in fact, transform Gargantua. As I discussed 
in the previous section, Ponocrates insists on leaving Gargantua as he is so he can witness for 
himself how atrociously mismanaged Gargantua’s tutelage under the sophists was. These 
extended descriptions of Gargantua’s education allow Rabelais to develop further the advantages 
of humanist education in an exaggerated, prolonged way. 
In the time between Eudemon’s speech and the giant’s transformation, Gargantua is again 
confronted with rhetoric. Having been sent to Paris with Ponocrates to study, Gargantua, still 
somewhat in a state of beastliness, pisses all over the city from the top of Notre Dame de Paris 
after stealing its bells to hang on his mare’s bridle. This episode offers a fake etymology for the 
name of Paris, as some of the denizens responded to the urine bath with laughter (“par rys”). 
This new etymology replaces that of the fake Joaninus de Baranco, who believed that Parisians 
derived their name from “Parrhesians” or “fiers en parler,” the approach to ethics called 
parrhēsia that Foucault discusses at length as steadiness and truth-telling (Government of Self 
48-49). The representative that is sent in the Parisians’ name to retrieve the bells, however, is 
more associated with the lower, degraded version of Paris than fearless speakers who are ready 
to accept violence and death for having spoken truly (Government of Self 56). Though there is 
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some deliberation among the Parisians over whether an orator (perhaps a parrhesiast) should be 
sent instead of a sophist, the “Sophiste” Janotus de Bragmardo is delegated to plea for the bells’ 
return (49). This second scene of speech-making complements the first by putting sophistry on 
full display as Eudemon was exhibited. Rabelais again draws our attention to the language of 
appearances in order to bring sophistry low, this time more explicitly linked to the Sorbonne (“la 
faculté”), whose condemnations of Pantagruel and Gargantua led to Rabelais’s replacing of 
‘theologian’ and direct references to the Sorbonne with ‘sophist’ in later editions. Ponocrates is 
startled when Janotus and his retinue of “six maistres inertes bien crottez à profit de mesnaige” 
show up to retrieve the bells (50). Janotus’s hair is cut “à la Césarine” and he wears his doctor’s 
hood “à l’antique;” he believes himself protected from violence by a costume of rented rhetoric 
and a belly full of holy water and quince pastries. Whereas Eudemon delivered his speech with a 
“voix tant éloquente,” Janotus delivers his plea with bad rhetoric, a confusing mixture of French 
and Latin, and bad reasoning, “en toussant.” For instance, in a marvelous bit of Latin, Janotus 
repeats the French word for “bell” to present his main argument for their return: “Ça je vous 
prouve que me les doibvez bailler. Ego sic argumentor. Omnis cloche clochabilis in clocherio 
clochando clochans clochatiuo clochare facit clochabiliter clochantes. Parisius habet clochas. 
Ergo gluc. Ha ha ha” (52). Gargantua has learned to depend on Ponocrates’s advice. When 
Ponocrates and Eudemon find Janotus laughable but harmless, Gargantua does too, and agrees 
that they should give him something to drink (53). This interlude between Eudemon’s speech 
and Gargantua’s new education reinforces the new protocol of laughter and communal drinking, 
and not violence, for responding to bad rhetoric. Janotus even laughs with them and, because he 
amused them so much, he is rewarded with new clothes (“chausses”) and something else to fill 
his belly (“saulcisses”). 
Rabelais reserves the scene of Gargantua’s actual transformation for a number of days 
after Eudemon’s speech. Ponocrates summons a doctor, Seraphim Calobarsy (an anagram of 
‘Phrancoys Rabelais’) who gives Gargantua hellebore. This herb, reputed to cure madness, 
literally and easily purges him of all his corrupt habits and learning from before: “Lequel 
[medicin] le purgea canonicquement avec Elebore de Anticyre, et par ce medicament luy nettoya 
toute l’alteration et perverse habitude du cerveau” (64; 1125 n. 10).111 In the end, it takes magic 
medicine rather than magic words to transform Gargantua into a studious humanist prince.  
I described earlier the rigor of Gargantua’s education under Ponocrates, particularly how 
his days are structured and how the young giant learns to see through the art of rhetoric by 
visiting the marketplace. Much of the focus of the new regime is on language consumption and 
production, whether it is reading, discussion, singing, writing, or reciting. Similar to the scene of 
Eudemon’s speech, Rabelais establishes the perfect conditions for eloquence in these chapters. 
The setting of Gargantua’s new education is indeed idyllic: “Lequel combien que semblast pour 
le commencement difficile, en la continuation tant doulx fut, legier, et delectable, que mieulx 
ressembloit un passetemps de roy, que l’estude d’un escholier” (72). We see here the same 
hyperbolic rhetoric of the descriptions of Eudemon. The hyperbolic “tant” and the expression 
“mieulx ressembloit” detract from reality through comparison to an impossible ideal: are 
humanism’s pedagogical methods really so good that they make such hard work seem like a 
pastime? Rabelais’s image of education gets lost in its own hyperbole, and eloquence with it. 
While being dressed and combed, Gargantua and his retinue “recitoient clerement et 
eloquentement quelques sentences retenues de la leçon” (65-66). If Eudemon’s eloquence is a 
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mere copy from antiquity, Gargantua’s training in eloquence appears to be equally formulaic and 
derivative. Eloquent recitation suggests intellectual dependence and it, like Eudemon, also falls 
into the danger of being an excessive form of imitation. Moreover, we do not see Gargantua 
producing eloquence himself: he neither defends “conclusions” nor puts humanism on trial again 
before Grandgousier. Where is the “rough-and-tumble of the forum” where Gargantua puts his 
learning to use and proves himself? Despite the commonplaces about eloquence’s role in the 
education of the prince, Rabelais does not seem invested here in showing a point at which 
Gargantua is expected to produce eloquence and find his own autonomy.  
In these ideal conditions, Gargantua deals only with his angelic double, Eudemon, and his 
humanist tutor. The later chapters of Gargantua show that it is the confrontation with his 
demonic, rather than his angelic, double that transforms him into a proper Renaissance 
sovereign. Outside the ideal conditions created by education, Gargantua has to apply his learning 
in a much wider context, with greater stakes: pseudo-epic international diplomacy. King 
Picrochole of Lerné, a former friend of Grandgousier, has begun an invasion of Gargantua’s 
homeland over a dispute between “les fouaciers de Lerné” and Grandgousier’s people. 
Grandgousier summons his son home to help with their defense (83). 
In the interim, Grandgousier dispatches his counselor Ulrich Gallet, “maistre de ses 
requestes homme saige et discret,” to negotiate with Picrochole. This scene of speech-making 
recalls Janotus de Bragmardo and the bells of Notre Dame, but with much more than bells on the 
line (85). Whereas Janotus’s speech was laughable, Gallet’s speech is competent, moving, 
Ciceronian in its structure, and, like other scenes where eloquence is key, all action halts for the 
performance.
112
 Gallet relies on antithesis, evoking specifically the “furie” that undoes 
friendship, faith, law, reason, and humanity, resulting in violence, grief, deception, disorder, and 
tyranny (105). Gallet’s speech is a much better representation of good language than Janotus’s 
clumsy reasoning and Eudemon’s absent eloquence, but instead of appealing to the generosity of 
a Gargantua and his retinue, Gallet’s speech unfortunately falls on mad ears. God has abandoned 
Picrochole to “son franc arbitre et propre sens” (84); he is “du tout hors du sens et delaissé de 
dieu” (89). The very “furie” that goaded Picrochole into invasion, aggravated by his counselors’ 
rhetoric and flattery, also immunizes him to eloquence. Gallet’s eloquence cannot transform or 
civilize in this case: madness is the catalyst for change here, and for the rupture within the 
Christian community that the Picrocholine war represents. A speech cannot convince a crazy 
person to be sane. Gallet fails to bring Picrochole back to the fold. Though the study of letters is, 
as Vergerio says, “a great help to those who were born for virtue and wisdom,” letters and the 
application of learning “take away neither madness nor wickedness” (Humanist Educational 
Treatises 37). Rhetoric, sometimes, is only “a means of persuading people of what they are 
already persuaded” (Foucault, Government of Self 229). Picrochole’s madness, like the greed of 
the Chat-fourrez, removes him from a communal commitment to abide by a certain ethical, and 
here also religious, code, one in which eloquence is believed to work. Picrochole is not 
persuaded by persuasion.  
Meanwhile, Gargantua makes his way home. Grandgousier has reluctantly interrupted his 
son’s studies and, in language reminiscent of the public emphasis of humanist pedagogical 
discourse, has told Gargantua in a letter that it is time to put his learning to use. In his call to 
arms, Grandgousier summons his son to a new kind of test of his learning, and a very different 
one than the rhetorical contest arranged under specific conditions between Eudemon and 
                                                 
112
 For readings of Ulrich Gallet as an ambassador, see Desrosiers-Bonin 35-37; Hampton, Fictions of Embassy29-
35; Lanham, chapter 8. 
71 
 
Gargantua. Grandgousier writes: “Car ainsi comme debiles sont les armes au dehors, si le conseil 
n’est en la maison: aussi vaine est l’estude et le conseil inutile: qui en temps oportun par vertus 
n’est executé et à son effect reduict” (84). He thus explains the exact relationship between arms 
and letters: arms are useless without counsel and study is selfish without application. The final 
proof of Gargantua’s successful study will not be a speech. It will be applying his learning to the 
defense of his people, “à moindre effusion de sang que sera possible” and “par engins plus 
expediens, cauteles, et ruzes de guerre,” in such a way that avoids the overuse of arms (85). 
Learning and respect for international borders are prioritized over arms and invasion.  
However, Gargantua remains in a state of Kantian tutelage as he travels to his father’s 
castle. Faced with an imminent confrontation with Picrochole’s captain Tripet, we find 
Gargantua speechless once again: “Tant qu’il luy feist paour, et ne sçavoit bien que dire ny que 
faire” (96). It is his tutor Ponocrates who has to tell him what to do; in this case, he says to seek 
the advice of a local lord and ally. This sequence of acquiring advice from different sources 
shows that, when multiple consultations are necessary, learning does not necessarily translate to 
real-world action or initiative. Though he has been summoned to princely defensive duties, 
Gargantua does not yet exhibit the qualities of the prince that humanism is meant to shape. 
Gargantua is only convinced to advance when his scout Gymnaste returns with intelligence about 
the enemy’s lack of “discipline militaire,” which would make it easy for them to “les assommer 
comme bestes” (100). Again we see the use of figurative language relating to animals to 
strengthen our impression of the enemy as lesser and wicked (“maraulx, pilleurs et brigans”) but 
also easy to vanquish. As effortlessly as Gargantua was to manipulate with good language, the 
enemy will be brought down with the arms of the righteous. 
Gargantua leads his father’s armed forces to victory against Picrochole. Now that he has 
proven himself capable of defending his home, the prince turns back to letters. Gargantua makes 
a speech that displays his learning, his rhetorical ability, and his generosity. This is also a 
performative speech that does something with his learning, applying it to the world. Rabelais 
marks Gargantua’s transformation from student to autonomous prince with a speech, a fully 
transcribed “concion” or harangue, given by Gargantua to his assembled armies and friends after 
Picrochole’s defeat. In this speech, Gargantua essentially passes humanism on to Picrochole’s 
young son, who is now king. Gargantua concludes that Ponocrates should be made “sus tous ses 
gouverneurs entendant, avecques auctorité à ce requise, et assidu avecques l’enfant: jusques à ce 
qu’il le congnoistra idoine de povoir par soy regir et regner” (135). The moment of autonomy, of 
self-government, is here literally a moment of command and entrusting. Gargantua reestablishes 
his guardian as the guardian of someone else until the other prince can “par soy regir et regner.” 
He thus removes Ponocrates’s hold over him and reasons for himself that Picrochole’s country 
needs a better leader. He does not offer himself, but rather repeats the cycle of educating the 
prince begun with him, in a symbolic but also material gesture in the form of Ponocrates, who is 
also given Picrochole’s chateau fort as a reward for his service, both in arms and in letters. A call 
to arms and a transfer of letters make the prince. Special language did not transform Gargantua; 
instead, he uses it to transform himself. The moment of autonomy, when the prince sets aside his 
guardian and becomes his own master, has to be decided by the prince. 
It is significant that this change is occasioned by a confrontation with Gargantua’s 
demonic double and not his angelic double. Eudemon, however empty his gesture of eloquence, 
nevertheless represented what Gargantua should be. Picrochole, by contrast, is what Gargantua 
could have easily become. Gargantua and Picrochole are both seen as susceptible to flattery and 
eloquence. Picrochole allows flattery to send him down a spiral of madness and international 
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conflict, but Gargantua is trained within a humanist, Christian code where flattery is an enemy 
and the mind must be armed against an onslaught of rhetorical weaponry. The real demonic 
double is, then, rhetoric put to use for wicked purposes, resulting in war, ruin, and madness. In 
this Rabelaisian system of antitheses, Picrochole’s madness brings Gargantua to Eudemon’s 
level, but with more authenticity and originality as well as respect for borders and Christian 
charity. The intrusion of eloquence into Gargantua informs the giants’ approach to conflict, 
reestablishing civilization and civility in the world of the pentalogy by removing the person in 
power who is immune to eloquence, to reason, and to God, and by replacing him with someone 
who can be educated within the Christian humanist code that holds the community together. 
We can briefly expand this inquiry into Rabelais’s attitude toward eloquence beyond 
Gargantua and Pantagruel, outside the specific context of education and its importance to 
statecraft. Unlike the examples of the Chats-fourrez, Eudemon, and Ulrich Gallet that I have 
discussed so far, Rabelais gives us an example of eloquence being used effectively in the 
prologue to the fourth book, published in 1552. Although eloquence is seen to work in this case, 
Rabelais makes it difficult to accept as eloquence, as defined by Seigel as “aesthetic splendor” 
combined with “psychological power” (87). While discussing modest wishes (“la mediocrité… 
dicte aurée,” 525), Rabelais narrates two stories about lost hatchets.113 They call into question 
what eloquence really means to Rabelais. The first story comes from the Bible: “un filz de 
Prophete en Israel” loses the iron off his hatchet handle in a river and he prays to God for its 
return. Rabelais tells us that if he had asked for something beyond his reach, coveting that which 
God had given to another, this man’s prayer would not have been answered.114 The tale is 
intended to be read as an allegory for humbleness. 
Rabelais pairs this Biblical story with an Aesopian fable that tells the same story, but 
transferred to the landscape of Greek mythology. A poor woodsman, Couillatris, loses his 
hatchet and implores Jupiter to replace it: “En cestuy estrif commença crier, prier, implorer, 
invocquer Juppiter par oraisons moult disertes (comme vous sçavez que Necessité feut inventrice 
d’Eloquence)…” (526). Normally a woodsman would be a man of few fine words, but because 
he is in great need he can suddenly articulate himself ‘disertement,’ or with fine elocution. His 
eloquent plea, however, seems more concise than “diserte:” “‘Ma coingnée Juppiter, ma 
coingnée, ma coingnée. Rien plus, ô Juppiter, que ma coingnée, ou deniers pour en achapter une 
autre. Helas, ma pauvre coingnée’” (526). It is not the woodsman’s elocution that gets Jupiter’s 
attention, but rather his annoying and repetitive shouting: “’Quel diable est là bas, qui hurle si 
horrifiquement?’” Thus Rabelais once again offers up the possibility of eloquence and puts it 
into question, for the woodsman’s howling is a far cry from “aesthetic splendor” and Jupiter’s 
annoyance is not testament to Couillatris’s “psychological power.” But Couillatris gets his 
hatchet back, and gold and silver ones as well for not demanding more from the gods than the 
one he had lost. This scene, combined with Eudemon’s encomium, calls into question the 
reading (and writing) practices that designate a given text as eloquent. By what criteria does 
Rabelais define these speeches as eloquent? Eudemon’s speech is eloquent because of its effects 
on its diegetical audience and not because its language is special. In a sense, Couillatris’s 
eloquence is more honest than Eudemon’s, for it is prompted by necessity rather than ritual and 
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 For a reading of “mediocrité aurée” in its Aristotelian context, see Duval, The Design of Rabelais’s Quart Livre 
de Pantagruel, chapter 4. 
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 “S’il eust soubhaité monter es cieulx dedans un chariot flamboyant, comme Helie: multiplier en lignée, comme 
Abraham: ester autant riche que Job, autant fort que Sanson, aussi beau que Absalon: l’eust il impetrié? C’est une 
question” (525-526). 
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the quasi-judicial artifice of making a case for humanism. That being said, Rabelais calls 
Couillatris’s plea eloquent precisely it is not. 
I have shown that satire deflates eloquence by pairing it with its opposite or with 
something that is immune to it because it is outside the context in which eloquence is believed to 
work. Though Couillatris’s eloquence is far from ideal, it is his imitators who bear the brunt of 
satire in this fable. The men who hear of the woodsman’s good fortune can only repeat his brief 
words in order to attempt the same result, but they cannot duplicate the honesty of his 
impassioned plea. When Mercury shows these imitators three hatchets in a lineup (iron, silver, 
gold), they greedily choose the gold ones. Mercury beheads them for using the woodsman’s 
eloquence perversely and for choosing literal gold over figurative “mediocrité aurée.” 
Couillatris’s first instance of eloquence was successful in the moment, but his imitators fail. 
Couillatris works within the ethical framework of honest labor; necessity and humility are the 
guides for his eloquence. His imitators do not operate within the same parameters, for with “ces 
perdeurs de coignées” Couillatris’s desperation becomes greed and his eloquence becomes a 
hollow formula for deception (533). One of the pitfalls of binary thinking and imitation 
combined is that the imitator is brought low when juxtaposed with the original. The hatchet-
losers cannot repurpose Couillatris’s eloquence to make it work for them; his eloquence in the 
past is no longer available to them in their present. One man’s eloquence is another man’s 
hollow exercise in wicked rhetoric.  
 
V. Conclusion: “lisons en nostre langue Gallique” 
  
Rabelais’s first dramatization of eloquence in action, in Gargantua chapter 15, is 
accompanied by the collapse of an ideal kind of language into an empty, ritualized form that 
causes concern rather than celebrating eloquence’s potency. Eloquence becomes an art that, in 
attempting to conceal itself and its persuasiveness, ends up betraying itself. Each time Rabelais 
evokes eloquence it behaves in the same fashion: he simultaneously holds up the desirability and 
possibility of eloquence while also insisting on its limitations and the conditions that must be met 
for it to work. Eloquence can civilize and call people back to the virtuous life, but the Chats-
fourrez are too greedy and wicked for it to work on them. Orators and princes use eloquence to 
hold communities together, but if the prince is beyond reason, no persuasion can get him to 
rejoin the community. Desperation can make eloquent speakers out of the most humble, but 
eloquence cannot be imitated or duplicated, so fables about eloquence’s power reduce it, to 
borrow Cave’s formulation again, into a “mirage rather than the affirmation of a value-system” 
that esteems such language (Cornucopian Text 199). As sociologist Erving Goffman has astutely 
said, often the most productive moments for understanding communication are those in which 
communication fails (125). The satirical genre allows Rabelais to exaggerate and nitpick this 
image of eloquence, removing it from the prevailing thoughts and practices of humanism and 
placing it in narrative situations where it is doomed to fail or falter. He has demystified 
eloquence as an inaccessible force from the past, a cliché, a commonplace, a complete 
mythology of man’s capacity to impose his will on his environment, but it does not necessarily 
represent meaningful communication. Rabelais’s rhetoric of eloquence turns out to be quite 
persuasive, and we readers are made wary. 
What remains to be discussed is what kind of bearing this status of eloquence has on the 
French language for Rabelais. Rabelais’s books suggest that Classical eloquence’s overly 
idealized success becomes inaccessible and unattainable in sixteenth-century France; in his push 
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to make eloquence something out of place and out of time, he also seems to remove the 
possibility of an eloquent French. The first volume, Pantagruel, proposes that language should 
refrain from artfulness, since most efforts to use fancy language fail or are met with violence: the 
Limousin, for instance, is warned to speak “naturellement,” avoiding “mots espaves en pareille 
diligence que les patrons des navires evitent les rochiers de mer” (234-235). Even Panurge, an 
expert rhetorician himself, says upon first meeting Pantagruel that rhetoric is only necessary 
when the facts are not clear; the fact that Panurge says this in Greek, though French is his 
“langue naturelle, et maternelle,” confirms the idea that words only engender more words, but 
recognition of a ‘natural’ language puts an end to an excessive flow of speech.115 Rabelais’s 
attentiveness to a language’s ‘naturalness’ speaks to humanism’s admiration for Classical 
eloquence, desire to appropriate it, and yet still be native to France and respectful of its 
increasing distance, in official terms, from Latin. As Richard Cooper attests in his study of 
Rabelais’s Neo-Latin works and letters, there is a shift in Rabelais’s writing towards French and 
away from Latin, but with it an increasing anxiety about whether or not French can equal Latin 
in style and substance (67). In Gargantua, we see the French language taking on form as 
Gargantua and his retinue compose “rondeaux et ballades en langue Françoyse” from Latin 
epigrams that they had read (73). Translation and transfer was to be the method of bringing 
Classical learning and letters to France. In this case, a Latin form known for its biting brevity 
transforms into longer, French forms known for repetitive refrains that Du Bellay will tell the 
French poet in 1549 to avoid because “ces vieilles Poësies Françoyses… corrumpent le goust de 
nostre Langue: & ne servent si non à porter temoingage de notre ignorance” (54). Rabelais 
locates French between a rich, Latin past and a disorderly present state. 
To conclude, I would like to discuss Rabelais’s survey of French literature described in 
the prologue of the fifth book. Both the fourth and fifth books of the pentalogy were published 
after Du Bellay’s famous patriotic and poetic manifesto, and its influence on Rabelais is quite 
clear. In this prologue, Rabelais places himself on the margins of French literary productivity, 
both in terms of style and subject matter. Rabelais calls himself a goose among the swans, 
excluding himself from the great French poets and writers that he lists here. However, this is not 
merely self-deprecation, though he leaves behind Alcofribas Nasier (a persona very proud of his 
own skill) and signs this prologue with his own name. He prefers to be counted among the 
unskilled rather than be just another imitator lost in a faceless crowd of other imitators. In other 
words, he would prefer to have the maddening but effective eloquence of Couillatris if it means 
not performing lesser imitations like the hatchet-losers: 
 
Et combien que maintenant nous lisons en nostre langue Gallique, tant en vers 
qu’en oraison soluë plusieurs excellens scripts et que peu de reliques restent de 
capharderie et siecle Gottis, ay neantmoins esleu gasouiller et siffler oye, comme 
dit le proverbe, entre les Cygnes plustost que d’estre entre tant de gentils poetes et 
facons orateurs mut du tout estimé. Jouer aussi quelque villageois personnage 
entre tant disers joueurs de ce noble acte, plustost qu’estre mis au rang de  eux 
qui ne servent que d’ombre et de nombre, seulement baailans aux mousches, 
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 “’… ce homos philologi pamdes homologusi tote logus te ce rhemata peritta hyparchin, opote pragma asto pasi 
delon esti. Entha gar anancei monon logi isin, hina pragmata (hon peri amphibetumen) me prosphoros epiphenete’” 
[“’Pourtant tous les amis de lettres reconnaissent que les discours et les paroles sont superflus quand les faits sont 
évidents pour tous. Les discours ne s’imposent que là où les faits sur lesquels nous discutons ne se montrent pas 
évidents’”] (248-249; 1277 n. 1).  
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chouans des aureilles comme un asne d’Arcadie, au chant des musiciens et par 
signe en silence, signifians qu’ils consentent à la prosopopée. (726, emphases 
mine) 
 
Rabelais goes on to say that these minor “ombre et nombre” writers are “un grand tas de 
Collinets, Marots, Drouets, Saingelais, Sallets, Masuels, et une longue centurie d’autres poëtes et 
orateurs Galliques” (726). Uniqueness in literary productivity produces sometimes unfortunate 
multiplicity. 
Rabelais begins his survey of the state of French literature, and its impact on the French 
language, by implying that these imitators of French poets bring nothing new to French literature 
and “l’eternelle fabrique de nostre vulgaire” (726). And yet, the text slips without warning back 
into praise for what these writers have produced, which is “nectar divin, vin precieux, friand, 
riant, muscadet, delicat, delicieux,” “le tout en rethorique armoisine, cramoisine.” This is a 
luxurious feast of writing. Still, it is altogether unclear whether Rabelais makes this remark about 
the singular originals (Collinet, Marot) or their plural copycats (Collinets, Marots). The “longue 
centurie” of French writers collapses the good with the less good. What began as a discussion of 
Rabelais’s distinction from lesser writers of his time, and the happiness that he enjoys from such 
distinction, ends as wholehearted approval and desire for what his time and his country have 
produced: “et m’auront puis que compagnon ne puis estre pour auditeur, je dis infatigable de 
leurs trescelestes escripts” (727). Rabelais fluidly shifts from writer to reader, from producer to 
consumer, who eschews his previously established criteria for producing writing (that it must 
“gasouiller et siffler”) in order to consume French reading with neither end nor rule 
(“infatigable”), French writers measured against themselves alone. Rabelais concludes the 
prologue with some characteristic verbal violence that plants him firmly on the side of French 
over Latin. He promises that he will prove to anyone, in a Pantagrueline set of “conclusions,” 
especially those “rappetasseurs de vieilles ferrailles latines, revandeurs de vieux mots latins tous 
moisis et incertains,” that “nostre langue vulgaire n’est tant vile, tant inepte, tant indigente et à 
mespriser qu’ils l’estiment (727). He then humbly offers up his book as a gift for our use, until 
something better comes along, “en gré attendant mieux à la prochaine venue des arondelles” 
(728). Again we see antithesis at work: for French writing to be made “tresceleste,” Latin has to 
be brought low. The “armoisine, cramoisine” color and texture of a French textual feast have to 
leave behind the “moisi” and “ferraille” of Latin. 
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Chapter Four 
Reserved for Mercury: Hélisenne de Crenne’s Broken Quill and Borrowed Eloquence 
         
        … ὁ Ἔρως ποιεῖ σοφιστὰς… 
(Love makes expert rhetoricians) 
Longus, Daphnis and Chloe 4.18 
 
 So far I have discussed eloquence as it is conceived of by male writers in the first half of 
the sixteenth century. I have shown that Jean Lemaire de Belges depicts specifically female 
eloquence as an inherently malicious force that ultimately topples cities; he, like many other 
Renaissance writers, has nothing nice to say about female speech. Now I turn to how women 
writers envisage female powers of persuasion, concentrating principally on Hélisenne de Crenne, 
to see how women perceive their gender’s ability to speak (and write) effectively: do women 
write about good women who speak well? I am interested in how Crenne’s desire to be eloquent 
and her concern for her ‘weak’ style are inseparable from her literary productivity and 
construction of her authority as a woman writing against certain Renaissance ideas about women. 
This chapter will uncover the discursive strategies Crenne uses to produce a mediating space to 
engineer her own authority, between the models and methodologies of female authorship that are 
available to her and the models of male rhetoric that would otherwise count as the most 
authoritative, but which she cannot claim outright as her own. The argument of this chapter is 
that Crenne self-authorizes – that is, both acquiring authority and becoming an author through 
the act of writing – by distinguishing her relationship to persuasive language from that of 
contemporary female writers and, instead, by aligning herself both with and against the rhetoric 
of men, in the process revealing how humanist clichés about eloquence are challenged by new 
types of writing, such as that produced by women. Eloquence in the traditional sense of the term 
is reserved “à la divine eloquence de Mercure,” making room for new means of persuasion by 
explicitly excluding and showing the limitations of that ideal form of persuasive language.
116
 
While eloquence’s disruptive and corruptive influence on the nation and on the prince are not 
Crenne’s prerogatives as they were for Lemaire and Rabelais, she does capitalize on the 
traditional notion of eloquence as a means to create a community for herself. Crenne’s attention 
to the mechanics of persuasion takes place on two levels: between rhetorical interactions that 
Crenne dramatizes in her work, as in between characters on a diegetic level, and the rhetorical 
interaction she stages with her community of “lisantes,” her compassionate women readers.  
The production of fiction and authority in Crenne’s works is complicated by the narration 
of her first publication, Les Angoysses douloureuses qui pro edent d’amours (1538), which will 
be the main focus of this chapter. ‘Hélisenne de Crenne’ is a pseudonym as well as the name of 
the protagonist and narrator of the Angoysses. Thus ‘Hélisenne’ denotes three figures, each the 
extension of the next but also distinct from one another: Hélisenne, the character who 
experiences love; Dame Hélisenne, the narrator who writes about her experience of love, 
addresses her readers directly, and explains how the Angoysses came to be written; and Crenne, 
the persona of the historical author who comments on the Angoysses in her other writing. As I 
shall demonstrate in this chapter, the attitude Crenne has towards persuasion, eloquence, and her 
own believability changes depending on which of these three is in question. The Angoysses is a 
project of persuasion in which the main thesis is that love should be avoided, as stated by its very 
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title page: “Les angoysses douloureuses qui procedent d’amours: Contenantz troys parties, 
Composée par Dame Helisenne: Laquelle exhorte toutes personnes à ne suyvre folle Amour” 
(94). Crenne offers herself up – body and text – as proof that love is folly. The multiple versions 
of Hélisenne end up being a happy narratological complication because they contribute to the 
persuasive nature of the text by making it agonistic: the incorrigible Hélisenne exalts love even 
as Dame Hélisenne, in her asides to the readers, glosses her experience as reason enough to vilify 
love. In other words, Crenne’s production of fiction relies on the writer and the narrator 
augmenting their authority and believability, and they accomplish this by undermining the 
character, her rapturous love, and her relationship to language. I shall explain shortly how the 
Angoysses as a whole is as “textually promiscuous”117 as it can get, shifting first-person narrative 
voices as well as genres to argue for and against this primary assertion about love. Crenne thus 
uses multiplicity and textual hybridity to carve out her own authority, using techniques of 
argumentation to make the case both for Hélisenne as a negative exemplar and for Dame 
Hélisenne as worthy of believability.  
The connection between fiction and authority is further complicated by how the historical 
identity of the writer shapes discussions of her in modern criticism. It is now widely accepted 
that the historical person behind these texts was Marguerite (de) Briet.
118
 Some scholars have 
speculated on the historical truth behind Crenne’s works and on the fictionalization of any real 
conflict Briet may have had with her estranged husband. It can be said that the presentation of 
the Angoysses does little at first to discredit a reading similar to Philippe Lejeune’s “pacte 
autobiographique” in which a writer (sharing her name with her protagonist) pledges to tell the 
truth about herself and in which a reader can believe that what is written has really happened.
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Indeed, Crenne stages this within part one, only to deny it later. The title page announces its 
writer (“Composée par Dame Helisenne”) and the opening address to her readers switches from 
the third person to the first, thereby eliding “Dame Hélisenne” with the ‘je’ of the rest of the 
book. The speaking voice claims to have lived the experience she recounts and is therefore a 
believable source on matters of love.  
That being said, we must question the relevance of an autobiographical interpretation that 
tends to restrict the scope of any discussion of early modern women’s writing and ask how 
Crenne wants us to read the text. I do not feel it necessary to a discussion of the thematization of 
eloquence in Crenne’s writings that there be an unmasked historical figure behind them or 
historical veracity to them. The writer disallows any historical interpretation of her fiction in her 
first “epistre invective,” where she admonishes her husband for thinking the Angoysses tells a 
true tale of an illicit love affair she herself experienced.
120
 Instead, I shall focus on the multi-
layered construction of ‘Hélisenne’ that we can gauge from her writing, for it speaks greatly to 
the problems inherent both to female authorship of the period and to how we read women’s 
writing. Too much attention to an autobiographical intent dismisses the production of Crenne’s 
authorial and literary identity according to the terms she lays out in the Angoysses and elsewhere. 
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Such a reading forces us to consider her only as a historical woman who may or may not be 
telling the truth about herself. The tendency to read for autobiographical openness is not often 
the case for male writers, as Constance Jordan has pointed out in a discussion of Renaissance 
feminism and Crenne’s artistic autonomy: “Her claim is revolutionary in its implications. 
Doctrine governing the conduct of women in public held that the resources of the imagination – 
feigning and fictionalizing – ought to be denied them.”121 Thus, reading these works 
autobiographically participates in the facet of Renaissance misogyny that presupposes that 
women cannot help but write in an autobiographical mode, and thus both their writing and their 
behavior are subject to moral censure.  
Crenne is, in fact, overtly defiant of this autobiographical assumption and very conscious 
of the fictionality and literariness of her writing. The name of the writer certainly constitutes a 
kind of pact in the case of Crenne, but one of fiction, a construction of a fictional identity that 
makes this kind of woman-authored writing possible. In Gérard Genette’s terms, her pseudonym 
is “… already a poetic activity, and the pseudonym is already somewhat like a work. If you can 
change your name, you can write” (Paratextes 41; cited in Bromilow140). The fact that Crenne 
maligns herself as an adulterous character and defends her right to write about it, as both narrator 
and writer, is perhaps only possible because Briet adopted both a pseudonym and a persona. The 
creation of ‘Hélisenne de Crenne’ allows her to react (with more indignation and even 
aggression) to Renaissance misogyny than decorum or modesty would normally permit, 
defending women’s right to write.  
Studies of Crenne have been turning in this direction in the past few decades. Pollie 
Bromilow points out in a recent article on Crenne that there has been much more critical 
attention paid to the quasi-autobiographical nature of the Angoysses (part one) and to the 
problematic (and, for some, distasteful) ‘unity’ of its three parts than there has been about 
Crenne’s construction of a writing persona or her promotion of women’s writing (“Fictions” 
144). This is the tradition of Gustave Reynier, whose 1908 study of the sentimental novel set the 
tone for both critical work and critical editions. For instance, Paule Demats – answering 
Reynier’s call to ignore parts two and three of the Angoysses by publishing in 1968 a critical 
edition of only part one – believes that Reynier’s objection was not the text’s unity, per se, but 
rather the “contraste violent” between the “vécu” of part one and the “fictif” of the rest (xxv). 
More recently, scholars have been finding other aspects of Crenne’s works to be more productive 
sites for exploring the writing practices of women in the early modern period. The English 
translator of the Angoysses, for instance, believes that the text’s intertextuality is a more 
compelling subject than its autobiographical potential, saying that the Angoysses is not a 
“mimetic representation of the author’s life” but rather a fictive and very literary creation based 
on “details not of her past life but rather of her past reading” (Torments xxv). The tension 
between fact and fiction is, unquestionably, an important feature of these texts as well as any 
interpretation of them.  
My contention is that Crenne orients this tension in a slightly different direction, one that 
takes up the distinct persuasive goals of rhetoric. The persona that serves as a defensive gesture 
also contributes to Crenne’s overall persuasive tactics. Crenne does not just want her readers to 
see her works as located somewhere between fact and fiction. Her attention to persuasiveness 
and language evokes eloquence’s very claim to plausibility. Eloquence leads people to believe 
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something could be true. Pierre Fabri defines this aspect of eloquence in his 1521 Le grand et 
vrai art de pleine rhétorique: “… car la force de eloquence n’est point seullement a mener les 
auditeurs a croire la chose comme elle est, mais a ce qui est et qui n’est mie, a la agrauer ou 
deprimer, et a conduire les auditeurs a croire qu’il peult estre vray” (21). In the Angoysses, Dame 
Hélisenne asserts to her readers that she writes the absolute truth of her experience; part of her 
construction of authority is her claim to first-hand knowledge of her subject. But there is periodic 
insistence to her husband (representative of male social and institutional authority) that her 
writing is just an exercise, safely inscribed in the moral activity of avoiding idleness. Crenne thus 
lays claim to intellectual activity and fictionalizing, as Jordan says, within the same discursive 
space as her claims to truth. The Angoysses is concerned with believability and lies, beginning 
with the lies lovers tell each other and the world. Hélisenne is one such liar, and Dame Hélisenne 
translates her lies into moral lessons through her plausible narrative for the benefit of her 
“lisantes.” Crenne, then, is a persona who becomes an arbiter of truths, as she persuades her 
readers that the self-conscious fiction she crafts could be true, depending on who is reading it. 
In this chapter, I use the term ‘fiction’ loosely, as an antonym to ‘historical fact’ the way 
that Hélisenne de Crenne is the fictional counterpart of Marguerite (de) Briet. ‘Fiction’ did not 
have the same definition in the early modern period as it does today, as Timothy J. Reiss and 
Nicholas Paige have shown.
122
 To avoid inaccurately using historically complicated terms such 
as ‘fiction’ and ‘novel,’ which is also relevant to this chapter, I have used ‘imaginative writing’ 
as shorthand for prose works that exhibit fabrication and invention, as ‘fiction’ implies in the 
early modern period. The term ‘fiction,’ moreover, suggests dissimulation: for instance, François 
Rabelais’s Pantagruel, in response to a request to arbitrate a dispute between lords, says: “’… je 
vous en diray mon opinion sans fiction ny dissimulation quelconque’” (253; cited in Greimas and 
Keane 290). It is important to distinguish Crenne’s use of fiction in this way, as a mask and as a 
persuasive and defensive tactic, especially with regard to the generic status of the Angoysses as a 
sentimental novel, because it helps us reorient our critical discussions of Crenne. 
It is tempting to read the confessional nature of the Angoysses (part one) as 
autobiographical, and Crenne certainly would like us to believe in that possibility to make it all 
the more persuasive, but the text remains inscribed in earlier literary traditions of imaginative 
writing even as it is seen to gesture toward the later emergence of the novel. Much critical work 
has been done to trace the development of the novel and define it against other genres. I find 
useful Mikhail Bakhtin’s discussion of the novel as a unique, fluid, constantly-developing genre 
that can borrow from other (more rigidly defined) genres without losing itself (“Epic and Novel” 
8) and Patricia Yaeger’s recasting of the novel as a liberating and productive space for female 
self-expression precisely because of its lack of firm formal constraints (Honey-Mad Women 6). 
The very formlessness of the Angoysses makes it more intimate. The sentimental novel, as well, 
is not defined by form but by subject matter. As I said earlier, Reynier named the Angoysses 
France’s first sentimental novel in 1908,’ sentimental’ because he was hesitant to call it 
‘psychological,’ which for him is too modern a term (101-102). Reynier defines the sentimental 
novel by its main plot characteristic: “… le caractère distinctif est qu’il attache moins 
d’importance aux aventures, aux éléments extérieurs de l’action qu’à l’analyse et à l’expression 
des sentiments” (3). The genre’s influences include Ovid, Le Roman de la Rose, chivalric 
romance, and especially the vogue of Italian and Spanish “écriture amoureuse” from the fifteenth 
and early sixteenth centuries. Understanding the Angoysses with these definitions of fiction as a 
rhetorical instrument and novel as an unfixed genre and form can help us redirect our discussions 
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away from this tendency to read for autobiographical truth and, furthermore, away from its 
troublesome generic disparity, that is, the fact that while its first part is sentimental (and 
therefore given pride of place in modern discussions), the rest is chivalric.
123
 The Angoysses is a 
deliberate and self-conscious fiction and, in it, Crenne convenes other genres – completely 
within the standards of the time – to maintain that fiction and her arguments against love. 
So that I can elaborate further on the complexities of Crenne’s project of persuasion, I 
must now briefly summarize her works. Briet published four texts under the name Hélisenne de 
Crenne: Les Angoysses douloureuses qui pro edent d’amours (1538), published in nine editions 
by 1560; Les Epistres familieres et invectives (1539), published in six editions by 1560; Le Songe 
de Madame Helisenne (1540); and the first French prose translation of books one to four of 
Virgil’s Aeneid, called Les quatre premiers livres des Eneydes du treselegant poete Virgile, 
traduictz de Latin en prose Françoyse par Ma Dame Helisenne, à la traduction desquelz y a 
pluralité de propos qui par maniere de phrase y sont adjoustez: ce que beaucoup sert à 
l’ lu idation & de oration desditz livres, dirigez à tresillustre et tresauguste Prince Françoys, 
premier de ce nom, invictissime Roy de France (1541), to which she appends her own glosses.
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It is noteworthy that Dido, Queen of Carthage, is featured prominently in these books of the 
Aeneid, as Crenne takes her as a literary model who, like Crenne, engages in “œuvres viriles.”125 
The range of texts – sentimental novel, letters in the Ciceronian tradition, medieval dream 
allegory, translation of epic poetry, and hermeneutical commentary – also speaks to Crenne’s 
self-authorizing since some are atypical of women writers. This range can also be likened to the 
rhetorical exercises representative of a humanist education, in which a similar theme is translated 
across different genres; in this case, that theme is the maligned woman fighting ineffectually 
against love. 
The Angoysses provides the general thematic backbone of Crenne’s works. The overall 
project of the book, as Dame Hélisenne affirms in the “epistres” that precede each of the book’s 
three parts, is to warn her (female) readers against the dangers of love. The Angoysses is a 
narratologically and generically complex book. I have already described the multiplicity of 
Hélisenne, who is a character, a narrator, and a writer, each with distinctive characteristics. In the 
first part of the book, Dame Hélisenne describes falling in love with Guenelic and writing about 
the “angoysses” of love and the faithlessness of lovers; Guenelic commits several cardinal sins as 
a lover, such as spreading gossip about Hélisenne’s love for him and even telling her husband 
that he has violated her chastity. Her husband finds her writing and destroys it before locking her 
in a secluded tower. There, she rewrites the first part of the text in the hopes that the document 
will find its way to Guenelic. That moment in the tower is where Hélisenne the character merges 
into Dame Hélisenne the narrator-writer. This first part of the Angoysses constitutes the ‘roman 
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 For the evolution of the modern novel, see Lukács; Watt. For the differences between novel and romance, see 
Frye, 303-326. For an insightful discussion of the Angoysses, feminist theory, and modern considerations of the 
history of the novel, see Conley.  
124
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sentimental’ portion of the text. It gives us a psychologically rich portrait of a woman in love 
trying to express her experience in words.  
Besides Hélisenne, there are two more first-person character-narrators. Guenelic narrates 
the second part of the Angoysses, in which he and his friend Quezinstra travel outside of France. 
The many exploits of the two friends prove their worth as knights and redeem Guenelic’s 
behavior from part one. At the beginning of part three, Guenelic and Quezinstra return to France 
to find Hélisenne. Guenelic sneaks into her tower and tells her of his adventures, which she 
writes down after he leaves, shifting the original narrative ‘je’ from herself to him. Thus 
Guenelic ‘writes’ the second part and a portion of the third through Hélisenne, and with this 
narrative transvestitism the genre of the book shifts from sentimental novel to chivalric romance, 
with epic undertones. When the two lovers die mid-escape, Quezinstra takes up the pen, 
borrowing Guenelic’s ‘je’ to record their last words. In the “ample et accommodee narration” 
that concludes the text, Quezinstra writes, in the first person, of the supernatural intervention by 
Mercury to get Hélisenne’s ‘little book’ published in Paris. The book is, presumably, the text we 
have in our hands. Thus the Angoysses, employing several narrators and borrowing from 
multiple genres, stages the process of its events being lived, narrated, written, and finally 
published.  
The Epistres familieres et invectives is a collection of eighteen letters on diverse topics. 
They belong to the same literary universe as the Angoysses and participate in Crenne’s project of 
persuasion and self-authorization begun in her first publication. In the fifth, eighth, and ninth 
‘familiar’ letters, in which Crenne takes up the tone of advice and conduct literature, Crenne tries 
to persuade two different female friends against love affairs on the grounds that men are 
untrustworthy and that passion is all too often based on error rather than on true love. She 
advises them to keep their passion concealed until it dissipates with time. In a true carry-over of 
the confessional nature of the Angoysses, Crenne reveals her own secret illicit desires to a friend 
in the tenth, eleventh, and thirteenth letters. The first three ‘invective’ letters are a conversation 
between Crenne and her husband, where they argue over the Angoysses’ believability and its 
status between truth and fiction. The fourth and fifth letters, addressed to a friend and to the 
small-minded denizens of a small town, respectively, concern a woman’s right to read and to 
write. Lastly, the Songe describes a dream in which Venus and Minerva appear to a Lover and 
his Lady. The same exhortation to virtue from the Angoysses resurfaces here and is mapped out 
along even more distinct lines. The title page reads: “Le Songe de madame Helisenne composé 
par ladicte dame, la consideration duquel, est apte à instiguer toutes personnes de s’alliener de 
vice, et s’approcher de vertu” (43). Each goddess tries to persuade the two mortals to either 
embrace or reject love. Crenne also tackles the topics of the relative benefits of reading, the 
importance of exempla, and the weakness of men’s minds when confronted by persuasion, for 
the Lover is easily swayed by both Venus and Minerva. 
It is clear from these summaries that Crenne’s main concerns are persuasion and 
women’s right to intellectual activity. These two preoccupations play out in a discourse of illicit 
desire, which allows her to capitalize on the resulting tension between defaming and defending 
herself, both as a woman and as a woman writer. Thus these summaries add a new dimension to 
my focus on Crenne as a writer concerned throughout with crafting her own authority through 
agonistic language about love in a range of formats. To illustrate these points further, I turn now 
to the scene of Hélisenne’s confession, which takes place at about the halfway point of the 
Angoysses, part one. In the Catholic sacrament of confession, the repentant sinner lays bare all 
their sins to a representative of the Church to receive absolution. It is a site of truth-telling in 
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which sins are exposed but remain secret, since the confessor cannot divulge those sins to anyone 
else. It is one of the moments where we can clearly see Hélisenne’s response to authoritative 
male discourse, Dame Hélisenne’s retrospective and interpretative gloss, and the status of 
language in “écriture amoureuse.” In other words, this incident of disclosure stages Crenne’s 
project in miniature. Hélisenne appropriates the confession as a restorative exercise of 
unburdening her heart. Dame Hélisenne extends the confession to the Angoysses as a whole, 
aiming it not at a male authority but rather at a community of women readers. The confession 
inspires a mode of persuasive writing in which the truth is shared and believed: the process by 
which Hélisenne becomes a writer begins with a confession. 
 
I. “En confession et sans difficulté”: Speaking and Writing as Unburdening 
 
Hélisenne’s confession is a scene in which the humanist faith in words confronts one of 
its limitations. In my previous chapters, I discussed how madness, greed, and ambition make 
eloquence ineffective and even powerless. In the Angoysses, love is the force that no eloquence 
can affect. Indeed, love makes all rhetorical interactions suspect, creating an alternative economy 
of communication in which words cannot be trusted. It is abundantly clear in “écriture 
amoureuse” that, as Paolo Valesio suggests, language is itself a “struggle for power” (99). In the 
Angoysses, this struggle transpires in language and about language. Crenne holds up the 
possibility of eloquence as a “fantasy of power” only to negate that power and exclude it from 
the text as a viable means to resolve talk into action (Rebhorn, Emperor 15). Eloquence in the 
Angoysses is used two ways: as a signal of hyperbole (as in, not even Mercury, god of eloquence 
himself, can describe Hélisenne’s beauty) or a trigger for immediate confrontation, a struggle for 
rhetorical dominance in a given interaction (lovers’ words are sweet and efficacious without ever 
being persuasive). Persuasion plays out agonistically: instead of dramatizing one character 
yielding to the rhetoric of another, Crenne’s characters are equal and opposite rhetorical forces. 
This is the very nature of Crenne’s writing as a whole: agonistic struggles for rhetorical control 
that never fully find resolution between two incongruent entities (such as fact and fiction), an 
irresolution from which Crenne produces her fiction and authority. 
 In the confession scene, three clichés concerning the relationship between love and 
language come together and demonstrate language truly is a struggle for power in the Angoysses. 
These clichés are: love turns lovers into liars, love makes it difficult for lovers to speak, and love 
immunizes lovers to verbal persuasion. I would like to elaborate quickly on this system of 
communication, specifically the first two aspects, before I turn to Hélisenne’s confession, to 
demonstrate more efficiently how that scene stands out as a valuable mode of exchange. This 
scene marks the first moment in the Angoysses where Hélisenne decides to refrain from feigning 
and fictionalizing. Not only does she disclose the truth of her love to another person, but she also 
advocates for herself against a male authority. Thus the scene of truth-telling is also an agonistic 
scene of argumentation. Though the monk fails to persuade Hélisenne to resist her forbidden 
love, the confession gives rise to the initiative to share the truth more broadly.
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Dame Hélisenne makes a point of establishing Hélisenne and Guenelic as liars. Hélisenne 
instinctively becomes a liar after Guenelic catches her eye: she crafts an “artificiele mensonge” 
to convince her husband that her altered state is not inspired by the handsome neighbor, but 
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Madonna Fiammetta by Giovanni Boccaccio (Idle Pursuits 113-120). 
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rather the litigations that had brought them to that town (106). Forbidden love moves Hélisenne 
to feign and fictionalize as gestures of self-protection against her husband, the social and legal 
authority of her domestic life who sees through such fabrications, such as when he finds a love 
letter written in her own hand and does not believe it was written only “par exercice” (136). 
Dame Hélisenne frames love as a corrupting force, the opposite of eloquence’s traditional 
civilizing powers: love has made Hélisenne “hardye et audacieuse” where she had previously 
been famously chaste and “timide” (114). For her part, Hélisenne constructs Guenelic as a liar in 
her own speeches and letters, accusing him of feigning love through deceptive words. The 
following represents a typical exchange: 
 
mais peult estre que voz doulces et attractive paroles sont fainctes et simulées: car 
le plus souvent, vous aultres Jouvenceaulx usez de telles fainctises et adulations, 
pour circonvenir la simple cr[e]dulité fœminine, aulcunefoys peu constante et trop 
liberale, et ne tendez à aultre fin, sinon qu’à priver d’honneur celles que vous 
dictes tant aymer. (175-176) 
 
The rhetorical interaction in the context of love involves not just exchanges of words. It also 
seeks to bargain for desire (concealed or disclosed) and honor (maintained or ruined). The fear of 
being deceived and losing honor make the lover want, and even endeavor, to mistrust what he or 
she hears. Though “Amour n’est aultre chose, qu’une oblivion de raison,” when it comes to 
language, there is an excess of reasoning that favors doubt and suspicion (203). What is more, 
though honor and chastity skew more towards the lady’s side of the discourse of love, this 
reticence to believe the lover appears to be relatively ungendered in the Angoysses, as Hélisenne 
and Guenelic share many qualities and discursive practices in this regard. Guenelic responds to 
Hélisenne’s calling out of young men with a similar accusation of the female sex. Guenelic 
claims that Hélisenne and her husband are colluding together so that they can laugh at his efforts 
to woo her: “n’estoit une chose qui me conforte, c’est que je ne suis seul abusé de ce variable 
sexe fœminin…” (183). No one in love is worthy of trust, especially when they talk about their 
love and desire: more talk is equated with less sincerity, more attempts at persuasion imply less 
real feeling and thus they can be easily disregarded. This is the very game of love, which both 
resists and depends on language. Failed persuasion means deferring the resolution and its 
consequences (ruined reputation). Prolonging the verbal romantic encounter increases longing: 
“Car la continuelle conversation est cause d’augmentation d’amours,” the monk will tell 
Hélisenne (153). Language and persuasion therefore are intensely called into question in the 
Angoysses precisely because its subject is love. 
The real currency in the communication of love in the Angoysses is not, in fact, words, 
but rather sighs, silence, and trembling. These are visible and audible signs produced by the body 
of the person in love, more honest and persuasive evidence of powerful love than words. 
Hélisenne and Guenelic have a tête-à-tête shortly after the confession, for instance, where this 
economy of love, language, and silence is plainly mapped out. Hélisenne sets aside Guenelic’s 
speech about facing any peril for her (except for her husband, who may be lurking in the vicinity 
and from whom he has already fled several times), and she considers his body language instead. 
In this round in the game of love, Hélisenne gambles on an exchange of speech with silence to 
increase his desire: “mais en considerant ses gestes exterieurs, je comprenoie qu’il estoit fort 
espris et attainct de mon amour, qui fut cause que pour ceste fois ne luy vouluz declairer le secret 
de mon cueur, non pour le bannir ne chasser: mais pour plus ardentement l’enflamber” (167). 
84 
 
This is a manufactured silence, a strategy for augmenting desire by not answering amorous talk 
with more talk. More often, however, Hélisenne is seen to be involuntarily silenced. Excesses of 
feeling inhibit speaking and cut off her voice: “Et quand je voulois prononcer quelque propos, 
par manieres de plaintes et exclamations, l’extreme destresse de ma douleur interrompoit ma 
voix, je perdis l’appetit de manger, et de dormir m’estoit impossible” (107). Love, then, is a fully 
corporeal experience that cuts off speech by shutting down the body. Physical signs of desire and 
emotional distress are privileged over verbal declarations of love in the Angoysses. Such is the 
status of communication in “écriture amoureuse:” it is a complex system of persuasion, fear of 
deception, words, physical signs, and silence. 
Language is, however, necessary to writing about the experience of love. A reader will 
not always be satisfied with the topos of inexpressibility, or the idea that something is beyond the 
descriptive capacity of the writer. Dame Hélisenne often represents a separate, more rational 
voice than that of her past self who suffers the pangs of love fiercely, stubbornly, and physically. 
She frequently steps in to interpret Hélisenne’s actions in a moralizing way to show the painful 
and undesirable physiognomy of love. Descriptions of Hélisenne’s emotional silences are for the 
benefit of the readers. This play between narrator and character is precisely what John Freccero 
calls the “logical contradiction” of any autobiography or autobiography-like text: there is an 
implied continuity between Dame Hélisenne and Hélisenne but also a discontinuity “… 
providing an Archimedean point from which the story of that former self may be judged with 
apparent objectivity and detachment” (20). Periodically, Dame Hélisenne interrupts the 
discontinuity to reclaim her continuity with her past self. This continuity occurs in the body, 
which is the site of both of these Hélisennes.  
Dame Hélisenne interrupts the narrative to call attention to the writing experience as a 
difficult process of remembering and reliving her past pain. Narrative interruptions such as “je 
demeuray tant chargée de tristesse et amaritude, que impossible seroit le scavoir relater, ne 
reciter,” in which Hélisenne and Dame Hélisenne fuse together to communicate the 
incommunicable, are quite frequent in the Angoysses (112). The pain that Hélisenne experiences 
bodily and emotionally extends to Dame Hélisenne’s writing experience. Her writing hand 
makes itself visible from the outset, in the opening letter of the Angoysses: “ma main 
tremblante… ma debile main…” (97). Certain memories – such as ones that recall her husband’s 
physical violence – are so strong that they even cause her to break her quill: “… m’intervint 
diverses et merveilleuses fantasies si cruelles et ignominieuses, que la recente memoire rend ma 
main debile et tremblante, en sorte que par plusieurs foys y laissay et infestay la plume…” (140). 
The emotional and physical aspects of experiencing love, in which the voice breaks and is cut 
off, reaches the hand that writes. Such moments take her readers out of a narrative about the 
body of a suffering lover to linger on the body of the suffering writer.  
Dame Hélisenne utilizes these breaks in the narrative to persuade her readers of her 
emotional authority on affairs of the heart. The broken quill becomes an emblem of that authority 
and the pact she has with her readers to share this experience. The writing process involves pain, 
but it is a pain that must be surmounted for writing to be produced. Hélisenne sometimes cannot 
get her voice back, but Dame Hélisenne always picks up another quill. It takes courage to write 
what is difficult to share, and attention paid to that courage increases Dame Hélisenne’s authority 
on her subject, which is both love and herself. After telling her readers that her quill is broken, 
she continues:  “… mais pensant qu’il me seroit attribué à vice de pusillanimité, je me veulx 
efforcer de l’escripre” (140). The shame of writing her illicit desire, subject to the social obstacle 
of moral censure and the personal obstacles of inexpressibility and talent, is overpowered by the 
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shame of not writing, of not sharing her experience. The logical contradiction of the Angoysses, 
then, works to separate Dame Hélisenne from Hélisenne to create a more objective, moralizing 
narrative, which we will see in the confession scene. Moreover, by dramatizing the writing 
process, Crenne also minimizes the loss of emotional impact – her site of authority – that would 
result in too great a distance between character and narrator. 
I turn now to the scene of confession itself. Hélisenne’s extreme love for Guenelic and 
her fear of her husband have driven her to attempt suicide (142). Her husband is advised by a 
servant to take her to “… quelque scientifique personne, qui avecq l’efficace de ses paroles la 
pourra corroborer et conforter, et par ce moyen pourra retourner à sa premiere coustume” (144-
145). This is the very promise of eloquence, that it can turn or return someone to a virtuous state. 
Thinking she would be more disposed to reforming if taken to a religious institution, her husband 
brings her to “ung auctentique religieux, lequel estoit fort bien famé et renommé” (145). 
Hélisenne “premeditates” her confession as soon as she learns that the “scientifique personne” 
will be a monk. In other words, she decides to use this situation to her advantage. This 
premeditation, in the form of an inner monologue (“disoye en moymesmes”), involves 
persuading herself to tell the monk the truth. She gives herself two reasons. The first is that it 
will be a relief to tell the truth instead of wasting energy on lying (145). The second concerns the 
parameters of a confession: she has to speak, she would like to tell the truth, and the monk 
cannot reveal what she says in confession, so there is no danger, only comfort, in telling the truth 
(146). 
Hélisenne begins to dismantle the monk’s authority even before she encounters him. 
Having entered the monastery “sans aulcune devotion,” Hélisenne turns to the courtly register to 
counter his predictably Christian discourse.
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 The monk is old, she reasons to herself, and “… 
du tout refroidy, impotent, et inutile aux effectz de nature” (146). This is a literary topos about 
the exclusion of old age from the experience of love, as Vieillesse is kept outside the “vergier” in 
Le Roman de la Rose (lines 339-406). The monk has never suffered love or, if he has, he is now 
a hypocrite for reprimanding others for what “aultrefois luy a esté plaisant” (146). The monk, 
then, may have the authority of the Church behind him, but Hélisenne frames authority as 
something based on experience, not an institution. It is therefore not “folye” to divulge her 
secrets to him, because he has no power to change her. The confession consists of three 
speeches, two by the monk and one by Hélisenne. The monk speaks first, encouraging her to 
repent and to think of the horrors of hell as cures for the emotional distress that led her to attempt 
suicide. In her response, Hélisenne counters each of the monk’s arguments by again referring to 
her own experience. Hélisenne’s body serves as her evidence, and her experience in her body 
inspires her to blaspheme: hell cannot be worse than her soul’s torment in her body and, even if 
she wanted to resist love, she would not, for Guenelic is both her poison and the remedy (150-
151).  
When Hélisenne turns away from her body as a site of authority in the middle of her 
confession, she refers to history, biblical history, and mythology, conventional locations for 
mining exempla for an argument. Hélisenne inserts herself into a long line of male exempla who 
similarly found love irresistible. She redefines madness as the presumption of thinking she can 
overcome love when King David, King Solomon, Aristotle, and Hercules could not, and they 
were “les plus experimentez en science” (150). Hélisenne therefore discards the “science” of the 
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monk because he lacks experience and the “science” of these male exempla because even if they 
knew better, they still succumbed to love. Thus Hélisenne aligns herself with male models and 
the right to be captured by love even if it means sin (David’s homicides for the sake of 
Bathsheba; Solomon’s idolatry) or humiliation (Remya/Hermya riding Aristotle like a horse; 
Hercules dressing as a woman to woo Iole). If men are reduced to such actions for the sake of 
love, Hélisenne argues, she cannot be expected to resist love either, for her virtue (both in the 
moral sense but also virtus, courage and manly vigor) is only “pusillanime” (150). By aligning 
herself with these male models, then, Hélisenne summons all the authority of learning just to 
point out its limitations and make her case for a confession that must take place without 
repentance. In her own words, Hélisenne is irredeemable, and by her argumentative stance in an 
interaction (the confession) which should let go of the rhetorical and the persuasive, she shows 
herself reluctant to leave behind the powers of rhetoric that reign in the system of amorous 
communication whose main mark is its game of deception. 
The monk is adept both at being firm in his ethical stance (against the perils of 
extramarital love and excessive passion) and at adapting his speech to his audience. The monk 
first tries the tactics of fear, shame, and duty, evoking hell, Hélisenne’s husband, and the promise 
of relief via contrition to get Hélisenne to confess and repent. His “bonnes parolles” offer 
Hélisenne “… peu de fruict, ou de nulle valeur, pource que ma pensée estoit occupée de 
venimeuse amour” (148). The monk’s second attempt is gentler, offering soothing words and 
concrete advice on how to mitigate “l’ardeur d’amours” to remove her from the brink of death 
(152). He counters Hélisenne’s evocation of male exempla with female models of chastity that 
preferred death to dishonor: Penelope, Oenone, and Lucretia were famously devoted to their 
husbands (154-155). Rather than summon them to talk about their similarity, as Hélisenne did in 
her justification for not resisting love, the monk chooses these models for their “contrarieté et 
difference” from Hélisenne (155). The monk thus returns Hélisenne to the domestic sphere, 
reminding her to fear her husband’s wrath and remember her place: her lord is not love, her lord 
is her husband. The monk’s misogyny, however gently worded it may be, serves to remind us 
how difficult it was for Renaissance women to speak and love. Hélisenne’s appeal to male 
examples subverts a tradition that aligns female behavior with female precedents and compels 
absolute female chastity. The monk restores the gender balance by convening female examples 
Hélisenne should model rather than male examples she may resemble, but whose different 
morality excuses love (“car entre eulx cela [love] n’est estimé pour vice mais au contraire s’en 
ventent et glorifient,” 153). In turn, if successful, his advice would return Hélisenne to her proper 
place in the community and, in so doing, end both her suffering and her narrative potential.  
The confession scene maintains the troubled system of communication discussed above, 
namely, the lies, silence, and inexpressibility involved in the experience and expression of love. 
The scene is bookended with lies Hélisenne tells her husband; she retains her emotionally 
charged silence, sighs, and weeping; she claims that even if all the “langues disertes” were to 
combine their talents, it would still be “… difficile de narrer les insupportables passions, dont 
mon ame est continuellement agitée et persecutée…” (149). The revelation of the truth in this 
religious context, however, slightly shifts the dynamics of this system. The key to this shift is the 
monk’s compassion. It leads him to believe Hélisenne, thereby removing the “difficulté” of 
giving voice to something hidden and of the desire to “descharger mon cueur” (145). When her 
husband and Guenelic believe Hélisenne, it is rarely and cautiously. The monk, by contrast, 
responds to this manifestation of emotion and her blasphemous argumentation with “doulceur et 
clemence” and words of comfort. He periodically affirms in his response that he believes what 
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she says to be the truth of her state (“je croy… je croy… je croy…,” 152). He even immediately 
acknowledges receipt of the complete truth in her confession: “Ma dame, je croy selon ma 
conception que vous m’avez du tout exhibé le secret de vostre cueur, sans riens reserver…” 
(152). The monk’s compassion and the truth-telling act of confession mean that there is no need 
for aggressive persuasive or fictionalizing maneuvers on either party’s part (145). Rather than 
interacting in a system that requires suspicion, the monk creates a new mode of communication 
that turns on compassion and belief. 
One aspect of the system of communication in “écriture amoureuse” remains firmly in 
place despite the monk’s compassionate concern for Hélisenne: the failure of persuasion in the 
context of love. Since Hélisenne clings to the old system and resists being brought into the new, 
believing her does not heal her. Given that lovers always suspect ulterior motives hidden in 
sentimental language, love immunizes lovers to persuasion. Avoiding the trap of “polides, 
elegantes et suaves parolles” thus becomes part of the game of desire between lovers (133). 
There is another aspect to this immunization, in which someone (usually someone not in love) 
tries to persuade a lover away from love. Dame Hélisenne couches this in terms of an illness with 
an undesirable cure, undesirable precisely because it runs counter to desire. Lovers do not want 
to be persuaded not to love; they have already persuaded themselves to defy persuasion. The first 
step toward healing is to want to be healed: “c’est ung grand commencement de guarison, que de 
vouloir estre guarye” (162). But lovers are both incapable of resisting love and also do not want 
to resist. The passive form of resistance glides into a more assertive form, as it does in 
Hélisenne’s own words: “m’est impossible d’y scavoir resister: car j’ayme si ardemment que 
j’aymeroys trop mieulx estre privée de vie que de la vueu de mon amy…” (149). Hélisenne 
relishes the pain she suffers for love and would rather die than part from it, to the extent that she 
immediately wishes to flee because the monk “me p[e]rsuadoit d’expulser amour de mon cueur,” 
but his advice is just “temps perdu” (157). Hélisenne does not fight back with more rhetoric, but 
instead withdraws from the interaction altogether. The monk’s compassion and persuasiveness 
cause Hélisenne to respond with cruelty in the only manner she can: she retreats into herself, into 
a fantasy (“si cruelle et furieuse fantasie”) in which the monk trades places with Guenelic (still in 
the monk’s habit) and, in that “petit lieu secret et devotieux,” they talk of love in a manner “plus 
plaisante et solacieuse” while the monk suffers the faraway perils of Scylla or Charybdis (156). 
In other words, Hélisenne recoils from a new system of communication in which persuasion can 
succeed into a fiction that supports the old system whose very mechanics involve multiple scenes 
of failed persuasion, of talk with no resolution into action. 
Hélisenne’s flight from persuasion participates in Dame Hélisenne’s construction of her 
past self as a negative exemplar. Hélisenne exalts her love and her powerlessness over it; she 
even takes a sort of pride in being resistant to persuasion, claiming to Guenelic, for example, that 
not even princes can seduce her (168). Dame Hélisenne typically makes use of monologue 
(introduced by such phrases as “disoye en moymesmes”) to distinguish Hélisenne’s discourse 
from her own, to show through Hélisenne’s speech how far she has fallen and the lengths to 
which she will go to justify herself and her actions. Hélisenne may enjoy how the monk’s words 
are wasted on her, but Dame Hélisenne sees this as a lamentable situation. She makes the case 
that being immune to persuasion is not an impressive quality to have: her current state is beyond 
the realm of eloquence and that is a bad sign. When the monk fails to persuade Hélisenne, Dame 
Hélisenne writes that her obstinacy is to blame (“car j’estoys si obstinée,” 157). Dame Hélisenne 
intersperses the confession scene with similar comments, not allowing Hélisenne’s exaltation of 
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love to go beyond the bounds of the primary assertion of the Angoysses: Hélisenne’s resistance is 
safely inscribed in Dame Hélisenne’s moral censure.  
Dame Hélisenne also accomplishes the presentation of Hélisenne as a negative example 
by aligning herself with the rhetorical model of the monk, whom she re-authorizes through his 
compassion and then, in dialogue form, enacts her own relationship to Hélisenne through a male 
figure of authority. The monk dismantles Hélisenne’s argumentative confession by amending her 
stance of experience as authority into a display of willfulness that does not equate to wisdom: 
“… vous comme plus voluntaire que sage, voulez suyvre vostre sensualité…” (155). 
Furthermore, Dame Hélisenne shows that the monk’s advice is sound: intense feeling can be 
mitigated with distance and time. As soon as Hélisenne is away from the monk she feels better 
(157). Dame Hélisenne’s descriptions, the monk’s words of comfort, and his persuasive tactics 
combined set up Hélisenne as a negative exemplar, which is the point of the entire book. The 
confession allows Crenne to dramatize Hélisenne’s antagonism to male authority and Dame 
Hélisenne’s alignment with that same male authority, the very agonistic process through which, I 
contend, Crenne triangulates her own authority through male and female voices. 
The combination of Hélisenne’s truthful (though confrontational) confession and the 
monk’s compassionate (though ethically firm) response provide the practices of writing and 
reading crucial to the project of the book as a whole. The confession is where Hélisenne begins 
to unburden herself, and the secularized confession that is the Angoysses (part one) offers itself 
without any repentance. Fictionalizing is a torment to her, Hélisenne says before meeting the 
monk: “O mon Dieu, que c’est chose fatigieuse et penible de faindre et simuler les choses” (145). 
The monk himself informs Hélisenne that “il est possible que la grand destresse que vous 
souffrez croist et multiplie par la taire et cacher…” (152). So the confession folds back to the 
book’s first epistle, where Dame Hélisenne’s opening gambit includes the idea of therapeutic 
talk, that the communication of pain to “quelque sien amy fidele” helps diminish its severity 
(96). When Hélisenne is again inspired to convey her pain, this time in writing, a memory of 
Guenelic recalls the connection between health, talk, and believability: “… vous estes destituée 
de vostre santé: mais si vous me vouliez croyre, en brief temps vous seroit restituée” (219). 
Hélisenne is quick to specify that Guenelic made this remark “par maniere de recreation” but his 
words are still “veritables” (219). In other words, Guenelic told Hélisenne he was the cure to all 
her woes without expecting her to believe it, within the system of communication that favors a 
sometimes playful game of deception and persuasion. Hélisenne now believes it, as her 
“lisantes” are called to believe and “considerer quel est ou peult estre mon mal,” the plausibility 
engineered by such a complex persona (220).  
Restorative glances from Guenelic, then, are replaced by restorative talk and, eventually, 
by restorative writing that is aimed at a wider public than one man. In addition to expanding 
readership, the emergence of the Angoyses out of the text’s own concluding pages entails a 
formulation of authorial control over her text previously absent. In many respects, the beginnings 
of the text-within-the-text are defined by a lack of control. Hélisenne, locked in her tower at the 
end of part one, decides that the best way to communicate with Guenelic is to rewrite “… la 
piteuse complainte que paravant j’avoye de ma main escripte: laquelle mon mary avoit bruslée 
par l’impetuosité de son yre” (218). This “complainte” is the outcome of a long process in which 
Hélisenne had no say on how her “amours trop publiées et vulgarisées” were circulated, whether 
in the form of town gossip, Guenelic’s showing his friends her letters, and her husband reading 
and destroying what she had written.  
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In a striking assertion of authorial control, Dame Hélisenne now concludes the first part 
of the Angoysses with an address to the “Tres chieres et honorees Dames” that constitute her 
intended readership. Here, she rejects the idea that her loves should not be published but should, 
instead, be withheld and hidden. Moreover, she articulates this in the terms of Hélisenne’s 
confession. Like Hélisenne, Dame Hélisenne offers up her text “sans riens reserver” (152) and 
with Hélisenne’s audacious refusal of repentance: 
 
… en considerant dont me procede la hardiesse de m’ingerer d’intituler l’œuvre 
presente, faisant mention d’Amours impudicques, ce que selon l’opinion 
d’aulcunes Dames timides, se pourra juger plus digne d’estre conservé en 
profonde silence que d’estre publié ne vulgarisé… de nulles je ne seroys increpée, 
et avec ce (comme j’ay predict) et ayant par plusieurs foys laissée la plume, 
l’affectueux desir que j’ay envers vous, mes nobles dames a esté occasion que me 
suis evertuée de vous declarer le tout, sans riens reserver: car par l’experience de 
ma furieuse follie, vous puis adviser et donner conseil qui vous sera utile et 
proffitable pour de tel embrasement vous conserver (221, emphases mine) 
 
Hélisenne’s removal from the community because of moral censure and her immunization to 
persuasion allows Dame Hélisenne to gesture toward the integration into a new one. Dame 
Hélisenne formulates an early feminist ideology, in which a community of women, removing 
Hélisenne from her near-constant solitude, finds utility and profit from a female-authored 
narrative about female experience. This ideology interacts with the specific rhetorical device of 
full disclosure in a writing practice in which persuasion materializes with ease out of courage, 
intimacy, and secularized confession, to which the “lisantes” respond with compassion and 
belief, convinced of the plausibility of such a tale of love’s torments. Thus the indeterminacy of 
truth and fiction is resolved by the proposed moral value of this fictionalized form of truth-
telling. A new rhetorical tradition, a new eloquence even, emerges from pieces of the old to 
create a rhetorical space for women’s writing. 
The rest of this chapter will unfold in three further movements. First, I will put Crenne 
into the context of early modern women’s writing by discussing the obstacles to female speech 
and the commonly used defensive strategies of other women writers. Second, I will talk about 
Crenne’s borrowed eloquence, that is, her dialogic relationship with three male writers. These 
two sections will help illuminate Crenne’s own discursive strategies beyond what I have already 
discussed by placing them in the broader field of early modern writing practices. Lastly, I will 
turn to one of Crenne’s other strategies for carving out her authority as a published writer. There 
she stages the ultimate triumph of her broken quill. 
 
II. The Defensive Tactics of Marguerite de Navarre, Jeanne Flore, and Louise Labé  
 
 When a Renaissance woman wanted to write and to publish, she had two opposing forces 
with which to contend: an injunction to be silent and a warning against risky exposure. A text 
written by a woman is understood as a stand-in for her body: to write, as a woman, is also to be 
written, to call attention to what should be silent and invisible, so both text and body are in 
danger if exposed to public scrutiny (Parker, Literary Fat Ladies 138). In male-authored 
rhetorics against women, a loose tongue or pen is equivalent to the unrestrained desire of a 
dangerously unruly female body. Margaret W. Ferguson calls this connection between female 
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behavior and writing the “ideologeme of chastity-silence-obedience” (“A Room Not Their Own” 
97, 103). Francesco Barbaro’s De re uxoria (On Wifely Duties, c. 1416) is the oft-cited source for 
this opposition between silence and chastity and speech and lasciviousness: “It is proper, 
however, that not only arms but indeed also the speech of women never be made public; for the 
speech of a noble woman can be no less dangerous than the nakedness of her limbs” (205). It is 
preferable, above all, that women be eloquently silent, mere mute bodies that are as controllable 
as they are controlled (206). Some proto-feminist writers, however, argue that the eloquence of 
women is greater than that of men, but they are often lone voices in the wilderness and, at times, 
their praises are dubious. Cornelius Agrippa, one of these staunch supporters of women, marvels 
at their ability to express themselves clearly and eloquently in his 1529 De Nobilitate et 
praecellentia foemini sexus.
128
 However, he proposes as evidence the fact that the lowliest of 
prostitutes has more eloquence than the most talented of orators, so in his project of ‘redeeming’ 
women and establishing their talent he rehearses some of the worst stereotypes about women – 
their relentless garrulity and the equation of their speech to sex and promiscuity – in his very 
praise of them.
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This prejudice against female speech derives partly from theology. Juan Luis Vives, in a 
treatise about women’s education written in 1523 for Queen Catherine of England and intended 
for the future Queen Mary, writes of female virtue and women’s capacity for learning. Yet he 
also emphasizes the necessary silence of women, insinuating, as Saint Paul does, that women are 
genetic carriers of deception. Since Eve was easily misled by the serpent and she in turn 
deceived Adam, no woman should be allowed to teach “lest when she has convinced herself of 
some false opinion she transmit it to listeners in her role as a teacher and easily drag others into 
her error” (De institutione feminae christianae 41-43).130 Women are thus cast as deceivers and 
liars and, what is even more dangerous, they are often ignorant of their deception. If indeed the 
impulse of humanist writers is to inform and reform readers, as Arthur F. Kinney has amply 
demonstrated, then the fear is that a woman writer could, unintentionally perhaps, misinform and 
corrupt her readers, and to a much broader public than her speech alone can access.
131
 
A succinct example of the ideological complications of female speech is in the final scene 
of William Shakespeare’s Henry V, when the titular king asks for the hand of Princess Catherine 
                                                 
128
 “Nonne sermone mulier viro facundior, magisque diserta et abundans?” (De Nobilitate et praecellentia foemini 
sexus 64) [“La femme ne s’exprime-t-elle pas avec plus de facilité, d’habileté, d’abondance que l’homme?” (105)]. I 
cite R. Antonioli’s critical edition of De Nobilitate, which supplies a modern French translation of the Latin original.  
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 “Jam uero nonne et Poetae in suis nugis et fabulis, ac dialectici in sua contentiosa garrulitate a mulieribus 
uincuntur? Orator nuspiam adeo tam bonus aut tam felix ut suadela uel meretricula superior sit. Quis Arithmeticus 
falsum supputando mulierem soluendo debito decipere potest?” (De Nobilitate 80) [“Venons-en maintenant aux 
propos frivoles et aux fables des poètes, ainsi qu’aux disputes verbeuses des dialecticiens: les femmes ne les 
surpassent-elles pas en tous ces domains? Il n’existe nulle part un orateur doué d’un talent assez heureux pour avoir 
plus de persuasion que la dernière des prostituées. Quel arithmetician peut tromper une femme s’il fait une erreur de 
calcul en luy payant une dette?” (114)]. 
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 Here is the quote in full: “The Apostle Paul, vessel of election, imparting holy percepts to the church of Corinth, 
said ‘Let your wives be silent in church, for it is not permitted them to speak, but to be subject, as the law 
commands. If they wish to learn anything, let them ask their husbands at home.’ And writing to his disciple 
Timothy, he says ‘Let a woman learn in silence with all subjection. I do not permit a woman to teach or to have 
authority over her husband, but to remain silent. For Adam was created first, then Eve, and Adam was not seduced 
but the woman was seduced and led astray.’ Therefore since woman is a weak creature and of uncertain judgment 
and is easily deceived (as Eve, the first parent of mankind demonstrated, whom the devil deluded with such a slight 
pretext), she should not teach, lest when she has convinced herself of some false opinion she transmit it to her 
listeners in her role as a teacher and easily drag others into her error, since pupils willingly follow their teacher.” 
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 See Kinney’s Continental Humanist Poetics. 
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to seal a peace treaty between England and France.
132
 Here the danger of female speech collapses 
into that of the female body, namely her lips, resulting in the woman’s necessary silence. This 
scene is also an excellent example of what Ann Rosalind Jones means when she notes that “the 
proper [Renaissance] woman is an absence,” that she neither talks nor is talked about, that she 
neither writes nor is written about (“Surprising Fame” 74). Any narrative about love will also, 
more often than not, contain talk of language, as I explained above. Lovers must, often at length, 
persuade each other that they feel what they say they do: love is a game of persuasion. In Henry 
V, the linguistic differences between Henry and Catherine – neither speaks the other’s language 
very well – obliges them to talk about language alongside their talk of love. This explicit 
attention to language and understanding unveils some of the facets of the Renaissance concept of 
proper womanhood, namely, chastity, obedience, and silence, though it is complicated by 
Catherine’s initial resistance to Henry’s proposal of marriage; this resistance is only permissible 
up to the moment she agrees to become his wife. Catherine’s answer, and subsequent silencing, 
is crucial to the play’s conclusion, however: she, as the personification of her country, must 
acquiesce to taking him as her husband and as the future king of France. Though the exchange of 
love occurs in sentimental terms, it is in fact transactional. 
 Despite his reputation for excellent oratory developed in Henry IV Part 1, Part 2, and 
earlier in Henry V, in this scene Henry insists that he speaks only as a soldier: “But, before God, 
Kate, I cannot look greenly nor gasp out my eloquence, nor I have no cunning in protestation… I 
speak to thee plain soldier” (140-145). His stance against rhetoric is a common rhetorical ploy: 
any moment where someone calls attention to the artlessness of his or her speech is meant to 
convey an alignment with honesty against sophistry and the idea that the ‘plain truth’ is 
persuasion enough. Catherine, who speaks only a broken English, nonetheless sees through 
Henry’s anti-rhetoric and turns it against him, marveling at the “tromperies” of the “langues des 
hommes” (115) and at how he has enough “faux French” to “deceive de most sage demoiselle 
dat is en France” (205). Henry says that his “wooing is fit for [her] understanding” (121), 
meaning if Catherine’s English were better she would immediately be suspicious of his assertion 
that he is a king and not a farmer, but he is off the mark. Though she remains unable to 
appreciate the meaning in Henry’s sexual puns, her understanding of language games in matters 
of love is greater than he anticipates: she has been trained to resist, and he does not want to play 
this game (“I know no ways to mince it in love, but directly to say ‘I love you,’” 125-126).133 
Henry construes understanding as linguistic and sees it in terms of the success of “broken” 
English and French. Catherine, for her part, concentrates on intentionality and whether or not she 
can gauge the truth hidden between Henry’s “false” language and his claims to “true English” 
(206), neither of which she trusts. This linguistic issue is never resolved. 
Henry grows impatient with her resistance. He says that they should stop talking about 
language altogether: “But thy speaking of my tongue, and I thine, most truly-falsely, must needs 
be granted to be much at one. But Kate, dost thou understand thus much English? Canst thou 
love me?” (180-184). She responds not with “I do not know,” but rather with “I cannot tell,” an 
ambiguous answer that hints at her lingering uncertainty but also at the injunction against women 
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 References to Henry V are given by line number from the The Norton Shakespeare, pp. 1542-1547.  
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 For instance, Catherine does not likely follow King Charles’s and King Henry’s purposeful use of the language 
of warfare (the unconquered “maiden cities” of France) to talk about sex and marriage (the seduction of virgins) 
(281-307). Shakespeare’s sense of sexual wordplay also surfaces in Act 3, Scene 4, in which Alice tries to teach 
Catherine some English words, resulting in Catherine’s repetition of innocuous English words that evoke 
homonymic obscenities in French (3.4.44-54). 
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to speak their desire. She never responds unequivocally to his questions about love, for no 
woman can speak openly and frankly about her desire without such a declaration being equated 
with lasciviousness. Indeed, when she finally does say yes to Henry, it is tellingly not in answer 
to a question about love but instead to one about obedience to her father’s wishes for her 
marriage (229-232). Silence, chastity, and obedience, in other words, resolve what language 
could not.  
Henry and Catherine’s betrothal turns to physical rather than linguistic connection, as it is 
literally sealed with a kiss. The custom is that French women are not kissed until their wedding 
day, but Henry is a king to whom “nice customs curtsy,” and he will not be refused: “Therefore, 
patiently and yielding. [He kisses her] You have witchcraft in your lips, Kate: there is more 
eloquence in a sugar touch of them than in the tongues of the French council; and they should 
sooner persuade Harry of England than a general petition of monarchs” (255-260). The only way 
to power for women is sorcery, here in the form of bodily witchcraft and not speech, which is the 
domain of men.
134
 Speech thwarts male desire: Catherine is able to call Henry out for his rhetoric 
of anti-rhetoric, but once she capitulates to him, she ceases to question his language. Then, when 
she is kissed, she is silenced for the rest of the play, for Henry’s rhetoric has succeeded. She is 
made ‘absent’ and therefore ‘proper’ through this process of restraining her speech and 
questioning of his language. Her eloquence, tied only to her lips, is restrained by her chastity, for 
only her husband will ever touch them. As Katherine Ann Jensen astutely points out, there is a 
“double bind” for women writers of this period: a woman should not speak and she has nothing 
to speak about, for a woman only has a story to tell “to the extent that she defers or deviates from 
marital union” (64). Princess Catherine has ceased to delay her marriage, so her story is complete 
and her voice is cut off in this narrative of the mastering of female speech and the body/nation. 
There were strategies for skirting the requirement of chaste silence and denying the 
accusation of being deceptive or sexually and textually wanton. These strategies do not require 
female silence but, instead, qualify female writing in order to reduce any adverse effects it may 
have. Since it is the act of writing itself, as well as the content of female writing, that is 
considered dangerous, these strategies make excuses for both the female authorial voice and the 
status of what is written. Jones calls this women’s “partial obedience,” a compromise between a 
submissive silence and the full agency that is granted through writing (“Surprising Fame” 80). 
These strategies include the topos of modesty and appeals to patrons, but I wish to concentrate 
on the following: a strict adherence to truth and rejection of rhetoric, claims to complete 
fictionality, and using proxies to speak on the woman’s behalf. I have chosen three female 
authors as representative of these strategies. I am not suggesting that these three women directly 
influenced Crenne’s writing or even that they deliberately made these defensive gestures as such. 
However, they provide necessary context for a discussion of female authorship, its direct 
relationship to language and writing, and how these authors assert hermeneutical control over 
their texts. Considering women’s writing in this period as a whole articulates an answer to the 
question I posed earlier: women do not write of good women who speak well, and Crenne is not 
an exception. 
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 For more on the sorcery and sensuality of rhetoric and its relationship to women, see Rebhorn, Emperor of Men’s 
Minds, chapter 3. 
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Marguerite de Navarre’s “veritables histoires” 
 
 Hélisenne de Crenne thought very highly of Marguerite, Queen of Navarre and sister of 
King François I. In her fourth invective letter, Crenne isolates Marguerite as the most 
accomplished and incomparable woman of the past, present, and future – “la splendeur d’icelle à 
la condition femenine donne lustre” – in order to silence her husband’s “langue pestifere” that 
never ceases to defame women (Epistres 152). Many scholars have pointed out that Crenne 
specifically attributes ‘masculine’ accomplishments to Marguerite by equating her with Plato, 
Cato, Cicero, and Socrates; this is the same admiration Crenne has for Dido.
135
 Marguerite’s 
status as a learned woman and as a queen undoubtedly granted her more allowances as a woman 
writer than other women had; for instance, her brother interceded on her behalf when the 
Sorbonne condemned as heretical her 1521 poem Miroir de l’âme p  heresse. So with her 
authority less in doubt, it is interesting to see that she, too, used defensive strategies in her works, 
though they are more theologically grounded than they are determined by her gender. 
 Marguerite de Navarre’s relationship to language has been long established as a slightly 
antagonistic one. This is not, however, an animosity related strictly to gender. Robert D. Cottrell 
argues in The Grammar of Silence that in her poetry – which was published before the 
Heptameron – Marguerite rejects ‘fallen,’ human speech in favor of the silent contemplation of 
the transcendent Word. For Marguerite, then, speech is intimately tied to faith and is, in a sense, 
an obstacle to faith and to truth. This attitude also emerges in her prose. The collection of short 
stories that we know now as the Heptameron was not published until 1559, though its 
composition was certainly earlier.
136
 The main defensive strategy of the Heptameron is anti-
rhetoric. The Heptameron, by establishing an opposition between truth and rhetoric, becomes a 
refusal of humanist rhetorical poetics and of attention to language in favor of an unembellished 
truth, which then precludes any accusation of deception. The prologue of the Heptameron 
famously outlines the rules of the game of storytelling at the heart of the collection. Each story 
must be true (“c’est de n’escripre nulle nouvelle qui ne soit veritable histoire”) and either 
personally witnessed by the storyteller or by a reliable witness (“quelque histoire qu’il aura veue 
ou bien oy dire à quelque homme digne de foy,” 9). Learned men will be excluded, “de paour 
que la beaulté de la rhethoricque feit tort en quelque partye à la verité de l’histoire.” Thus 
Marguerite de Navarre firmly places this text on the side of truth-telling versus fiction. 
Marguerite prefers the “nudity,” “simplicity,” “truth,” and “austerity” of history to rhetorical 
ornaments and artifices. The claim to veracity secures the hermeneutic compliance of the 
readers: they cannot criticize truth-telling and the ‘authority’ of the text as a whole rests on the 
verifiable truth of its contents. Furthermore, by maintaining ‘clarity’ and ‘purity’ of the story, the 
Heptameron aligns itself with the project of the Évangéliques, a group of Catholic reformers who 
sought to simplify the practices and teachings of Christianity through unambiguous preaching 
and vernacular translations of the Bible.
137
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 For more discussions of Marguerite and Crenne, see Nash, “Exerçant œuvres viriles,’ and “Renaissance 
Misogyny;” Wood, “Les lettres d’Helisenne de Crenne et Jacopo Caviceo: lecture et stratégies scriptuaires;” and 
Smarr’s Joining the Conversation: Dialogues by Renaissance Women, 154-166. 
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 All references to the Heptameron are from Michel François’ 1967 Garnier Classiques edition. 
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 For more on the Évangéliques, theology, and the Sorbonne, see Farge, Orthodoxy and Reform; for more on the 
Évangélique influence on Marguerite de Navarre, see Randall, “Scandalous Rhetorics;” Vance, Secrets, chapters 3 
and 4; Berthiaune, “Rhétorique et vérité chez Marguerite de Navarre.” 
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 But anti-rhetoric is, nevertheless, rhetoric.
138
 Every moment that tries to convince 
readers, both internal and external, of the story’s authenticity is a rhetorical strategy designed to 
reassure and persuade both the game-playing devisants and the reader. The tales themselves are 
not devoid of rhetorical and narrative strategies. The frame narrative and debate-like structure do 
not allow it, for the dramatization of the storytelling obliges the devisants to persuade as well as 
to narrate, even if their performance does not succeed in winning anyone over to their side. In 
essence, Marguerite’s setting aside of stylistic concerns does not erase narrative concerns that 
include the use of language in persuasion. However, anti-rhetoric provides Marguerite with a 
means of authorizing her text while also striking a compromise with her position against the 
superfluities and inconsistencies of language.  
In terms of representing women speaking, the Heptameron appears to rehearse the 
traditional connection between a woman’s speech, her chastity, and her obedience. Patricia 
Francis Cholakian maintains that the silence and silencing of female desire is present from the 
opening pages. In Parlamente and Hircan’s preliminary negotiations over the group’s activities in 
the prologue – a decision to be made between Bible study, sex, and storytelling – Cholakian 
writes,  
    
The man [Hircan] falls silent in the face of what he doesn’t know about the 
woman’s desire. The female [Parlamente] rejects the sex act in favor of the speech 
act and substitutes dis-course for inter-course. But although female desire will 
become one of the principal subjects of this discourse, it will continue to be 
encoded as problematic and ambiguous, the mysterious question for which no 
answer is provided, the gap over which (like the bridge across the raging river) 
the woman’s text must be constructed. (37) 
 
In other words, female desire is at the heart of the Heptameron as a whole and it is crucial to its 
illustration of female speech. Since these female characters primarily speak only their desire, 
they need to be silenced. Both linguistic and bodily unruliness must be contained. In the stories, 
women who refuse desire are lauded; women who speak their desires are humiliated, chastised, 
or killed. The duchess of tale 70, for instance, having been thwarted in her desire for her 
husband’s servant, sought to humiliate her rival by exposing her affair with that same servant; 
the duchess is then violently killed by her husband.
139
 After hearing the story of Jambicque of 
tale 43, Parlamente declares that such women who put pleasure before honor lose the right to be 
called women and must be called men, whose honor is in conquering: “mais celles qui sont 
vaincues en plaisir ne se doibvent plus nommer femmes, mais hommes, desquelz la fureur et la 
concupiscence augmente leur honneur” (301). The novelty of the Heptameron’s treatment of the 
ideologeme of chastity-silence-obedience resides in its multiplicity and its internal agonistic 
mechanism, which allow for variations on the same theme and thus different judgments on the 
part of the devisants (McKinley 151). The stance against female speech in the Heptameron is 
therefore not as harsh as it is in conduct books intended for women but it is still resonant with 
that kind of writing. 
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Jeanne Flore’s Claim to Fi tionality  
 
 Of the contemporary women writers in this brief survey, it is perhaps Jeanne Flore who is 
closest to Crenne, at least stylistically. Crenne most likely read either the Contes amoureux 
(publication date unknown), or a modified version entitled La Pugnition de l’Amour  ontempn  
(1540), both attributed to Flore.
140
 It has been suggested that Crenne copied material from Flore 
or vice versa; some scholars believe that the Contes amoureux was published only a year before 
the Angoysses, so a connection between the two works seems likely (Contes 22). Like Crenne, 
Flore was heavily influenced by Giovanni Boccaccio and Jean Lemaire de Belges, both in terms 
of her language and the content of her stories. Flore’s French is erudite and Italianate, and 
several passages have been adapted from Lemaire’s Illustrations de Gaule as well as from his 
poetry (see 28, 82, 204). The Contes amoureux loosely follows the format of the Decameron: six 
women share and discuss stories about love. What the Heptameron resists – the explicit 
discussion of female desire and sexuality without subsequent violence – the Contes amoureux 
openly embraces. 
Both Crenne and Flore make similar claims about their works’ status as fiction. Crenne 
writes in her first invective letter, published a year after the Angoysses, that no one should read 
the novel as fact: indeed, she finds it hard to believe that her husband believes the Angoysses to 
be true. The Contes amoureux likewise finishes with this defensive gesture. In a poem entitled 
“Jeanne Flore au lecteur,” the writer states “Je t’ay voulu pour la conclusion / Bien advertir que 
tout ce est fiction / De poësie” (225). Flore includes in her text a self-defensive poetic gesture 
that dismisses any and all “gloses” that would be “à mon desadvantaige,” not at the beginning of 
the text, but at the end, a preemptive strike against those who have already finished reading the 
book: whatever the readers believed about the text’s status as fact or fiction as they read is 
overturned by Flore’s closing argument that ‘this is just fiction.’ The claim that “tout ce est 
fiction” suggests frivolity and thereby dismisses any malicious interpretation of the text as true 
tales meant to deceive women readers into following their desires. Furthermore, this erasure also 
allows Flore to write what she wishes, in the manner she chooses, even if it is a subject like 
desire. Flore candidly resists any alliance with truth-telling.  
In overall tone and content, however, the Contes amoureux is markedly different from the 
Angoysses. Whereas Crenne uses writing as a means to confess and to express her suffering, 
Flore’s heroines only suffer if they do not submit to the desires of their lovers (34). This 
difference in didactic tone is also reflected in the writers’ addresses to their female readerships. 
Whereas Dame Hélisenne directs her words toward a compassionate, sisterly audience, Flore 
pushes any overly prudent readers to love or else be punished for not pursuing pleasure. There is 
no guilt; pleasure reigns supreme. Discussing this perplexing message in the Contes amoureux, 
Cathleen M. Bauschatz suggests that the text is a parody of the didactic discourse addressed to 
women in order to keep them chaste and silent.
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 If it is a parody, and Bauschatz is quite 
convincing, then the instances of female eloquence in the Contes amoureux should be taken as 
parodic as well, an exaggerated reproduction of the image of women described by male didactic 
writers seeking to prescribe female behavior. It is nonetheless worthwhile to examine this image 
of women on its own terms, to see how Flore imagines female eloquence. 
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 I will be citing the original edition, the Contes amoureux, republished by the Presses Universitaires de Lyon. 
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 See both “Cebille/Sebile: Jeanne Flore, Reader of Christine de Pizan?” and “Parodic Didacticism in the Contes 
amoureux par Madame Jeanne Flore.” 
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Flore’s Contes amoureux produces an opposition between female beauty and female 
speech in which beauty is privileged over speech. These heroines can have divine beauty, indeed 
they should, but they cannot have divine powers of speech as well: their eloquence is physical, 
not rhetorical. Towards the middle of the first story, Venus appears to a knight – fittingly named 
Andro or ‘male, masculine’ – to help him “conquerir sa belle amye,” Rosemonde Chiprine; her 
husband, advanced in years, has been so consumed with jealousy over his young bride that he 
has constructed a “Chasteau jaloux” in which to imprison her (116-117). The storyteller, 
Madame Melibée, interrupts this divine visitation with an apostrophe to Beauty. She says that 
Beauty has “plus de force en ung seul moment devant les yeulx des amoureux, que n’a pas la 
doulce Eloquence seulle de soy” (117). The Lady Eloquence, Madame Meribée continues, could 
not change a lover’s heart even if she had a hundred years to do so. As I argued above, this is one 
of the rules of persuasion in narratives about love, that eloquence bears no weight. It cannot 
make someone love or make someone fall out of love. In fact, silence is preferable to speech. 
Words, though expressed with sincerity, often undermine the sentiments expressed, but physical 
beauty speaks convincingly without words. Words in the Contes amoureux distract from the 
contemplation of bodily splendor and “persuasions artificielles” are quickly forgotten when the 
prepared speaker is confronted with overwhelming beauty (172). When Venus finally leads the 
two lovers to their bedchamber, it is in silence. The lovers are so overcome with emotion that 
they are unable to speak and, instead, each contemplates the other’s beauty at length (125). 
Lovers are always reduced to silence; speech only gets in the way of the successful resolution of 
amorous discourse, namely, love-making.  
The second story in the Contes treats female language more explicitly. The story relates 
how a beautiful young woman named Meridienne is punished by Venus for not reciprocating the 
love of any of her male admirers. Meridienne is a dangerous, and dangerously eloquent, beauty. 
The connection between her appearance and destruction is not made with any subtlety. 
Meridienne’s arrival at the ceremony in honor of Venus is compared to that of Helen at Troy, 
bewildering the Trojans with the beauty that will lead to their downfall (139-140). Looking into 
Meridienne’s eyes is likened to being instantly killed by the “regard venimeux” of the basilisk 
(140). The dangers of her speech are described just as explicitly as her beauty is, in particular in 
our first look at Meridienne. In fact, one of her major sins is that she speaks too much and too 
well.  
Ignoring a dream in which Venus threatens her for her audacity, and attributing that 
dream to the goddess’s envy, Meridienne rises from her bed and removes her clothing, not 
fearing in the slightest to exhibit her nudity (136). She chats (“causoit et devisoit”) with some 
young men who are present in her chamber, strategizing to herself on how best to seduce them: 
“par maniere d’essay comment elle pourroit tres promptement naufrager quiconques ce jour là 
aborderoit la nef de son desir sur le roch de sa beaulté… comme estoient les Syrenes voulantz 
submerger le saige et prudent Ulixe” (137). The storyteller Andromeda continues this description 
of the dangers Meridienne poses to men by adding that her eloquence would surpass even that of 
Cleopatra when she tried to “à soy rendre captif qui venoit pour la subjuguer soubz l’empire 
Romain [Octavian].” This siren wants these men to drown in desire and to completely lose their 
autonomy. It is not her beauty that Andromeda, or Flore, objects to, but rather Meridienne’s 
cruelty that she purposely carries out through her speech. Beautiful women are dangerous 
enough; eloquent seductresses are worse. Such a narrative typically demands, at the very least, 
the public humiliation of the female orator. A statue of Venus falls on Meridienne and, by the 
order of the young ladies of the city, her body is thrown to the fields to be devoured by wild 
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animals until it is unrecognizable and “espoventable à regarder” (152-153). Her body that was 
once refused to all men as an object of pleasure is now given to ravenous animals as 
nourishment. The message about female speech as an obstacle to pleasure is made abundantly 
clear. 
  
Louise Labé and Folly’s Publi  Defender 
 
 Louise Labé’s complete works were published in 1555, well after Crenne’s last work, 
which appeared in 1541. Yet a discussion of her D bat de Folie et d’Amour is relevant to a 
discussion of women who write prose. Labé’s strong poetic voice has been well established by 
François Rigolot in Louise Labé Lyonnaise ou la Renaissance au féminin. His discussion of 
Labé’s ambiguous appropriation of Orpheus as a poetic model – since, as a woman, her only 
other option is Eurydice’s muteness – is certainly indicative of the other subterfuges that women 
writers had to use in order to write.
142
 This without doubt seems to be the typical dilemma of the 
women writer: choose a male literary model or figure (Boccaccio for Marguerite; Orpheus for 
Labé) or choose silence. Labé amply demonstrates this to be the case and it carries over into her 
Débat. 
The strategy that Folly adopts in order to speak against the god of Love in the Débat is, in 
fact, a technique that silences. Folly chooses Mercury to speak in her defense at the court of 
Olympus against Cupid and his defender, Apollo. This act of ‘being spoken for’ is a scenario that 
we also see in the male-authored texts that Crenne imitates: the speech of female characters is 
either ventriloquized by a male writer, sanctioned by a male writer or narrator, or mediated by a 
male character, as one way of tempering sexual and/or linguistic licentiousness. In Labé’s Débat, 
language itself is the most apparent and significant problem that is addressed. A debate that takes 
place between the god of eloquence and the god of poetry cannot be otherwise.  
Apollo’s argument against Folly rests on the assumption that Folly’s language, like her 
person, is unruly, inappropriate, and dangerous, and that she violates the order of the universe.
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Cupid/Love, however, maintains order and is the origin of speech (Complete Poetry and Prose 
70; 82). However, Folly’s crime is not speech, but rather action. She told Cupid that she has the 
power to take his eyes and then she does: “Amour ha voulu montrer qu’il avoit puissance sur le 
cœur d’elle. Elle lui ha fait connoitre qu’elle avoit puissance de lui oter les yeus” (96). In these 
parallel actions, Cupid instigates with words, leaving his “vouloir” latent, and Folly follows up 
with action. But she is not on trial for what she did. Apollo makes this a trial about who Folly is 
and the kind of language that she represents, precisely because Folly is not an ‘absence’ or a 
‘proper’ woman. Mercury, then, also has to account for language in his rebuttal. For Mercury, 
Folly, “comme elle est tousjours ouverte, ne veut point que j’en dissimule rien: et ne vous en 
veut dire qu’un mot, sans art, sans fard et ornament quelqconque” (96; 100). So not only does 
Folly have to be spoken for, but her defender must also insist on a refusal of humanist poetics or 
any language of the forum where the trick is to “conter tousjours à son avantage,” as Apollo 
knows from frequenting it. This tripling of defensive strategy – being spoken for, refusing 
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 See, in particular, chapter 6, “Être une Orphée lyonnaise.” 
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 For more on the unruliness seen as native to women in the early modern period, see Natalie Zemon Davis’s essay 
“Women on Top” in Society and Culture in Early Modern France, 124-151. Davis argues, “… the image of the 
disorderly woman did not always function to keep women in their place. On the contrary, it was a multivalent image 
that could operate, first and foremost, to widen behavioral options for women within and even outside marriage, and, 
second, to sanction riot and political disobedience for both men and women in a society that allowed the lower 
orders few formal means of protest” (131). 
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rhetoric, and associating linguistic wordplay with her opponent – shows the extent to which 
unruly Folly needs to be tempered by means of a much more competent man. 
 For Tom Conley, the Débat offers a “concise poetics” for women’s side of narrative, in 
which pleasure is taken from sharing the experience of love from the woman’s perspective 
(“Closed Room” 329-330). He cites Apollo in particular, who says that “le plus grand plaisir qui 
soit apres amour, c’est d’en parler” (Complete 88). Here, Conley sees the “restructuring process 
of storytelling – that brings real and fictional realms together, permitting mundane experience to 
clothe itself in a far more ornate and pleasing fabric” (“Closed Room” 330). I agree that being 
allowed to speak of female desire in a way that partakes of both fact and fiction constitutes a 
viable poetics for women’s narrative. It is a process that Crenne claims for herself. However, the 
circumstances of Apollo’s statement upset this poetics. Apollo says this on behalf of Cupid, 
against Folly, and though he includes Sappho in his list of lyrics poets, he limits the “pleasure of 
talking about love” to men. Apollo does not see talking or writing about desire as an option for 
women. Mercury, too, focuses on the follies of men in love and the resistance women build up to 
men’s words and sighs. Love provides opportunities for men to speak and for women to be 
silent: “Il leur [men in love] semble que la place qui parlemente est demi gaignee. Mais s’il 
avient, que, comme les femmes prennent volontiers plaisir à voir debatre les hommes, elles leur 
ferment quelquefois rudement la porte…” (114). Women keep desire a secret: they “se laissent 
bruler dedens le corps avant que de rien avouer” (118). Women’s pleasure is, then, in resisting 
speech and narrative. But with Folly, Mercury adds, women’s madness gradually extends to 
writing and singing about their passions (120). Nothing is resolved, however: any poetics of 
women’s side of narrative is claimed by men. The verdict of the case is postponed as well, and 
Folly must accompany blind Cupid as his helper in the interim, silent and ancillary to his work, 
as Mercury has argued all along. Eloquence was never truly on Folly’s side. 
 
  lisenne de Crenne’s “Rude et obnubil  esperit”  
 
 These three basic strategies (stance of anti-rhetoric, claims to fiction, speaking by proxy) 
are therefore means of circumventing the demand for female silence, though they are also 
implicated in the process of silencing women. Crenne, for her part, does not fully adopt any of 
these strategies but instead uses similar ones to further her construction of fiction and authority. 
Strategies used for defense and for silencing are, for Crenne, ways of amplifying her own voice 
and asserting control over her literary output. 
Crenne’s exclusion of eloquence from the Angoysses – eloquence is “reserved for 
Mercury” – is not the same as Marguerite de Navarre’s stance of anti-rhetoric. Crenne’s attitude 
toward rhetoric is far less severe than the Queen’s. It never reaches the point of resisting 
humanist rhetorical poetics altogether by insisting on artlessness or of refusing to intermingle 
fact and fiction in an effort to convince readers of the writer’s or the text’s believability. Most 
tactics are fair game. She never strays from her project of persuasion, in which rhetoric is 
deployed to create plausibility. The prevailing notion about early modern women’s writing is that 
it tends to deny its own rhetoric, primarily in prefatory discursive practices, promoting a modest 
artlessness that seeks to prove that eloquence can derive from somewhere other than the study 
and application of rhetorical science (La Charité 8). Thus women’s writing style is often called 
‘plain’ or ‘natural,’ coming from the heart and in a sense attuned corporeally to the writer’s 
modesty and sincerity. Crenne, interestingly, stages in sartorial terms how concern for public 
opinion influences women’s style: Hélisenne, having received too much attention for her beauty 
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while garbed in “habillementz riches et sumptueulx” (Guenelic scandalously steps on her cloak 
as her husband is watching), then decides it would be more prudent to dress “plus simplement” 
(125). Style becomes a question of public scrutiny, in which clothing and rhetorical clothing 
broadcast to the world an image of a moral, interior self. Plain clothes are more pleasing to her 
husband; ornament pleases her public too well and makes Hélisenne’s unchaste body more 
visible. Therefore while Crenne does not dramatize a position of anti-rhetoric in her writing as 
the Heptameron does, we can still talk about anti-rhetoric in terms of gender-specific stylistic 
artlessness. 
Crenne exhibits some concern about her writing style being perceived as unintentionally 
weak and artless because, as a woman, she never learned a more robust, rhetorical style. Her 
consideration of the quality of her rhetoric unites the process of finding a strong writing style 
with Renaissance attitudes towards women. Crenne insists that her style is, in fact, her good faith 
effort to emulate better writers, though she is not so presumptuous as to claim the right to join 
their ranks. In the epistle preceding Angoysses part one, Dame Hélisenne implies that her 
inability to write is due to physical and emotional, rather than intellectual, weakness: she prays to 
“celle qui est mere et fille de l’altitonant plasmateur [Mary, Mother of God] de vouloir ayder à 
ma triste memoire, à soustenir ma debile main, pour vous le scavoir bien escripre” (97). In this 
first section of her first published work, Crenne does not seek a higher style, but just one that is 
suitable to her subject matter – “pour vous le scavoir bien escripre.”  She does not call it suitable 
for its ability to express a bare, verifiable truth, but rather because it is a fitting register for the 
expression of her truth according to her parameters: not eloquence, but her effort and care that 
originate in her very self, which is “studieuse et affectée” (222). In other words, her style is 
suitable in that it shares a complete experience, “sans riens reserver.”  
The attention Crenne gives to the potential inadequacy of her language to convey her 
sentiments accurately is usually meant to highlight the intensity of her experience of suffering. 
The pact of her broken quill – the courage it takes to write something painful for the sake of 
someone else – often takes on the valence of insufficiency across her works. In the twelfth 
familiar letter, for example, Crenne admits to Quezinstra that she fears he will see “ingratitude 
ou negligence” in “l’insuffisance de mes escriptz” (111). At the end of the first part of the 
Angoysses, Dame Hélisenne similarly addresses her style, but this time in terms of the greater 
stylistic expectations her larger readership may have: 
 
Bien suis certain que ceste mienne petite œuvre se trouvera de rude et obnubilé 
esperit, au respect de celles que povez avoir leu, qui sont composés par les 
Orateurs et Hystoriographes, lesquelz par la sublimité de leurs entendements 
composent livres: mais en cela me doibt servir d’escuse, que nostre condition 
fœminine n’est tant s ientifi que que naturellement sont les hommes. Et encore ne 
suis, ny ne veulx estre si presumptueuse que j’estime superer, ne seulement à 
apparier aulcunes Dames en science de literature : car comme je croys il y en a 
qui sont de si hault esperit douées, qu’elles composeroient en langaige trop plus 
elegant, qui rendroit (aux benevolles Lecteurs) l’œuvre plus acceptable. Mais si 
mon debile scavoir est cause qu’il n’est en langaige plus aorné et modeste, à luy 
se doibt attribuer la faulte, et non au deffault de mon vouloir et aspirant desir, 
comme celle qui totallement est studieuse et affectée pour vous faire congnoistre 
mon affection. (221-222, emphases mine) 
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Dame Hélisenne here makes several statements about her writing style. The style of the 
Angoysses is not like that of “Orateurs et Hystoriographes.” Her work derives from a “rude et 
obnubilé esperit” (“a rough and clouded mind”) and a “debile scavoir” (“weak knowledge”), the 
same words she uses in the fourth invective letter to describe how misogynists imagine the 
female mind, too clouded and weak to pursue intellectual activity (Epistres 150). Her style is a 
product of her mind and it is, in that sense, ‘natural’ to her rather than artificially crafted. Since 
women are not as “naturellement scientificque” as men are, women have to fabricate their own 
style. Other women may be able to write in more “elegant” language, which would be more 
“acceptable” to readers, but it is more important to Dame Hélisenne that her language suit her 
desire to communicate her “affection”: “à luy [mon debile scavoir] se doibt attributer la faulte, et 
non au default de mon vouloir et aspirant desir.” What could be conceived as a posture of 
modesty intended to prevent a hostile response – we should forgive the apparent weakness of her 
style because Dame Hélisenne is not an orator, a historiographer, or one of the great learned 
women – additionally advances the idea that she does not seek a “sublime” language, but only 
one that is suitable to her project of making an experience known (“pour vous faire congnoistre 
mon affection”). Its ‘weakness’ is in the mind of the reader who either perceives something in 
the language that is not there or denies the right for it to be written based on style and not 
substance. Thus the cloudy mind that expresses itself negates the intended misogyny of that 
description by authorizing such language for which desire and not ornament is the main object.  
Crenne anticipates, then, readers who will criticize her style and readers who will censure 
her subject as facts that should be kept secret. I have already established how Crenne creates 
hermeneutical confusion by claiming to one kind of reader (represented by her husband) that her 
work is “composée seulement par exercice” (Angoysses 136) and that to believe otherwise is to 
“continuelement prendre les choses de la plus deterieure partie” (Epistres 126). Her husband’s 
response to this accusation, also penned by Crenne, participates in the agonistic, persuasive 
character of her writing by calling into question and also showcasing her believability and 
persuasiveness (135). Fact and fiction cede to plausibility: the “lisantes” see plausibility where 
most male readers see fact. As I argued above, persuasion is severely limited between characters 
because love makes language suspect. The real persuasion is intended to work on the readers 
precisely because they, like the monk, are outside that troubled system of communication that 
turns on disbelief. What Crenne covets is, then, not necessarily a refined language imitated from 
more polished writing. Instead, she wants competent (female) readers.  
Like Flore, Crenne uses the excuse that “this is only fiction” as a direct part of her project 
of persuasion. The difference between the two writers is that Crenne’s gesture toward fictionality 
constitutes an accusation of actual (dramatized) – as opposed to potential – bad reading practices 
more than a self-protective dismissal of her work. In her first invective letter, she expresses 
frustration that her husband believes the events of the Angoysses to be factual, “pour faire 
perpetuelle commemoration d’une amour impudicque. Et d’avantaige tu crois que telle lascivité 
se soit en ma personne experimentée” (125-126). Crenne rejects her husband’s autobiographical 
reading of her novel and his indignation at her perceived audacity, for having “experienced” such 
a love and for having “commemorated” an illicit love in writing. Not having aligned herself 
completely with truth or fiction allows her to play with the boundaries between the two, to use 
the Epistres to complicate reading practices and protect herself, as a woman writer, from 
accusations of writing something forbidden. The fourth invective letter speaks more generally 
about male readership and the kind of competent reader she would prefer to have. Addressed to a 
misogynist, Elenot, Crenne claims that if he were better read (“bien studieux en diversitez de 
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livres”), his opinion about women and women writers would be vastly different and he would be 
less adamant about women’s lack of intellectual competency (150-151). She also laments his 
sudden malicious whim to read the Angoysses: “certainement ces parolles tiennes sont du tout 
contraires à mon desir, pource que bien vouldroye que mes livres fussent tousjours exhibez aux 
scavantes personnes” (153). Crenne wants well-read, charitable readers who will not accuse her 
of misinforming or corrupting them, or of misrepresenting herself. 
These readers are also persuadable and can parse these distinctions in their reading 
practices. Whether confronting male authorities or when addressing her lady readers, it is clear 
that Hélisenne de Crenne’s voice is always the dominant one. Unlike Folly, Hélisenne is her own 
advocate in the Angoysses and her voice is even doubled for that purpose, creating an extra level 
of writing authority for Dame Hélisenne as her character becomes more of a negative exemplar. 
In a choice between male model and feminine silence, Crenne decides on neither. She asserts 
narrative control over the Angoysses and a certain degree of hermeneutic control over it in her 
Epistres, uncompromisingly responding to the voices of her potential male detractors. The 
construction of her authorship and the writing of her desire is all her own, not reassigned to more 
competent male speakers within the text or elsewhere. She is the authority on her desire and the 
language in which it is written.  
Crenne’s stance on female speech is therefore altogether different and more complex than 
the three defensive strategies discussed above allow. We would think that women writers would 
want to reclaim what had been denied them in conduct literature or other writing against women. 
However, a female character that is both morally upright and eloquent does not seem to have 
much narrative or moral potential. Good women are not eloquent, and eloquent women are not 
good. It appears that female authority operates on a principle of exclusion: for one woman to be 
granted permission to write, there must be a woman who moves back into silence. One woman’s 
writing precludes other women’s speaking. Hélisenne’s silence in death gives her book life and 
produces for Dame Hélisenne (and Crenne) the agency and authority the character lacked. The 
circumstances of Hélisenne’s death in the Angoysses is certainly indicative of this divergence: far 
less violent than any of the deaths of garrulous heroines such as Meridienne, Hélisenne merely 
fades out of the physical world in which she suffered so she can join the divine afterlife in spirit 
and the textual world through her book. Her triumph signals on the whole a different 
representation of female loquacity, as it is welcomed into the world of intellectual pursuit and 
print. As a result of her literary output, Hélisenne de Crenne makes many early modern lists 
celebrating the triumphs of the day by inventorying female writers. François de Billon, in his 
1555 Le Fort inexpugnable de l’honneur du Sexe Feminin, offers her works to all “les Francois 
se delectans de Prose.”144  
 
III. Theft and Correction: Crenne’s Dialogic Eloquence 
 
Regrettably, Crenne’s attention to her style turns into her worst nightmare: for some of 
her contemporaries and for some modern scholars, her suitable style comes across as bad rhetoric 
and bad French. Crenne makes excuses for her artlessness, but she was in fact criticized for her 
erudite, Latinate, often overwrought language that, admittedly, does not make for easy reading. 
In this section, I will discuss the reception of Crenne’s writing in terms of her linguistic and 
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imitative practices. ‘Style,’ as discussed above, refers to Crenne’s manner of presenting her 
subject, “sans riens reserver,” and her conception of how such a style will be perceived. Within 
her writing, this conception takes the form of a defensive articulation of her style as it suits the 
expression of desire. Now I turn to ‘style’ as the distinctive appearance of Crenne’s language, 
which I will call her (erudite, Latinate, Middle French) ‘idiom.’  
In his 1549 Défense et illustration de la langue française, Joachim Du Bellay exhorts 
poets to digest Latin properly and fully according to the ‘nature’ of the French language. 
Prosateurs, likewise, seek an equally strong “prose inspirée” (Lecointe 14). However, there is a 
fine line between “enrichir la langue française” with foreign words and “eschorcher” the 
language by stuffing it with too much foreignness. The French humanist, lawyer, and historian 
Étienne Pasquier rather infamously branded Crenne an “escorcheur du latin” in a letter published 
in a collection from 1586. Pasquier, a devotee of Du Bellay’s linguistic project, expressed 
frustration about the state of the French language: “molle,” “corrompue,” and based on a 
“Grammaire toute effeminée,” the “vray françois” was nowhere to be found and, instead, 
everyone “ineptly Italianizes” (Choix de lettres 88-89). He also, erroneously, claims that Crenne 
(who published her first book in 1538) was the inspiration for Rabelais’s “écolier limousin” of 
Pantagruel (published in 1532). This Limousin pretentiously Latinizes his French. Pasquier says: 
 
Le semblable [adapting foreign words properly to French] devons nous faire 
chacun de nous en nostre endroit pour l’ornement de nostre langue, & nous ayder 
mesmes du Grec & du Latin, non pour les escorcher ineptement, comme fit sur 
nostre jeune aage Helisaine, dont nostre gentil Rabelais s’est mocqué fort à 
propos en la personne de l’escolier Limosin, qu’il introduit parlant à Pantagruel 
en un langage escorche-latin. (91) 
 
Thus Crenne is accused of overplaying her erudition through a performance of difficult language. 
Pasquier was not the only one to point out Crenne’s idiom. Later editions of Crenne’s complete 
works remove some of the overt signs of linguistic erudition from the text. These ‘corrections’ 
are framed as a question of understanding, but within the context of defining the national 
language by common usage. For the 1550 edition, the editor Claude Colet felt obligated to 
correct Crenne’s idiom (her “motz obscurs, & trop aprochans du Latin”) to “rend[re] en motz 
plus familiers (et maintenant usitez entre les François) grande partie des termes trop scabreux & 
obscurs” (Angoysses 664). He describes this process in a letter to some women readers who, at a 
dinner party, had read to him from Crenne’s works to show their utility (“bien belle et 
d’edification a toutes gens qui ayment la Vertu”). They had complained about how difficult these 
texts were to read. Colet believes that this obscurity was perhaps intentional, that Crenne “… 
peult estre, avoit usé d’un tel stille, pour ne vouloir estre entendue, fors des personnes plus 
doctes (en frustrant par ce moyen celles de mediocre sçavoir)…” (664). Colet claims to have 
translated Crenne’s writing into a “français usité” while still maintaining “… beaucoup de motz 
et propos deduitz selon le stille poëtique,” that is, making the idiom more accessible without 
losing its pleasing ‘poetic’ quality. He does, however, admit that some of these “propos” are 
untranslatable into “mots familiers” (665). Colet implies in his letter that Crenne suffers no 
“mescontentement” from this translation (664).  
Scholars of our time, too, have dismissed Crenne in part because of her idiom. Jean 
Plattard, notably, says “D’un bout à l’autre du volume, la banalité des pensées et la médiocrité de 
l’invention cherchent à se parer de ce style prétentieux” (57). It is as though we are supposed to 
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understand from such criticism that Crenne believed her choice of idiom to be vital cosmetics in 
a scheme to obscure and smarten a mundane subject matter, the inner workings of the female 
desiring mind; Colet, too, suspected this. Crenne’s highly rhetorical idiom would also be seen, in 
the Renaissance imagination, as a consequence of her gender and as a map of her morals. After 
all, Quintilian labels “effeminate” and “extravagant” any expressions that are cosmetically 
unnecessary to the speech or text (2.5.10-12). It could be concluded then that Crenne, rather than 
finding a style appropriate both to her and to her subject, naively coats her writing with discourse 
she does not understand but blindly reproduces in an effort to lend her text more art.  
Despite these harsh criticisms, Crenne’s works enjoyed considerable success and were 
published in multiple editions up to 1560. Their success may be precisely because they were 
associated thematically and linguistically with other popular works of the time (Conley 323). For 
I must confess now, “sans riens reserver,” that Crenne’s discursive practices – ones that produce 
her own authority – are in fact plagiarized from the texts of male writers, to the extent that her 
authorial self may be construed as solely built upon cobbled-together fragments of other, better 
textual precedents: today, we would find such a practice distasteful. Entire passages of the 
Angoysses can be found in Jean Lemaire de Belges’s Les Illustrations de Gaule et singularitez de 
Troie (1510-1513), Jacopo Caviceo’s Il Peregrino (1508; translated into French in 1527), and 
Giovanni Boccaccio’s L’Elegia di Madonna Fiammetta (ca. 1343; translated into French in 
1532). These are all texts that are, like the Angoysses, invested in the place of female eloquence 
within the vogue for the “écriture amoureuse” of Italian and Spanish sentimental novels. I will 
not dwell at length on the specifics of Crenne’s borrowings. Paule Demats’s critical edition of 
part one of the Angoysses highlights (typographically, in italics and footnotes) the sentences and 
fragments Crenne plagiarizes from the Illustrations, Peregrino, and Fiammetta. They do not 
overwhelm Crenne’s own words by any means. Yet consulting an edition that visually indicates 
slippages between Crenne’s pen and the words of others serves as a patent reminder that 
Crenne’s work, style, and idiom are dialogic in nature and must be understood in the broader 
field of early modern writing practices, particularly the Renaissance theory of imitation. To 
appreciate this dialogic quality of her work, I will now contextualize Crenne’s troubled system of 
communication in “écriture amoureuse” and her idiom: in other words, what her thefts contribute 
to her subject (what she writes and how she writes about it) and to her corrected idiom. 
Crenne appropriates several structural devices and plot points from Peregrino and 
Fiammetta, most importantly the confession and the limitations of language’s usefulness in the 
context of love. The tension between exalting love and vilifying it is central to the Angoysses, 
Fiammetta, and Peregrino, though the latter two applaud the intensity and constancy of their 
lovers more than Crenne’s text does. Fiammetta unfolds much like the Angoysses and it heavily 
influences part one: an older Fiammetta gives an account of a love affair she had when young 
and how her passion was a kind of madness that immunized her to reason. Both texts open with 
summoning readers to therapeutic talk: “Les anxietez et tristesse des miserables (comme je peulx 
penser et conjecturer) se diminuent, quand on les peult declarer à quelque sien amy fidele” 
(Angoysses 96) is an elaboration on Flammette’s  opening “Flamette aux dames: Les douleurs 
des miserables croissent habondanment, quand ilz congoissent ou sentent que aucune a 
compassion” (fo. ii). The monk’s advice to Hélisenne that she share her pain so that it will not 
“croist et multiplie par la taire et cacher” is, likewise, quoted from Flammette (Demats 45). The 
Italian amoureuse is usually seen surrounded by lady friends, being diverted by their songs and 
their love stories. This is an important divergence between Fiammetta and the Angoysses: the 
only women Hélisenne encounters, excepting her female servants, are “mesdisantes” and she 
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turns to her female readership to compensate for her solitude. The Peregrino is less tonally 
significant to the Angoysses, as it recounts the adventures of Peregrino as he tries to woo 
Genevera; this text’s influence is more salient in parts two and three of the Angoysses, as they are 
in the chivalric mode and written from the perspective of the male protagonist. Though it is less 
confessional, Peregrino stages the deaths of its two lovers, who die under similar circumstances 
as Hélisenne and Guenelic, that is, regretting what love has done to their lives. Thus these three 
texts are thematically bound together. 
Both Boccaccio and Caviceo filter women’s experience of desire through their own 
voices. Boccaccio takes on Fiammetta’s narrative first-person to communicate the female 
experience of desire; unlike his Decameron, there is no objective narrator to mediate between 
this feminine voice and the reader, which gives the illusion of autobiography. It is notable that 
the 1532 translation, Flammette, does not name an author, so Crenne may have understood the 
text as a project similar to her own in more ways than plot if she was unaware of its provenance. 
The conceit of Peregrino is that the ghost of Peregrino appears to Caviceo and begs him to write 
his story for him and share it with the world (3-4). Thus Genevera emerges out of a mediation 
between a real man and his apparition-like creation: Genevera is the product of two men’s 
imaginations. This triangulation is striking: Crenne transposes it into the Angoysses and makes it 
exclusively female. 
Both of these Italian texts also demonstrate a keen interest in the rhetoric of women; they 
seem to have given shape to Crenne’s own conception of female speech more than Lemaire’s 
outright antagonism, as discussed in my chapter on Jean Lemaire de Belges.
145
 Genevera is 
perfect in every way: a good woman who speaks well. Genevera is a master rhetorician, often 
astonishing her interlocutor with lively, articulate, intelligent responses in an expanded world 
beyond that limited to two lovers who, like Hélisenne and Guenelic, exchange praises for each 
other’s speech without ever being persuaded by it. For example, when Genevera decides to join a 
convent to escape the amorous pursuits of Peregrino, she convinces her mother of this plan with 
a “prompta e composita risposta cum tanto acume de intellecto, ornate de parole e gravità de 
sententia… Pur cum parole modeste e dolce la persuadeva” (187). Genevera extols the virtues of 
speaking frankly and not feigning or dissimulating; her acts of persuasion are often successful 
(20).  
Fiammetta, by contrast, is a liar. The lying lover is a topos inherited from the likes of 
Ovid, whose Ars amatoria instructs the lover on how to feign and lie to win the beloved, and to 
speak in secret codes with her.
146
 Fiammetta learns the coded language of lovers from Panfilo 
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 See Migiel’s convincing study of women’s rhetorical power in the Decameron. 
146
 Here is a telling example of Ovid’s prescriptive love language: 
Disce bonas artes, moneo, Romana iuventus, 
Non tantum trepidos ut tucare reos; 
Quam populous iudexque gravis lectusque senatus, 
Tam dabit eloquio victa puella manus. 
Sed lateant vires, nec sis in fronte disertus; 
Effugiant voces verba molesta tuae. 
Quis, nisi mentis inops, tenerae declamat amicae? 
Saepe valens odii littera causa fuit. 
Sit tibi credibilis sermo consuetaque verba, 
Blanda tamen, praesens ut videare loqui. (1.459-470) 
(Young men of Rome, I advise you to learn the arts of the pleader, not so much for the sake of some poor wretch at 
the bar, but because women are moved, as much as the people or senate, possibly more than a judge, conquered by 
eloquent words, but dissemble your powers, and don’t attempt to look learned, let your periods shun rancorous terms 
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such that “… in brieve spazio… io con una finta novella non dessi risposta dicevole” (34). This 
is a deliberate instruction in fiction-making, where a specific rhetorical skill set is transferred 
from one person to another. In the Angoysses, there are no lessons in lying. Love’s effects on 
Hélisenne and her language use are more immediate and framed as far less playful than in 
Fiammetta. The virtuous, chaste Hélisenne, who “… jusques à ce temps avoi[t] usé de regards 
simple et honnestes [towards men],” upon seeing Guenelic for the first time, instantly falls for 
him (106). After one restless night following her exposure to love, when her husband notices a 
change in her “contenance,” Hélisenne resorts to a quick lie about the legal matter that had 
brought her and her husband to that town: “en grand promptitude trouvay une artificiele 
mensonge.” Unlike Fiammetta, Hélisenne learns this skill of fictionalizing from no one: it just 
comes to her as a response to male questioning. Hélisenne will always, to varying degrees of 
success, try to fabricate lies to disguise what her body, face, and gaze threaten to expose: her 
physicality provides the “indices evidens, gestes exterieures, et mouvemens inconstans” that give 
the truth away. Hélisenne has become a liar, though not a very capable one, as her husband rarely 
believes her. Indeed, I would suggest from this congruence between Fiammetta/Fiammetta and 
Hélisenne/Angoysses that it is likely a prerequisite of the confessional mode of writing that the 
character-narrator begin as a dissimulator: that she must be a sinner of some stripe before she can 
take up a practice of truth-telling, that she must first become familiar with rhetorical masking 
before she can endeavor to write. The idealized Genevera may be frank precisely because she is 
not a writer nor does she become one. 
Crenne’s idiom – its erudite, Latinate, ‘artful’ quality in Middle French – is actually quite 
common for the first half of the sixteenth century. The linguist Alexandre Lorian says that the 
tendencies to amplify and to complicate sentence structure are, in fact, two of the major 
hallmarks of sixteenth-century prose and Crenne is a representative of that accepted “style fleuri” 
(9). Eric MacPhail too sees Rabelais’s “écolier limousin” as a figure for the “European vogue of 
Latinate diction and obscure and archaic styles” that “belongs to a context of lexical 
experimentation and linguistic hybridism… in the debate over the meaning and authority of 
usage” (875). So it is somewhat perplexing that Crenne’s idiom receives such criticism when it is 
quite conventional artful writing that was, on occasion, ‘corrected’ via translation into a more 
legible idiom. The idiom of Peregrino is just as criticized as Crenne’s. Its obscure Latinate 
terminology was significantly corrected in Italian editions subsequent to its republication in 1513 
and its French translation appears to have been edited as well.
147
  Its idiom reflects, however, 
common practices in the literature of the time: a “lingua cortegiana” for a “letteratura cortegiana” 
(Peregrino vii). Correction is, then, a sign of linguistic shifts, reading practices, and a widening 
readership that wants to read in an idiom more like their own. 
I propose that Pasquier’s objection to Crenne’s idiom was instigated more by a 
generational conflict than a linguistic one. In a sense, Pasquier is reacting to the pastness of 
Crenne’s idiom. His loyalties were to the Pléiade who, in many respects, sought to define 
themselves by rejecting the previous generation of poets, the Rhétoriqueurs. Crenne owes her 
style partly to Jean Lemaire de Belges, a late Rhétoriqueur who represents “un jalon important 
                                                                                                                                                             
of abuse. You would be out of your mind to declaim to your darling; even in letters beware using litigious terms. Let 
the style you employ be natural, easy, familiar, coaxing, also, of course, so that she thinks you are there (I cite 
Humphries’s translation 119). 
147
 Griffin 143 n.1. Il Peregrino’s full French title is Dialogue treselegant intitule le Peregrin, traictant de lhonneste 
et pudique amour concilie par pure et sincere vertu traduict de vulgaire Italien en langue Francoyse par maistre 
Francoyse Dassy. Dassy was secretary to Henry, King of Navarre, husband of Marguerite (Griffin 134, 143 n. 5). 
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dans l’introduction en France d’un type de prose à caractère poétique” (Lecointe 43). Studies of 
Crenne’s translation of the Aeneid expose her great debt to Lemaire’s poetic prose. Crenne’s 
translation of an epic turns out to be an elaborate paraphrase of a paraphrase. Christine M. 
Scollen-Jimack concludes that Crenne’s “latinizing style, her extraordinarily obsequious 
dedication to François I, her reliance on medieval commentators, and on the version of the events 
of the Trojan war by Dares and Dictys, her glosses” are writing practices of the Rhétoriqueurs 
(210). Crenne’s Aeneid is the Angoysses in another form, using Virgil and Lemaire as a 
foundation for showcasing her own rhetorical prowess (202). Scollen-Jimack also believes that 
Crenne’s Latin was probably not strong, and that she frequently consulted the Rhétoriqueur 
Octavien de Saint-Gelais’s verse translation of the Aeneid (209). 
Crenne’s theft and idiom inspire a number of questions relevant to my discussion. What 
does it mean for Crenne’s eloquence if it is borrowed? Does knowledge of her plagiarism alter 
how we are to read her construction of authority? Why is she maligned for writing the same way 
as these earlier authors? Why are they not labeled “eschorcheurs” as well? It is, however, easy to 
justify setting these questions aside. The principle of Renaissance practices of imitation often 
means that “toute écriture est d’abord réécriture” (Rigolot, “Écrire au féminin” 6). This is a 
period in which attitudes toward literary tradition and imitation allow the construction of 
authority through, for instance, gathering from other sources and organizing fragments into a 
commonplace book as a means to “authoritative self-fashioning” through consultation, as Mary 
Crane has demonstrated (3). David Quint has shown how ‘origin’ (the allegorical source of a 
text) is more crucial to authority than originality in this time (x). Terence Cave’s seminal work 
on Renaissance writing practices, The Cornucopian Text, singles out one of the topoi of imitation 
and translation (both acts of transfer) as the “desire to appropriate or naturalize an alien 
discourse.”148 Crenne thus participates in the writing practices common to the period. Her 
sources therefore lend her literary authority by their words and association. 
In their work on Crenne, scholars have found her borrowings to be productive sites for 
investigating literary and generic developments and women’s writing more generally. I have 
already mentioned Lisa Neal’s argument that Crenne’s writing is a product of her past reading 
rather than her past experience.
149
 Jean-Phillipe Beaulieu, an astute Crenne scholar, argues that 
intertextuality, as well as being a common practice of the time, becomes a “… justified product 
of a démarche scriptuaire féminine, the first step of which would be imitation of male texts” 
(“Erudition and Aphasia” 37). Robert D. Cottrell has an alternative explanation. Rather than 
assume that female erotic desire has no creative language of its own and that therefore it must 
mimic or steal from male discourse, Cottrell posits that Crenne deploys a “male pathology” to 
depict a woman and her idiom exactly as men imagine them to be in order to prove her mastery 
over male discourse (“Female Subjectivity and Libidinal Infractions” 14). 
I have been arguing that each choice Crenne makes participates in her project of 
persuasion against love. These choices establish her as the dominant voice in and of her text by 
staging agonistic encounters on the narrative, generic, and thematic levels. Essentially, my 
argument is that Crenne culls from literary and rhetorical tradition to create a persona who rules 
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 The Cornucopian Text 35. Cave’s remarks in pages 35-77 elaborate on an early modern theory of imitation, in 
which “The reader must devour his models, destroying their alien substance so that they may be regenerated in his 
living utterance as a product of his own essential nature” (45-46). 
149
 The Torments of Love xxv. Along similar lines, Tom Conley suggestively proposes that Crenne’s borrowings are 
signs of her “urgency of writing” (327). Her reading existence disguises her writing existence: Hélisenne scrapes out 
a “vicarious existence… via writing itself” as she lifts passages from male writers. In this scenario, she hides her 
words in between theirs such that her husband cannot differentiate them (330). 
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her textual universe by diverse procedures of methodical argumentation: in other words, as a 
rhetorician partially camouflaged by the confessional mode of writing that she develops between 
truth and fiction. Diegetic persuasion and eloquence are staged but ineffective, leaving Dame 
Hélisenne (and thus Crenne) to be the true persuasive voice of not only the text’s primary 
assertion, but also of her own undoubted authority. I hesitate to go as far as Cottrell, because an 
adoption of “male pathology” could be construed as parodic, which I do not see in Crenne’s 
writing. Crenne certainly reacts to male authority and discourse by absorbing it. Her broken quill 
and her borrowed eloquence – emblems of the fictionality of her texts, her claims to gentler 
forms of persuasion through the confessional mode, her plot thefts and idiom emulation – are the 
conditions for creating female agency (as a writer) that emerge out of Crenne’s dialogic and 
agonistic notion of literary production. 
 
IV. “La chose contentieuse”: The Translatio of Heroes and Books  
 
In this concluding section, I want to address Crenne’s use of geography and chivalric 
romance in her production of fiction and authority in parts two and three of the Angoysses. This 
discussion will present the Angoysses as a case study of early modern “textual promiscuity,” or 
generic hybridity (Pré-histoires 12). The narrative and generic complexity of the Angoysses, and 
the specific plot developments of the text’s conclusion, expose fissures in traditional concepts of 
the source and nature of authority. So from correction and imitation as forms of idiomatic 
translation and textual transfer, I turn now to translation as displacement in space. 
Early criticism of Hélisenne de Crenne doubted the value of parts two and three of the 
Angoysses. I must reiterate again that the privileging of part one has been mainly due to its 
perceived ‘modernity’ and its place in the history of the novel; the turn to chivalric romance 
comes across as a regrettable generic regression in that history. More recent criticism, by Jean-
Philippe Beaulieu notably, shows keen interest in the implications of the mixture of sentimental 
and chivalric prerogatives, when descriptions of adventure (masculine activities of combat, 
tournaments, navigations) bristle against expressions of intense feeling.
150
 The Angoysses 
purports to have a didactic project of persuasion in mind – to teach ladies to avoid love – but it 
often does so erratically and without much conviction. If the avoidance of love is the text’s 
intended message, then parts two and three are indeed superfluous and even detrimental to that 
message. What better way to teach the dangers of extramarital love than by ending the book with 
the bleak image of the lady locked in a tower, her “scelere et maulvais” lover nowhere to be 
found (188)? However, I see parts two and three as necessary continuations to complete 
Crenne’s mission of textual authority. The chivalric belongs to the agonistic quality of the text’s 
very fabric. In these sections of the text, Crenne advances her feminist ideology by mapping both 
the tradition of translatio imperii et studii and the debate of arms versus letters along a gender 
and generic divide that privileges the literary output of the female writer over the triumphs of 
male heroism.  
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 Beaulieu, “Données chevaleresques” 74. For how the chivalric nature of parts two and three gives a new shape to 
the pact between Crenne and her readers, see Beaulieu, “Les données chevaleresques du contrat de lecture dans les 
Angoysses.” For how these sections of the Angoysses do not conform to the conventions of the chivalric novel, see 
Beaulieu, “Où est le héros? La vacuité de la quête chevaleresque dans les Angoysses;” and Baker, “France’s First 
Sentimental Novel and Novels of Chivalry.” Baker provides examples of Arthurian romances and chivalric novels 
that Crenne may have known (36). For errancy as the primary marker of romance, see Parker, Inescapable Romance, 
chapter 1.  
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I will now trace the itineraries of Hélisenne, Guenelic and Quezinstra, and the text that 
becomes the Angoysses. It will become clear that the path of translatio is laden with its own 
authority that Crenne exploits for her own purposes. The commonplace of translatio imperii et 
studii holds that there is a seamlessness to the continuity of empires (the political power and 
legitimacy of imperium) and their arts and learning (knowledge and authority represented by 
studium). Greece paves the way for Rome, and Rome leads to the great (northern) nations of 
early modern Europe. This sense of translatio as transfer is a narrative of displacement and 
progress, providing a natural order and ordering of the (European) world.
151
 In the Book of 
Daniel, Daniel interprets Nebuchadnezzar’s dream of four giants as the sign of the succession 
and destruction of four empires, after which the kingdom of God will reign on earth forever 
(2.31-2.45). Chrétien de Troyes’s Cligès (ca. 1170) recounts how translatio imperii et studii 
made its way to France, where “science” finds its ultimate, perfect resting place.152 To 
compensate for Hélisenne’s own spatial limitations, Crenne sends her hero out to reenact the 
path of translatio, bringing that authority back home to France with him. Guenelic’s travels take 
him east, west, and then north, an itinerary intended to redeem him of his discourteous behavior 
from part one. But as Crenne sends him on this route, she questions its very value and ends up 
supplanting it with other itineraries, that of death and her book. This process, then, involves not 
only the horizontal axis of the hero’s travels on earth, but also a vertical axis between the 
underworld, earth, and divine paradise. 
Hélisenne does not circulate in a significant way, at least not in the terms of the greater 
European geographic space that we associate with translatio. Her movements are limited to a 
small area of France and, at the end of part one, she is taken out of circulation when her husband 
locks her in a tower. Her movements show, by their very limitation, how Hélisenne is forced to 
retreat into her mind and her fantasy, and eventually writing, in order to find a place for self-
expression. The world is not open to her as it will be opened up for Guenelic. The spaces in part 
one – the lodgings, the temple, and the law court – are deliberately left vague and are described 
minimally. Just as her husband has no name, Dame Hélisenne leaves these spaces unspecific, 
using infinite articles and circumlocution to refer to them: “une ville,” “un logis,” “un temple,” 
“le lieu ou on plaidoyt les causes.” This is in stark contrast to the very literary route of famous 
places and names that Guenelic and Quezinstra will trace: an abundance of names replaces lack 
of specificity. Once Hélisenne’s husband becomes aware of her extramarital desire, he tries to 
control that desire through restrictions in space: he forbids her from leaving their lodgings and 
even changes lodgings so Guenelic will not know where they are; when Hélisenne does circulate 
in public, she must be accompanied by her husband; when her eyes betray her desire, her 
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 “Roman reverence for Greek culture was simply a corollary of the desire to displace that culture, and eliminate its 
hegemonic hold, through contestation and thus difference” (Copeland 30). See also Goez, chapters 1 and 2 for 
biblical and Classical sources for translatio in the Middle Ages. 
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 Si que ja mais de France n’isse 
L’ennors qui s’i est arrestee. 
Dex l’avoit as altres prestee, 
Que des Grezois ne des Romains 
Ne dit en mais ne plus ne mains, 
D’eus est la parole remise 
Et esteinte la vive brese. (lines 37-44) 
(et que jamais ne sorte de France / la gloire qui s’y est arrêtée. / Dieu l’avait prêtée aux autres, / car quant aux Grecs 
et aux Romains, / le chapitre est clos désormais. / On a cessé de parler d’eux, / elle est éteinte, leur vive braise). 
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husband beats her. Movement, both of her body and of her body in space, becomes a sign of her 
marital disobedience. 
These limitations cause Hélisenne to seek and retreat to “lieux secrets” where, most 
often, she unburdens her heart to herself and delights in fantasy: “je me retiray en lieu secret et 
taciturne, pour plus solitairement continuer mes fantasieuses pensées…” (187). These ‘secret 
places’ are often found adjacent to public space such as the temple and law court, where it is 
likely that her reveries can be interrupted by their very object, Guenelic himself. Her bedroom is 
also a refuge, but one that is often violently disturbed by her husband. Her bed is not a comfort to 
her because that is a space she must share and in which she is expected to share her body unless 
she can justify abstinence: her husband “s’approcha de moy, pour parvenir au plaisir de Venus, 
mais en grand promptitude me retiray loing de luy…” (119-120). The only space that is certain 
to provide comfort is her mind – her “fantasieuses pensées” – a space that is unregulated by her 
husband and that, as Dame Hélisenne, she eagerly shares with her reading public. Restriction of 
movement, then, forces Hélisenne to begin carving out a new kind of space for herself and her 
‘fantasy,’ a space that eventually becomes écriture, where “fantasies,” “angoisses” and “écrits” 
become interchangeable. 
 Hélisenne therefore has freedom of thought, but even that proves sometimes to be 
insufficient as a replacement for freedom of movement. Her turbulent mind is not a stable refuge, 
so she turns to the vertical axis for a different kind of displacement. She is constantly describing 
herself as in a perpetual state between life and death. In her suffering, Hélisenne imagines the 
relief brought by death in terms of passive transport, a translation of sorts into the underworld. 
When her husband announces her impending imprisonment in a castle tower, she begs Charon to 
carry her over the River Styx and for Mercury to bring her to the Elysian Fields, using passive 
constructions.
153
 Even movements towards death require male supernatural intervention. Her 
imprisonment in “la grosse tour” not only takes her out of circulation, but its ascension and 
height also mock her desire for vertical movement: transported, but not translated into a new 
state connoting some kind of progress beyond literary productivity (213). This relationship with 
death sums up Hélisenne’s relationship to movement: obstructions, both physical and moral, 
prevent freedom of movement. It is in this state of relative immobility, emotional instability, and 
solitude that she begins to draft her Angoysses in the hopes that it will reach Guenelic: it is the 
only recourse to disobedience she has left.  
While Hélisenne is only able to occupy the spaces that are allotted to her by her husband, 
Guenelic has no such limitations on his movement. He and Quezinstra participate in iconic 
moments in Renaissance culture that allow the two heroes to take on the roles of knights, 
protectors, diplomats, councilors, and law-makers. The path of translatio thus becomes the path 
of romance and humanism. There are three main stops on Guenelic’s road to redemption along 
the horizontal axis of east-west-north. First is the island of Cyprus, where Guenelic and 
Quezinstra become knights in the service of a great Duke. Second, they fight in a Trojan War in 
miniature in the name of the lady of Eliveba,
154
 of unknown location but somewhere between 
their tour of the Trojan coast and Rhodes. Third, in the west, they defend the monarchical state 
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 “O Alecto, Thesiphone et Megera filles d’Acheron l’horrible fleuve, à tous vos cheveulx colubrins presentez vous 
à moy, apres que le vilain Charon m’aura pass e oultre le fleuve appel  Stix: et me transmigrez pour perpetuelle 
habitation en la profondité des abismes appellées chaos, qui est l’eternelle confusion: car je me repute indigne à 
l’occasion de mes tant multiples faultes, et exhorbitans pechez: que Mercure recepteur et conducteur des ames, 
messager des dieux, me conduyse aux champs Helisiens, ou est le sejour des bienheureulx…” (209, emphases mine). 
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 “Eliveba” is an anagram of Abbeville, the village in Picardy where Marguerite (de) Briet was born. In many 
respects, this lady is a double of Hélisenne herself. 
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and the just prince’s right to rule in Bouvaque, a made-up city in Italy. Their patrons – the Duke, 
the lady, and the just prince – each offer them a permanent place at their courts, an ending to 
their travels. This kind of social recognition would, in a different text perhaps, mark the end of 
the hero’s journey and transformation, when the knight errant ceases to wander and finds a place 
after continuous displacement.
155
 But love gets in the way and insists that they wander further. 
Unlike other narratives that take advantage of the redemptive tour du monde trope, there 
is no logic to the movements of these two heroes apart from a casual touristic interest in taking in 
the sites seen by mythical heroes. Crenne frames part two of the Angoysses as an effort to redeem 
Guenelic who opens the section with a lament: “Helas moy paovre miserable, qui trop tard 
congnoys mon imprudence et inconstance…” (232). The male-authored texts from which Crenne 
draws typically feature a male lead traveling great distances, pivoting around his immobile lady 
to whom he eventually returns. In two of Crenne’s source texts for this part of the novel, Jehan 
de Saintré (1456) and Il Peregrino (1508), the lovers are sent out by their ladies for the specific 
purpose of self-improvement. Angoysses part two begins as a promise of redemption in matters 
of love, but there is no sign that a transformation takes place. The event that should have been 
the point culminant of their transformations – their knighthood – takes place at their first stop, 
not their last (Beaulieu, “Données” 78-79). Guenelic says that his quest for Hélisenne will outdo 
the voyages of those heroes: this translates, however, to an unfortunate thoroughness in the re-
creation of those travels, as if our hero suffers from being too well-read (246). They are not 
delayed in their quest by pirates, enslavement, or storms like Peregrino and other heroes of 
chivalric romance; their travels are marked by more agency, but no direction. There is still an 
aimlessness to their wanderings: Guenelic never even asks where Hélisenne is. In fact, if their 
quest comes up in conversation, Guenelic is too ashamed to admit that love is the reason for their 
travels. He is chastised by the prince of Bouvaque for allowing love to conquer his reason (383-
394). Such encounters reproduce the agonistic quality of part one, staging a debate between two 
people, and they maintain the Angoysses’s project of persuasion. The prince suggests that 
Guenelic’s love is perverse, since it takes him away from success as a knight and a permanent 
place, dragging him away from masculine pursuits back into the world of the sentimental. Love 
should not take precedence over chivalric prowess. Guenelic’s redemption pulls at the fabric of 
the text, revealing a certain incompatibility of the two genres that Crenne capitalizes on to secure 
her hero in a certain limbo of generic space. 
The path of translatio therefore becomes an itinerary of stagnation, of tourism and 
reenactment for their own sakes. When the two heroes finally reach France in part three, 
translatio is not given any value. Visiting ancient places does not guarantee a triumph or 
recognition at home. In fact, Guenelic and Quezinstra are treated with derision and malice upon 
reentry, specifically because they have traveled far. Their welcome to the town near Hélisenne’s 
tower prison is telling. The townsfolk, “qui n’avoient charité ny amour,” delight in provoking 
people “à courroux” (420). They jeer at the heroes’ (apparently visible) displacement in time and 
space: “messieurs s’il vous plaist, vous nous racompterez de voz nouvelles, venez vous de faire 
la guerre aux Macedoniaens? aux Arrabiens? ou à ceulx d’Athenes? ne vous soit ennuy, pour 
nous solacier de nous reciter de voz faicts d’armes” (420). The townsfolk also insinuate that the 
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 Antoine de la Sale’s Jehan de Saintré influenced Crenne’s writing and is indicative of this kind of conclusion to a 
chivalric romance: it is My Lady’s financial generosity, not geographic displacement, that transforms Jehan, turning 
him into a proper lover and helping him advance socially. When he returns to find that My Lady has taken up with 
an Abbott, he tells the tale to the king and queen and his journey comes at an end: his story is coterminous with his 
love affair. 
111 
 
only type of “jouxte” these knights excel at is of the “nocturne” variety (421). At the very 
moment when the two heroes are about to find Hélisenne, all that they did in part two is voided 
of meaning. Maybe the products of translatio are not as welcome in France as Cligès suggests.  
Crenne thus indicates that this attempt to transform something symbolic (translatio) into 
something physical and real (a journey) does not carry the same cultural weight; she, too, may 
feel the rupture between Classical past and French present that other early modern writers 
experience acutely.
156
 I propose a reading of this unsuccessful translation as a self-serving 
gesture on Crenne’s part. This is an interpretation that combines the rather dismissive idea that 
she continues the Angoysses just so that she can her hand at every genre with the primary 
antagonism that is dramatized in part two, figured dialogically by the agendas of Guenelic and 
Quezinstra. This is the debate between arms and letters, the question over what profession is 
proper for young noblemen to pursue. Since Hélisenne is a woman, she cannot make this choice, 
but she can decide for her hero and, in so doing, Crenne create a symbolic professional space for 
her entire persona.  
Dame Hélisenne announces from the outset of part two that it concerns military pursuits. 
In the opening letter, alongside her defense of Guenelic, Dame Hélisenne takes up her quill with 
“ma tremblante et debile main” to show men’s side of narrative (228). She claims that part of her 
project for this book is to inspire modern men to martial activity, just as Homer’s Iliad so moved 
Alexander the Great: “Et en raison de ce, j’ay indubitable foy que l’œuvre presente excitera, non 
seulement les gentilz hommes modernes, au marcial exercice” (229). This is a somewhat jarring 
shift in the book’s overall message from love to war, that a book about love can motivate a 
“posterité future d’estre vrays imitateurs” of the art of war. Guenelic’s introduction to his side of 
the story includes his youthful vacillation between pursuing arms and pursuing letters, “l’art 
militaire” or “l’œuvre littéraire.”157 Guenelic never becomes a man of letters. He is pushed into 
knighthood by circumstance and by Quezinstra, who argues, several times over, that the military 
art will give him courage, which is more pleasing to ladies than learning (295). Though the 
heroes are learned and can quote the proper sources in their interminable debates for and against 
love, the two heroes leave behind erudition as a valid life choice, exchanging letters for swords: 
“œuvres viriles et de louenges dignes” (238). In fact, the main antagonism between Guenelic and 
Quezinstra is displaced from arms versus letters to arms versus love because letters is not their 
prerogative; this reflects as well the confrontation between the Angoysses’ generic duality. 
Whereas arms and letters have a relationship of dependence (letters rely on the success of arms), 
love destabilizes what the profession of arms seeks to secure and place, as we see with 
Guenelic’s continual displacement for love’s sake. Essentially, then, Crenne sends her hero out 
on the path of translatio to take him out of letters and then empties translatio of its symbolic 
meaning when the two lovers meet again: his path of translatio is folded into her Angoysses. 
Crenne therefore uses genre to divide her prerogatives from Hélisenne’s double and potential 
rival in narrative, Guenelic. In this manner, Dame Hélisenne becomes the sole writer – a woman 
of letters – the only person with authority with claims to intellectual activity in the Angoysses.  
Dame Hélisenne’s reassertion over her text is manifest in the opening pages of part three 
and, significantly, with a return to confession. She amends her encouragement of the military art 
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 See Greene, The Light in Troy. 
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  “Moy estant en ma florissante jeunesse, aagé de vingt et deux ans, j’estoye en varieté de pensée, en vacillant par 
plusieurs foys pour ne scavoir bien discerner: lequel me seroit plus utile de m’occuper à l’art militaire, ou de 
continuer l’œuvre litteraire, à laquelle j’avoye donné commencement pour parvenir de m’exalter jusques au siege de 
Minerve” (233-234). 
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in part two to restate her claim about avoiding sensuality, which is what drives her “assiduité 
d’escripre” (399). The chivalric romance has not overwhelmed the sentimental novel. What is 
more, to further the text’s adamancy about the avoidance of love, Hélisenne completes her 
confession from part one by finally repenting. As she lays dying, she philosophizes about 
mortality to Guenelic and her imminent “transmigration;” even in her last moments, she attempts 
to persuade, but Guenelic will not follow her example (467). Then she turns away from him to 
address God directly and repent: “… j’espere tant en ta divine clemence et infinye bonté, que 
mon oraison ne sera enervée, mais te sera acceptable… voyant comme je manifeste mon grand 
peché, je accuse ma vituperation et turpitude, et deteste mes vices” (468-470). The confessional 
act begun in part one is finally complete. This is the logical conclusion to Hélisenne’s as a 
negative exemplar in a text that constructs itself as agonistic: Hélisenne, now both exalting and 
vilifying love, dies so that her book may continue to do the same. The confessional mode of 
writing without repentance engages the readers’ compassion and belief. What follows 
Hélisenne’s repentance defies plausibility and can only be read a symbolic apotheosis through 
publication that circumvents finding an authority in a source along traditional lines. 
I turn now to “la chose contentieuse,” the text-within-the-text that becomes the Angoysses 
(503). I described earlier Hélisenne’s attempts to control the circulation of her “amours trop 
publiées et vulgarisées” (142). Composed in private and in secret, in oral and in written forms, it 
still makes its way into the world despite Hélisenne, culminating in “l’œuvre presente” (233). In 
the final pages of the Angoysses, Hélisenne dies mid-escape, a mere four miles away from her 
tower, and Guenelic follows her shortly after (460). Quezinstra is about to kill himself when 
Mercury arrives to take the souls of the two lovers to the Elysian Fields (487). After being 
excluded from the text as a mere figure for an impossible human eloquence, Mercury himself is 
finally summoned to Hélisenne and to the Angoysses. The god spots the book, which had fallen 
from Hélisenne’s pocket, and he takes it with him to the underworld where he deposits the souls 
before flying to Mount Olympus to present the book as a gift to Minerva. Venus declares that the 
book should be given to her because it is about love, “choses amoureuses et veneriennes;” 
Minerva maintains that it is about “choses belliqueuses,” her domain (501). Their debate 
reiterates the arms versus love problem of part two with even more attention to genre. Mercury 
leaves before Jupiter makes his judgment on the genre, so we never know if the arms versus love 
debate is ever resolved. This is how the novel ends: Mercury returns to earth to command 
Quezinstra to get the book published in Paris. Hélisenne’s suffering body – her “angoysses” – is 
replaced by the Angoysses douloureuses.  
Thanks to this supernatural intervention, the book is able to bypass the horizontal, earthly 
geographic displacement of Greece-Italy-France that is required of the book’s hero. Instead, it is 
made to circulate along a more successful vertical axis of the underworld, earth, and Mount 
Olympus. The book undergoes a symbolic death and rebirth, and its own merit and interest links 
Greece directly to France in a reverse route. At this point, the two lovers have managed to finally 
achieve a place in the vertical axis that they desired all along, death, the only way out of the 
irresolvable debate between reason and passion. Quezinstra also leaves circulation for good, 
becoming a hermit who tends to the lovers’ temple. Only the book remains in circulation.  
As a conclusion, I would like to turn to the adjective “contentieuse,” for everything seems 
in the end to pivot more around the book than the immobile heroine. This adjective comes from 
the verb contendre, to dispute, to quarrel; it takes on a litigious connotation. This definition 
makes sense in the context of the many debates of this agonistic text: between Venus and 
Minerva, between love and arms, between sentimental and chivalric novel, between didacticism 
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(message of avoiding love) and failure of that didactic message (fame achieved via writing about 
love), how we read Hélisenne and Dame Hélisenne separately, the scenes of failed persuasion 
that lend construction to the book as a whole. As I have argued, Crenne does not intend to solve 
any of these, but rather continuously point towards herself as the mastermind behind keeping 
these debates on equal footing and thus emerging as the voice of authority over all.  
The adjective “contentieuse” also brings to mind “content,” contentment, from contenter, 
something that is satisfied in itself without desiring something else. Hélisenne was always 
seeking a private place to indulge in her “fantasieuses pensées,” thoughts which both are her 
“angoysses” and become the sentimental novel Angoysses. Crenne’s process of self-authorization 
is achieved almost through sleight of hand, through the elimination and displacement of the other 
contenders for both authority and authorship. Her fellow narrators follow a more traditional, but 
ultimately unnecessary, path. She removes her heroes from the site of writing – which she 
articulates as an inner, private, domestic, immobile space – and from the occupation of writing 
and letters to show that translatio does not have to be an integral part of the creation of fiction 
and authority. Then she removes her self as Hélisenne. The three characters are taken out of 
circulation at the very moment when the book is multiplied and put into successful circulation: 
the book is the only thing left; its end marks the end of illicit desire that is never “content;” the 
desiring character cedes to the writer. The heroes and the didactic message were pretexts for 
writing: the project was always about a kind of self-authorization that is and should be slightly 
disobedient, “plus voluntaire que sage” even (155).  
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Coda 
“Est-ce pas ainsi que je parle par tout?” 
Michel de Montaigne’s Praise of Jacques Amyot 
 
This dissertation opened with the Judgment of Paris, where three different eloquent 
means of persuasion were in competition with each other. Minerva’s “eloquence non vaine,” 
even bound as it is to humanist ideology and objectives, nevertheless failed to persuade Paris to 
choose her as the most beautiful. The paradoxical vanity of Classical eloquence in Renaissance 
imaginative writing is that, although it is traditionally seen as an indomitable civilizing force and 
irresistible transformative power, it often does not work when it should, and sometimes it works 
when it should not. The writers of my corpus thematize eloquence and then explore the issues 
surrounding what it might mean to make eloquence French, fully utilizing the possibilities and 
hybridity of imaginative writing to do so. I have argued that a characteristic of the emerging 
discourse of imaginative writing is that it stages the failure of more aggressive forms of 
persuasion by both drawing from and drawing away from the discourse of rhetoric. Dramatizing 
the ‘problem’ of eloquence therefore makes room for the text’s own persuasive maneuvers, 
summoning mercurial readers, who are in the know, to participate in the game of meaning. The 
result is very self-aware texts, conscious of the role persuasion plays in their own construction. 
Since imaginative writing is meant to borrow from rhetoric, then the problem of eloquence 
means literature itself is at stake: literature can be rhetorical, but it refuses to be eloquent. 
Eloquence is, then, a productive point of negotiation between the demands of Classical and 
humanist conceptions of language and literature and the resulting paradigm shifts as those 
conceptions are confronted by new ideas about writing, rhetoric, and the vernacular. Agonistic 
language and problems of persuasion emerge as conditions for a new literary discourse from 
earlier rhetorical traditions. 
Related to the project of making eloquence French is the rising question of how to make 
the French language eloquent. Jean Lemaire de Belges and Hélisenne de Crenne share an ornate 
and Latinate French that is later criticized and rejected. François Rabelais, Mireille Huchon 
demonstrates, creates a language located in between their intense artificiality and the common 
usage of the decades after the period under study here (“La Prose d’art” 299-302). In the first 
half of the sixteenth century, the concern was to strengthen the French language by imitating 
Latin and Classical rhetoric in an effort to create a strong vernacular. Pierre Fabri tellingly says 
in his 1521 Le Grand et vrai art de pleine rhétorique that: “Aulcuns ignorans… se veuillent 
efforcer en leur ignorance de soustenir que il n’est point de rhetorique aultre que la naturelle 
acoustumance, et que l’en doit parler en françoys ainsi comme il vient a la bouche, sans y garder 
ordre” (8). French without the trappings of rhetoric was practically inconceivable.158  
I would like to end my study with a brief discussion of Michel de Montaigne who, in his 
project of writing the self, runs counter to Fabri’s prescriptions. He does not seek out a rhetorical 
style or Classical eloquence, but, instead, a French “comme il vient a la bouche.” In “Sur des 
vers de Virgile,” Montaigne admonishes himself for absorbing too much and too well the styles 
and ornaments of his reading that then influence his writing. He would rather use phrases “qui 
s’usent emmy les rues françoises; ceux qui veulent combatre l’usage par la grammaire se 
moquent” (853). He does not correct his idiosyncratic verbal habits if they are not eloquent: 
Montaigne does not seek eloquence, only to write the way he speaks (“Est-ce pas ainsi que je 
                                                 
158
 For more on the history of this paradigm shift, see Trudeau. 
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parle par tout?”). This anti-prescriptivist intention turns to usage as the location of language’s 
value. Usage, he maintains, is created by “beaux espris” and innovation, rather than the processes 
of “estirant et ployant” that take language away from “la route commune” (851). He conceives of 
no other way to represent himself “au naturel” than his own “façon… mienne ordinaire” (“De la 
ressemblance des enfans aux peres,” 2: 37, 763). 
Montaigne has many qualms about rhetoric, far too numerous and complex to enumerate 
here. Much of his attitude toward language can be summed up by this remark, from “De 
l’institution des enfans” (1: 26): “De vray, toute belle peincture s’efface aisément par le lustre 
d’une verité simple et naifve” (169). Language is, often, an undesirable mask and obstacle. 
Montaigne’s admiration for Jacques Amyot shows us the kind of language he values in his 
reading as well as for his writing. He sees Amyot as a model for French prose, and attributes to 
him the beginnings of a new eloquence, based not on the previous generation’s concern for 
ornament and Latin emulation, but rather one that feels more natural and even conversational, 
because actual speech and dialogue give more life to language, as he says in “De l’art de 
conferer” (3: 8, 900). Montaigne would prefer an eloquence that is “nerveuse et solide,” which 
ravishes by its substance, to any other eloquence: in other words, he seeks to regain the orality of 
an eloquent performance by redefining it by the parameters of naturalness and conversation (3: 5, 
850). Montaigne opens “A demain les affaires” (2: 4) with this assessment of Amyot’s 
translation of Plutarch: “Je donne avec raison, ce me semble, la palme à Jacques Amiot sur tous 
nos escrivains François, non seulement pour la naïfveté et pureté du langage, en quoy il surpasse 
tous autres…” (344). Amyot’s ‘modern’ French expression triumphs when, “toutefois son stile 
est plus chez soy, quand il n’est pas pressé et qu’il roulle à son aise.” In other words, Amyot’s 
style is pleasing to Montaigne when it seems native to Amyot (“chez soy”) and not stilted by 
unyielding adherence to the eloquence of someone else. Montaigne contrasts his delight in 
reading Amyot with the ‘bloodlessness’ of other texts written in French (1: 26, 146) and the 
lackluster French poetry written in imitation of Ronsard and Du Bellay (1: 26, 171).  
On his own merit as well as his ideas for a written French that has some life to it, 
Montaigne signals a paradigm shift through the invention of a new literary form and the creation 
of a baroque vernacular that suits his subject. No longer truly invested in “making eloquence 
French” or “making French eloquent,” he reveres a style that is personal, a bit unpolished, and 
constructed in part by the rejection of Classical eloquence that began earlier in the century on a 
thematic and ideological level. 
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